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I. INTRODUCTION
Evidentiary privileges enable parties and potential witnesses' to refuse to
disclose relevant and material evidence,' both at trial3 and during the course of
pretrial discovery.4 Because these privileges contravene the public's right to
every person's evidence,5 as well as the corresponding obligation of every citi-
* B.B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; Shareholder, Ryley, Carlock & Applewhite, Phoenix,
Arizona.
I See Farley v. Farley, 952 F. Supp. 1232, 1238 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (noting that a privilege
may be asserted by "a person who is not a party to the proceeding in which the privilege is
involved") (quoting 1 CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 72.1, 101
(John W. Strong et al. eds., 4th ed. 1992); Rhode Island v. Almonte, 644 A.2d 295, 298 (R.I.
1994) ("[T]he holder of a privilege may not be an adverse party to the litigation but may well
be a person who is entirely a stranger to the litigation, excepting insofar as he or she might
be a witness or might have an interest in the material to be disclosed.").
2 See United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 296 (6th Cir. 1978) (Weick, J., dissenting)
(noting that an evidentiary privilege permits its holder "to withhold or to suppress relevant
and material evidence"); Olam v. Congress Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 n.15
(N.D. Cal. 1999) ("A privilege ... vests the holder with a right to refuse to produce other-
wise relevant evidence.").
I See United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589, 597 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("[T]estimonial
privileges, by their very nature, keep relevant and probative evidence from the jury."); Gran-
ite Constr. Co., 330 N.L.R.B. 205, 211 n. 1 (1999) ("[A]II privileges... deprive the parties of
the right to introduce otherwise relevant evidence at trial."); Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44
F.L.R.A. 1021, 1052 (1992) (noting that "a privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the factfinder").
I See Real v. Cont'l Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 213 (N.D. Cal. 1986) ("[E]ven relevant
evidence is not discoverable if such evidence is privileged."). See generally Handgards, Inc.
v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (observing that "the same
rules of privilege govern the scope of discovery as generally govern the admissibility of
evidence at trial").
I See United States v. Dube, 820 F.2d 886, 889 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)). The "long-standing common law precept" that the public
has a right to every person's evidence has been described as "one of the fundamental max-
ims of the law." Davis Enters. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 877 F.2d 1181, 1189 (3d Cir.
1989) (Weis, J., dissenting); see also Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844, 847 (8th Cir.
1929) ("For more than 300 years it has been a maxim that the public has a right to every
man's evidence. Privileges . . . are exceptions to the rule.").
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zen to testify when called upon to do so,6 they have traditionally been looked
upon with disfavor by the courts and other tribunals.7
As the Second Circuit has observed, "the duty to disclose in a court all
pertinent information within one's control, testimonially or by the production
of documents, is usually paramount over any private interest which may be
affected."' 8 Nevertheless, by protecting the confidentiality of certain private
communications,9 privileges may foster important personal and professional
relationships,'0 and serve other valuable nonevidentiary societal interests."
Because they are both important'" and often highly controversial,
13
6 See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396 (D.D.C. 1973) (dis-
cussing "the basic proposition that the public 'has a right to every man's evidence"' and "the
correlative duty to testify") (quoting 8 JoHN H. WiOMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2192, at 70 (John T.
McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); Arizona v. Superior Court, 609 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1980) ("The duty to testify has been recognized as a basic obligation of every citizen
since the public has the right to every man's evidence.").
I See Mem'l Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[B]ecause evidentiary
privileges operate to exclude relevant evidence and thereby block the judicial fact-finding
function, they are not favored ... ."); Parvarandeh v. Goins, 124 F.R.D. 169, 171 (E.D.
Tenn. 1988) ("Courts do not favor creating new privileges because privileges contravene the
fundamental principle that the public has a right to every man's evidence.") (internal quota-
tion marks and citations omitted).
8 McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937); see also In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426,
430 (5th Cir. 1981) (asserting that "truth-seeking considerations" are "normally dominant"
over any policy considerations intended to be served by an evidentiary privilege).
I See, e.g., Giffin v. Summerlin, 78 F.3d 1227, 1240 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to "the
evidentiary privilege protecting private communications between a physician and a patient");
United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 401 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that "the common law
marital communications privilege.., protects the confidentiality of private communications
made between spouses during their marriage").
10 See Fritsch v. Chula Vista, 187 F.R.D. 614, 631 (S.D. Cal. 1999) ("By creating an evi-
dentiary privilege, society has made a judgment that fostering certain ideals or relationships
is worth the potential sacrifice involved in terms of the loss of relevant evidence."); Montone
v. Radio Shack, 698 F. Supp. 92, 94-95 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("[A]n important defining aspect of
a 'privilege,' both historically and common-sensically, is that the privilege directs itself to
particular relationships. Thus, each of the traditionally recognized privileges . . .can be
traced to an interest in fostering and protecting a relationship of high social importance.").
11 See In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Each of the recognized
privileges protects a substantial individual interest or a relationship in which society has an
interest, at the expense of the public interest in the search for truth."); D'Aurizio v. Palisades
Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1360 (D.N.J. 1995) ("Common law privileges exist to foster under-
lying societal values."); Diaz v. Dist. Court, 993 P.2d 50, 57 (Nev. 2000) (observing that
privileges "are not designed or intended to assist the fact-finding process or to uphold its
integrity," but instead "are justified by the public's interest in encouraging socially useful
communications and by certain notions of legitimate privacy expectations").
12 See generally NL Indus., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 144 F.R.D. 225, 233 n.ll
(D. N.J. 1992) (observing that "privileges serve an important part in the preservation of the
law and the administration of justice"); New Jersey v. Baluch, 775 A.2d 127, 151 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) ("Privileges serve an important purpose, grounded in critical
public policy concerns ....").
13 See, e.g., Spencer Sav. Bank v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 842 (D. N.J.
1997) (discussing "the controversy surrounding recognition of the self-critical analysis privi-
lege"). See generally Gale v. Wyoming, 792 P.2d 570, 624 n.25 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[flew, if any, areas of evidence law raise such fundamental dilem-
mas and result in such controversial outcomes" as "the law of privilege") (quoting Develop-
ments in the Law - Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REV. 1665, 1665-66 (1985)).
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evidentiary privileges have been the subject of considerable litigation.14 How-
ever, despite the fact that unions stand in a fiduciary relationship to the employ-
ees they represent, 15 and evidentiary privileges reflect a recognition of the duty
of loyalty fiduciaries owe to their principals, 16 there is surprisingly little case
law discussing the possible existence of a union representation privilege.' 7
There has likewise been very little academic discussion of this potential privi-
lege to date.'
8
This article is an attempt to fill the latter void.' 9 The article begins with a
discussion of cases that have considered the possible recognition of a union
representation privilege.20 Using a test for the recognition of new evidentiary
"' See, e.g., May v. Collins, 122 F.R.D. 535, 539 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (observing that "[tihe
newsgatherer's privilege has been often litigated"); State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 237 (Or.
1985) ("The issue of when and to what extent communications made to agents and assistants
of professional persons are protected by the evidentiary privileges is one with which many
courts have wrestled."). See generally Kenneth S. Broun, Giving Codification a Second
Chance - Testimonial Privileges and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 769,
780 (2002) ("Questions concerning evidentiary privileges have been frequently litigated
since the enactment of Rule 501 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence].").
15 See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 309 N.L.R.B. 856, 857 (1992) ("It is well settled that a
union owes a fiduciary duty to employees it represents as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative .... "); Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 302 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1009 (1991) ("A
union owes a duty of fair representation to those unit employees it represents and ... this
duty is akin to the duty owed by other fiduciaries to their beneficiaries.") (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
16 See Kelly v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 962 (3rd Cir. 1997) ("Privilege doctrine
assumes that protecting . . . loyalty and trust ... can only be accomplished if privileged
material is never disclosed .... "); Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610, 618 (Wash. 1994) (assert-
ing that the recognition of a testimonial privilege "is simply the legal acknowledgment of...
fiduciary duties"); Broun, supra note 14, at 796 ("[One] nonutilitarian rationale for privilege
is that it gives recognition to the duty of loyalty owed by the recipient of information to the
person confiding in her.").
17 One commentator has described the union representation privilege as a "newly emerging"
evidentiary privilege, "recently recognized in the labor arena." Leeann R. Gruwell Ander-
son, Turning the Key: Ensuring Evidentiary Privileges as Labor Counsel, 45 DRAKE L.
REV. 492, 492 (1997); cf. EEOC v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 92 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
34,070, 44,076 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (asserting that "a general federal policy ... protecting the
absolute sanctity of [communications concerning] labor negotiations" is "as yet unarticulated
in case law").
18 The only previously published article that appears to have been devoted exclusively to the
topic is Mitchell H. Rubinstein, A New York Court Recognizes a Labor Union Evidentiary
Privilege, 9 LAB. LAW. 595 (1993). But see Loomis Armored Inc., 94 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1097, 1101 (1990) ("In one commentary the authors identified the 'Grievant-Union'
[privilege] as a developed 'privilege'....") (emphasis added) (citing JAY E. GRENIG &
WAYNE ESTES, LABOR ARBITRATION ADVOCACY: EFFECTIVE TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES
§ 7.51, 89 (1989).
19 In addition to the authorities cited in note 18, the issue is discussed in Scott A. Brown,
Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1322 (1996), and also, briefly, in MARVIN F. HILL, JR. & ANTHONY
V. SINICROPI, EVIDENCE IN ARBITRATION 164 (2d ed. 1987); John G. Adams, Privileges
Under the NLRA: Attorney-Client, Work-Product, Collective Bargaining and Strike Strat-
egy, and Mediator, 48 LAB. L.J. 570, 573-75 (1997); and Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17,
at 518-25.
20 This potential privilege, generally described here as a "union representation privilege,"
has also been denominated an "employee-union representative" privilege, United States
Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361, 368-69 (D.C. Cir. 1994); a "labor relations" privi-
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privileges first articulated by Professor John Wigmore2 t and subsequently
embraced by a number of state and federal courts,22 the article then analyzes
the competing policy interests underlying the potential adoption of the
privilege.2 3
The article ultimately concludes that courts and other tribunals should rec-
ognize a qualified form of this important privilege,2 4 despite the absence of any
significant prior legislative support 2 5 and the fact that the only federal courts
that have specifically considered the issue refused to adopt such a privilege.26
lege, Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 965, 968 (Sup. Ct. 1991); a "labor official" privilege,
Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 492; and a "labor union" privilege, Rubinstein, supra
note 18, at 595. The differing nomenclature undoubtedly reflects the new and "emerging"
nature of the privilege. Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 492.
21 Professor Wigmore is a "long acknowledged preeminent authority on the law of evidence
in this country." Ohio v. Sims, 369 N.E.2d 24, 39 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County 1977);
see also EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 551 F. Supp. 737, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (referring to
Wigmore as "a leading commentator on the law of evidence"), rev'd on other grounds, 715
F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983). For a recent academic discussion of Professor Wigmore's
approach to evidentiary privileges, see Edward J. hnwinkelreid, The New Wigmore; An
Essay on Rethinking the Foundation of Evidentiary Privileges, 83 B.U. L. REv. 315 (2003).
22 See, e.g., Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 167 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting
that "Professor Wigmore's four-part test ... for determining whether novel privileges
deserve judicial recognition" has been "endorsed by the Second Circuit"). See generally
Douglas v. Superior Court, 597 A.2d 774, 777 (Vt. 1991) ("Most courts have created a
testimonial privilege only when the conditions meet the four-part test for recognition set
forth in Dean Wigmore's treatise."); In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 48 (Idaho
1985) (Bistline, J., concurring) ("Many courts and commentators have accepted Wigmore's
test as the proper method for determining if a proposed privilege ought to be recognized.").
23 See generally In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir.
1976) ("The granting or withholding of an evidentiary privilege requires a balancing of com-
peting policies."); Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("In order for a
new privilege to be adopted, the relevant competing interests must be appropriately consid-
ered and balanced.").
24 See Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. 1021, 1053 (1992) (describing the union
representation privilege as "a limited privilege"); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 146, 149 (Ct. App. 2003) (discussing the contention that "there is a qualified privi-
lege for confidential communications between a union representative and union members
concerning investigations into union matters and grievances"); cf. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations
Bd. v. Homer Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 28, 547 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1989) ("The
privilege ... is at least a qualified one."). Judicial recognition of this privilege would be a
"significant development in labor law." Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 595.
25 In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1998),
the court noted that a bill passed by the New York state legislature that would have created a
new testimonial privilege for confidential communications between employees and their
union representatives was vetoed by the governor of that state. See id, at 335-36. The court
also noted that the parties in that case had been unable to identify "any legislation in other
states relating to a general union privilege." Id. at 336 n.2; see also Hunt v. Maricopa
County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 619 P.2d 1036, 1041 (Ariz. 1980) ("[T]here is no
statutory privilege to protect the confidentiality of communications between an employee
and his [union] representative."); Am. Airlines, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 152-53 ("[T]here simply is
no indication ... that the [California] Legislature intended to [create] an evidentiary commu-
nication privilege between union members and their representatives.").
26 See McCoy v. Southwest Airlines Co., 211 F.R.D. 381, 386 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (finding
"no merit" to an argument that discussions between employees and their union representa-
tives were privileged); Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 334 ("[T]he court declines to
recognize a common law privilege shielding conversations between union officials and
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Given the evolutionary nature of the law of evidentiary privileges,27 courts
should not regard this absence of statutory or judicial support for a union repre-
sentation privilege as weighing heavily against its recognition.2 8
II. EXISTING CASE LAW RECOGNIZING THE PRIVILEGE
A. City of Newburgh v. Newman
In the view of some observers, 29 the prospect of a union representation
privilege was initially suggested by an intermediate New York state appellate
court in City of Newburgh v. Newman,3" although implicit support for the privi-
lege can be found in at least one earlier federal administrative agency deci-
sion.3 In City of Newburgh, a police officer facing disciplinary charges sought
and obtained the advice and assistance of a union official.32 A deputy police
commissioner subsequently ordered the union official, who was also an officer
in the department,3 3 to answer questions about his conversations with the
officer facing discipline.34 The union official then filed an improper practice
members on matters of union concern."); Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 501 (D. Utah
1992) ("[T]he court does not find that it is justified in creating [such] a new evidentiary
privilege."); cf. EEOC v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 92 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 34,070, at
44,076 (N.D. 111. 1981) ("No [labor negotiations] privilege exists either at common law or by
statute.").
27 See SEC v. Lavin, 111 F.3d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referring to "the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges"); D'Aurizio v. Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352,
1355 (D. N.J. 1995) (noting "the evolution of a federal common law of privileges") (quoting
2 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 172, at 226
(2d ed. 1994).
28 See Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("[R]ecognition of [a]
privilege in federal courts does not depend upon finding that it has either existed uniformly
at common law or has been approved in terms by act of Congress."); In re Agosto, 553
F. Supp. 1298, 1317 (D. Nev. 1983) (rejecting the proposition that "the lack of precedent for
the recognition of a.. . privilege [is] a sufficient bar to a further inquiry into the propriety of
considering such a privilege"); Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio Ass'n of
Pub. Sch. Employees, 667 N.E.2d 458, 467 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) ("The absence of a legisla-
tive enactment or previous judicial ruling creating.., a privilege ... does not itself foreclose
[the] formulation and application of such a privilege if justice so requires.").
29 See, e.g., Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 519 ("The first inklings of a labor official
privilege appeared in City of Newburgh v. Newman .... "); cf. Rubinstein, supra note 18, at
595, 602 (describing Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1991), as "a case of first
impression . . . recogniz[ing] a labor union privilege," but acknowledging that "Seelig is a
logical extension of the Newman decision").
30 421 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div. 1979).
31 See Berbiglia, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1476, 1495-96 (1977) (discussed infra notes 254-70
and accompanying text).
32 See City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
33 See id. Union officials frequently serve in the dual role of employee and union represen-
tative. See NLRB v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 688 F.2d 345, 357 n.13 (5th Cir. 1982) (referring
to the "dual status" of "a worker who is also a union officer"); Zamudio v. California, 73
Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 83 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing the "situation where an individual wears
two hats - that of employee and that of union representative"); Materials Research Corp.,
262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1015 (1982) ("[W]here employees are represented, the union official...
is usually a steward employed at that same plant.").
31 See City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 674-75.
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charge against the department 35 under a New York state law regulating labor
relations between public employers and employees commonly known as the
Taylor Law.36
The New York Public Employment Relations Board ("PERB"), 37 which
has jurisdiction over such charges,3 8 held that the employer had engaged in a
statutorily prohibited practice. 39 Because the Taylor Law gives public employ-
ees the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing,40 and an aspect of that right "is the privilege of consulting
with appropriate union officials as to matters affecting them as employees,"4
the PERB found that the department's questioning of the union official inter-
fered with the employees' statutorily protected organizational rights."2
Significantly, the PERB also ordered the department to cease and desist
from any future questioning of union officials "about information obtained by
them in the course of assisting unit employees who may be involved in discipli-
nary or grievance procedures."' 3 The board explained its decision to award
this broad prospective relief"4 on the following basis:
Such consultations are in the nature of internal communications and, like other inter-
nal union affairs, they may be deemed confidential by the union and the employees.
To invade that confidentiality tends to inhibit employees from seeking the advice of
15 See id. at 674. The filing of an improper practice charge is the means by which New
York public employees, or their union, may challenge an employer's alleged violation of
their state statutory rights to organize and bargain collectively. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Metro.
Bus Auth., 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2088, 2091 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
36 The "Taylor Law" is the popular name for the Public Employees Fair Employment Act of
1967. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-14 (1997). Broadly speaking, the act "deals with rights
and relationships involved in public employment, such as organizing, collective bargaining,
[and] the prohibition of strikes by public employees." In re Bd. of Educ. of Watertown City
Sch. Dist., 710 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (N.Y. 1999).
" The New York Court of Appeals has noted that "[w]ith the enactment of the Taylor Law,
the Legislature created PERB, an independent board empowered to resolve employment dis-
putes between public employers and the collective bargaining representatives of public
employees." Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of N.Y. v. New York, 767 N.E.2d 116, 118
(N.Y. 2001) (citing N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 205).
38 See Palumbo v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 400 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859 (App. Div. 1978);
DeMilia v. McGuire, 420 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
" See City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 674.
40 See id. at 675 (quoting N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW §§ 202, 203); see also Kennedy v. Metro.
Suburban Bus. Auth., 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2088, 2091 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[T]he Taylor
law[ ] makes it an improper practice for a public employer ... to interfere, restrain or coerce
public employees in the exercise of their organizational rights and [their right] to choose
their collective bargaining representative.").
41 City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 675; see also Children's Village v. Greenburgh
Eleven Teachers' Union Fed'n of Teachers, 648 N.Y.S.2d 152, 153 (App. Div. 1996) (dis-
cussing "the rights of union members to organize and to consult with union officials on
matters affecting them as employees").
42 See City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
43 Id. at 674.
4 The PERB has the express statutory authority to direct an employer to "cease and desist
from any improper practice," and also to take "affirmative" steps to remedy such a practice.
Saratoga Springs City Sch. Dist. v. N.Y. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 416
N.Y.S.2d 415, 420 (App. Div. 1979) (quoting N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 205.5(d) (1997)).
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their union representatives as to matters affecting their interest and similarly to deter
the representatives from proffering advice, if sought.
4 5
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the
PERB's determination.4 6 In particular, the court agreed with the PERB's con-
clusion that an employer's "[q]uestioning of a union official as to his observa-
tions and communications with a union member facing disciplinary
proceedings, if permitted, would tend to deter members of the union from seek-
ing advice and representation with regard to pending charges, thereby seriously
impeding their participation in an employee organization."4 7 The court thus
found that assuring the confidentiality of such consultations is necessary to pro-
tect the right of employees "to fully participate in an employee organization,
with the full benefits thereof."48
However, the court maintained that it was not adopting a common law
evidentiary privilege analogous to the attorney-client privilege.4 9 The court
apparently concluded that the protection available to an employee who has
communicated with a union representative in confidence should be more lim-
ited than that provided by traditional evidentiary privileges:
Any privilege established by the decision of the board is strictly limited to communi-
cations between a union member and an officer of the union, and operates only as
against the public employer, on a matter where the member has a right to be repre-
sented by a union representative, and then only where the observations and commu-
nications are made in the performance of a union duty.
50
B. Cook Paint & Varnish Co.
1. Factual Background
Approximately two years after City of Newburgh, the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") 5 ' reached the same result,5 2 without
45 City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 675.
46 See id. at 676. As the state agency "charged with implementing the fundamental policies
of the Taylor Law," the PERB "is presumed to have developed an expertise and judgment
that requires [courts] to accept its construction [of the law] if not unreasonable." Lynbrook
v. N.Y. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd., 399 N.E.2d 55, 58 (N.Y. 1979) (citations
omitted).
47 City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 675-76.
48 Id. at 676.
49 See id.; see also Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1991) ("[A union
official] does not have ... a broad common-law privilege, an analogue to the attorney-client
privilege.").
50 City of Newburgh, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
51 The NLRB is the federal agency with responsibility for administering the National Labor
Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-56, 159-61, 164(c) (1994); Rochester Joint Bd. v.
NLRB, 896 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1990); ITT Lamp Div. v. Minter, 435 F.2d 989, 992 (1st
Cir. 1970). It is essentially a federal counterpart to the PERB, with somewhat broader juris-
diction over unfair labor practices arising in the private sector. See In re Town of Wallkell
Unit of the Orange County Chapter, Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, 382 N.Y.S.2d 224, 225
(Sup. Ct. 1975) ("In effect PERB sits as the National Labor Relations Board, but in a limited
fashion.").
52 Even though it merely "establish[ed] the labor official privilege in the administrative
setting," the analysis in City of Newburgh "also provide[s] support for common law recogni-
tion of the privilege." Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 525; see also Levitt v. Bd. of
Collective Bargaining of City of N.Y., 531 N.Y.S.2d 703, 705-06 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (noting
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discussing Newburgh,53 in Cook Paint & Varnish Co. 5 4 In Cook Paint, a
union steward advised a bargaining unit employee in connection with an
employment dispute," and subsequently represented the employee in grievance
proceedings initiated by the union when the employee was ultimately dis-
charged as a result of the disputed incident.5 6 When the matter was not
resolved satisfactorily in the grievance process,5 7 the union invoked binding
arbitration under the terms of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.58
In preparing for the arbitration, the employer's attorney attempted to ques-
tion the union steward about his knowledge of the matter,59 and to obtain con-
temporaneous notes he had prepared in connection with the proceeding.
60
When the steward objected to being interviewed or producing his notes, 61 he
that "the Taylor Law and its model, the National Labor Relations Act ... have, in many
essential respects, been interpreted in the same way," and that "[a]gencies and courts have
often borrowed from each other evolving notions of the sensible application of these [acts]")
(parentheses omitted).
53 The NLRB may be "guided by Federal precedents" in considering privilege issues. Pat-
rick Cudahy, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 968, 970 n. 11 (1988). However, the Board "has long held
that it is not bound by State court decisions," United Steelworkers of Am., 137 N.L.R.B. 95,
96 (1962), and it ultimately "bring[s] to bear [its] own reason and experience in determining
how to apply [a] privilege in the context of unfair labor practice proceedings." Patrick
Cudahy, 288 N.L.R.B. at 970 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
54 258 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1981).
55 See id. at 1230. A steward is a "union official who represents other union employees in
grievances with management and who oversees the carrying out of the union contract."
Cahoon v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 175 F. Supp. 2d 220, 227 (D. Conn. 2001) (quoting
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (6th ed. 1990)); see also Salierno v. Micro Stamping Co.,
345 A.2d 342, 344 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975) (noting that the function of a union steward is "to
deal with the employer on a day-to-day basis in solving employee problems and
grievances").
56 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1230-31. The Board has observed that "[o]nce a disci-
plinary decision has been made by the employer, the proper forum for the discussion and
evaluation of that disciplinary action shifts to the grievance procedure." Baton Rouge Water
Works Co., 256 N.L.R.B. 995, 997 n.6 (1979).
57 The Supreme Court has noted that in most collective bargaining relationships, "an
attempt is usually made to keep the number of arbitrated grievances to a minimum." Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 192 n.15 (1967). As a result, "[t]he vast majority of all grievances are
resolved short of arbitration." Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local No. 579, 229 N.L.R.B.
692, 696 n.ll (1977).
58 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231. Grievance and arbitration provisions are "a stan-
dard feature of almost all collective bargaining agreements." Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d
1111, 1121 (3d Cir. 1996).
'9 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231. The employer presumably anticipated obtaining
useful information from the steward based on the fact that a "union official handling [a]
grievance will typically meet with the grievant, discuss the grievant's petition, suggest possi-
ble arguments, and perhaps conduct an investigation of the underlying facts." Thomas v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909, 919 (7th Cir. 1989).
6 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231.
61 In this respect, the fact pattern in Cook Paint is not unique. See, e.g., Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 257 N.L.R.B. 130, 133 n.6 (1981) (describing another union steward "who refused to
answer questions, when called in for an interview as to [an] incident, on the grounds that
right, wrong, or indifferent he did not want to become involved in any interview which could
result in disciplinary action against a fellow union member").
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was threatened with discipline unless he disclosed the substance of his commu-
nications with the employee he represented.62
After the steward ultimately submitted to the interview under protest
6 3
(and provided his notes directly to the arbitrator, rather than the employer),6 4
the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.6 5 The union
asserted that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act") 66 by threatening employees with disci-
pline for engaging in concerted activity.67
2. The Board's Initial Decision
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with its employees' exercise of their rights under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.68 Section 7 in turn gives employees the right "to engage in
... concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection."6 9 In its landmark ruling in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,7 °
the Supreme Court held that the section 7 right of an employee to engage in
concerted activity includes the right to the presence of a union representative at
an investigatory interview the employee reasonably believes may result in dis-
ciplinary action. 7 1 In several subsequent cases, 72 the Board has held that the
right to union representation recognized in Weingarten encompasses the right
to confer with the union representative prior to the interview itself.73
62 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231.
63 See id. The steward's decision to submit to the interview undoubtedly reflected his
understanding of "the time-honored principle of industrial relations that - with few excep-
tions - an employee must 'obey now and grieve later."' Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium,
Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1997). However, one of the widely-recognized excep-
tions to this principle applies where, as implicitly alleged in Cook Paint, an employee "has a
right to union representation which would be denied by obedience to the order." AT&T
Communications, 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1229, 1232 (1990) (Kaufman, Arb.) (quoting
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 199-200 (4th ed.
1985).
6 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231.
65 See Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 646, 649 (1979), enforcement denied, 648
F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Unfair labor practice charges may be filed by "any person," 29
C.F.R. § 102.9 (2002), which in this context includes "individuals or labor organizations."
Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 713 F. Supp. 368, 371-72 (D. Kan. 1988) (citing 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(1) (1994) and 29 C.F.R. § 102.1 (2000)).
66 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994).
67 See Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
68 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 383 U.S. 53, 59 n.3 (1966).
69 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994).
70 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
71 See id. at 262 ("[Section] 7 guarantees an employee's right to the presence of a union
representative at an investigatory interview in which the risk of discipline reasonably inheres
. . . .").
72 See generally PPG Indus., Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1165 (1980) ("The parameters of
employee rights under Weingarten have been set forth in numerous Board cases .. "); Ohio
Masonic Home, 251 N.L.R.B. 606, 606 (1980) (referring to the Board's "pronouncements
interpreting the Weingarten principle").
13 See System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. 723, 727 (1988); Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048,
1048-49 (1982), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 711 F.2d 134 (9th Cir.
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The union in Cook Paint relied on these principles in arguing, through the
Board's General Counsel,74 that the employer's coercive interview of the union
steward unlawfully interfered with the section 7 right of the steward and the
employee he represented to engage in protected concerted activity. 75 In its ini-
tial decision,7 6 the Board declined to consider the impact of Weingarten on the
confidentiality of communications between an employee and a union represen-
tative.7 7 It instead held that the employer violated section 8(a)(1) by seeking to
compel the steward to answer any questions concerning the disputed matter.7 8
The Board premised this holding on its conclusion that once disciplinary
action has been taken and the dispute is to be submitted to arbitration, the
employer's motive for interrogating any employee has necessarily moved
beyond its legitimate interest in maintaining the orderly operation of its busi-
ness,79 and "into the arena of seeking to vindicate its disciplinary decision and
of discovering the union's arbitration position."8 The Board held that this lat-
ter interest, while also perhaps a legitimate one, 81 must nevertheless give way
to the greater right of employees "to make common cause with their fellow
1983); U.S. Postal Serv., 254 N.L.R.B. 703, 707 (1981); Climax Molybdenum Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 1189, 1189-90 (1977), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
74 Under section 3(d) of the NLRA, the Board's General Counsel is authorized to investi-
gate unfair labor practice charges and issue complaints based on those charges, and to prose-
cute those complaints on behalf of the charging parties in proceedings before the Board. See
29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1994).
15 See Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 646, 650 (1979), enforcement denied, 648
F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981):
The starting point of the ... argument is the well-established principle that an employee's partic-
ipation in grievance and arbitration proceedings constitutes protected concerted activity which
may not be interfered with either by his employer or by his union. The ... basic proposition is
that [the employer's] threat of discipline if [the steward] . . . refused to be interviewed in the
course of [its] preparation for arbitration was an unlawful interference with the employees' par-
ticipation or refusal to participate in protected concerted activity.
(Citations omitted.)
76 Cook Paint, 246 N.L.R.B. 646 (1979), enforcement denied, 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
77 See id. at 646 nn.2 & 4. The court in City of Newburgh v. Newman, 421 N.Y.S.2d 673
(App. Div. 1979) also did not rely on Weingarten, presumably because Weingarten is "not
controlling" in cases arising under the Taylor Law. Sperling v. Helsby, 400 N.Y.S.2d 821,
822 (App. Div. 1977). For a criticism of the New York courts' failure to extend Weingarten
to public sector employment, see Anthony R. Baldwin, Weingarten and the Taylor Law - A
Claimed Difference Without a Distinction, 7 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 123 (1990).
78 See Cook Paint, 246 N.L.R.B. at 646.
71 See id. The Board has long recognized that "an employer has the right to establish legiti-
mate rules to govern the conduct of its employees and to investigate violations of those
rules." United Techs. Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 1430, 1442 (1982); see also Gen. Elec. Co., 253
N.L.R.B. 1189, 1191 (1981) (Penello, concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
Board has upheld an employer's right to investigate violations of work rules and other
improper activities. An employer may also question its employees during such an investiga-
tion, and insist that they cooperate.").
80 Cook Paint, 246 N.L.R.B. at 646. Indeed, a concurring member of the Board noted that
the employer had admitted that "one of the reasons it wished to talk to the [steward] was to
learn the Union's case." Id. at 647 (Truesdale, concurring).
81 Cf Bill Scott Oldsmobile, 282 N.L.R.B. 1073, 1077 (1987) (Dotson, Chairman, dissent-
ing in part) ("[l]nterviews in preparation for trial are one of the rare kinds of interrogations in
which the Board has long recognized that the employer has a legitimate interest.").
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employees."82 The administrative law judge,8 3 whose decision the Board was
affirming,8 4 articulated the basic reasoning underlying the Board's initial
holding:
There obviously is a world of difference between an employer's trying to obtain
factual information helpful in determining whether an employee should be disci-
plined, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, his attempting to obtain information
to justify discipline already imposed. In the former case, the employer is legitimately
concerned about maintaining order in the operation of his business; in the latter case,
he is concerned only with vindicating action he has already taken. In the former
case, an employee's statutory right to make common cause with his fellow employ-
ees may well have to yield to the more urgent need of orderly conduct of the busi-
ness, a necessity to management and labor alike; in the latter case, however, there is
no apparent reason why an employer's vindication of action he has already taken
should be allowed to override the employees' concern for solidarity.
85
3. The Federal Appellate Court's Decision
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused to
enforce the Board's initial decision in Cook Paint.86 In particular, the court
rejected the Board's apparent "per se rule" that an employer may never
threaten discipline in order to compel an employee to respond to questions
relating to a matter scheduled for arbitration,8 7 holding that the Board lacked
the statutory authority to adopt such a rule.1
8
However, the court acknowledged that there are limits to the employer's
right to conduct pre-arbitration interviews of its employees.8 9 In particular, the
employer may not use such interviews to discover the union's arbitration strat-
egy9° or otherwise "pry into protected union activities." 9' Because the interro-
gation of an employee's Weingarten representative may implicate protected
82 Cook Paint, 246 N.L.R.B. at 646.
83 Unfair labor practice hearings under the NLRA are held before administrative law judges,
whose decisions are then subject to Board review. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.15-.16, 102.34 &
102.45(a) (2001).
84 See Cook Paint, 246 N.L.R.B. at 646.
85 Id. at 651 (footnote omitted).
86 See Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v NLRB, 648 F.2d 712, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Board
itself "has no independent enforcement authority." NLRB v. Hub Plastics, Inc., 52 F.3d 608,
613 (6th Cir. 1995). The NLRA instead authorizes the Board to petition the federal appellate
courts for enforcement of its decisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1994); United States v.
Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 870 (7th Cir. 1998).
87 Cook Paint, 648 F.2d at 719-20.
s8 See id. at 725 n.25. The court explained that "pre-arbitration interviews are part of the
grievance-arbitration process," which in turn is "a matter of contract." Id. Because the
Supreme Court has made it clear that "contractual matters are to be resolved without interfer-
ence from the Board," the court in Cook Paint concluded that "whether an opposing witness
may be interviewed prior to arbitration is a matter to be decided by the parties, and not by
Board rule." Id. (citing NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967)); cf. Am.
Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 155 n.4 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding it
unnecessary to decide whether "the creation of a union representative-union member eviden-
tiary privilege is a matter that should be left for negotiation and included in the parties'
collective bargaining agreement").
89 See Cook Paint, 648 F.2d at 722.
90 See id.
9' Id. at 723.
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union activity,92 the court concluded that "very different considerations may be
relevant in considering the legality of an interview of a union steward that are
not present in the case of employees generally."9 3
The court nevertheless rejected a "blanket rule" that would have prohib-
ited an employer from ever questioning a union steward9 4 in favor of one that
merely prevents inquiries that would seriously infringe on its employees' statu-
torily protected activity.9 5 Because the Board had not addressed the impact of
the employer's interview on such activity,9 6 the court remanded the case to the
Board97 to consider the extent to which the steward "was entitled to special
protection due to his status as a union steward." 98
4. The Board's Supplemental Decision
On remand,9 9 the Board acquiesced in the Court of Appeals' conclusion
that the employer was contractually entitled to conduct legitimate investigatory
interviews in preparation for the parties' pending arbitration." ° The Board
nevertheless concluded that the employer's interview of the steward exceeded
permissible bounds and impinged on protected union activity10 1 to the extent
the "facts sought were the substance of conversations between an employee and
his steward, as well as the notes kept by the steward, in the course of fulfilling
his representational function. '"102
92 See id. at 724-25 ("[A] steward may be acting pursuant to his position as a representative
of the employees, responsible for processing the grievance at issue. To require collective
bargaining representatives to submit to compulsory interviews might seriously infringe on
protected activity.").
93 Id. at 725.
94 Id. The court stated: "For example, a union steward who has no representational respon-
sibilities in a particular case, or one who may be directly involved in illegal acts of miscon-
duct, may not be entitled to any special protection." Id.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 725 n.25 (noting that "the Board... advanced no reasoning or analysis ...
other than that all pre-arbitration interviews are unlawful"). The administrative law judge,
by contrast, did address this issue, and concluded that even if, as a general proposition, "an
employee may be compelled to cooperate in his employer's preparation for arbitration,"
requiring such cooperation from a union steward who acted as the grievant's union represen-
tative would effectively deprive the grievant of "the union representation to which he [is]
entitled" under Weingarten. Cook Paint, 246 N.L.R.B. at 654.
9' See Cook Paint, 648 F.2d at 725.
98 Id. at 726.
99 On remand, the Board was "bound by the court's opinion as the law of the case." Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 323 N.L.R.B. 1029, 1029 (1997). However, the Board has never
repudiated its original decision in Cook Paint, and that decision arguably "remains binding
on the Board's administrative law judges" in other cases. Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs.,
Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 347, 356 n.21 (2000), enforced, 297 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2002). In this
regard, administrative law judges are generally "required to follow Board cases where they
are inconsistent with those of various circuit courts." Aqua-Chem, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 1108,
1120 n.2 (1988).
100 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231 (quoting Cook Paint, 648 F.2d at 723).
'0' See id. at 1231, 1232.
102 Id. at 1232.
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Focusing on the steward's role in the underlying incident, 0 3 the Board
noted that he had engaged in no alleged misconduct,"° nor was he a witness to
the incident that resulted in the termination of the employee he represented, 105
in which case the employer would have been within its rights in questioning
him about those matters. 10 6 His involvement in the matter instead had arisen
solely as the result of his status as the employee's union representative.10 7
The Board noted that permitting the employer to interrogate the steward
concerning his consultation with the employee he represented would have a
chilling effect on all of its employees and their union representatives. 108 The
Board explained:
Such consultation between an employee potentially subject to discipline and his
union steward constitutes protected activity in one of its purest forms. To allow [an
employer] to compel the disclosure of this type of information under threat of disci-
pline manifestly restrains employees in their willingness to candidly discuss matters
with their chosen, statutory representatives. Such actions by [an employer] also
inhibit stewards in obtaining needed information from employees, since the steward
knows that, upon demand of [the employer], he will be required to reveal the sub-
stance of his discussions or face disciplinary action himself.1° 9
Although the Board stopped short of characterizing its holding as the rec-
ognition of a new evidentiary privilege," 0 that arguably is the practical impact
103 See id. at 1231 ("[O]ur initial inquiry involves examination of the role played by [the
steward] in the ... incident.").
1"4 See id. An employer has the right to question its employees about their own alleged
misconduct. See Blanchard v. Simpson Plainwell Paper Co., 925 F. Supp. 510, 517 (W.D.
Mich. 1995); Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 390, 391 (1984).
105 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231. The Board has held that, at least prior to the
imposition of discipline, an employer may "lawfully compel[I ... employees to cooperate in
its investigation of another employee's alleged misconduct." Manville Forest Prods., 269
N.L.R.B. at 391.
106 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 52 F.L.R.A. 1390, 1406 (1997) ("Although union offi-
cials are entitled in some circumstances to protection against management-conducted interro-
gations, a union steward who is directly involved in alleged acts of misconduct is not
relieved of the responsibility to cooperate fully in the employer's investigation of such mis-
conduct."); U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300, 1306 (1991) ("[T]here
will be times when the interrogation of a union steward may be appropriate, as, for example,
when a steward acting in that capacity is a witness to employee misconduct or when a
steward engages in flagrant misconduct.").
107 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1231; cf. Ralphs Grocery Co., 101 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 634, 638 (1993) (Ross, Arb.) (noting the distinction "between actions of stewards on
behalf of their union members and actions taken in their capacity as an employee").
108 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1232.
109 Id. (footnote omitted).
"o See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 2003)
("Cook Paint limited its ruling to those situations in which the employer sought to interro-
gate a steward about the pre-arbitration assistance the steward gave to an employee about the
upcoming arbitration, concluding such an interrogation would constitute an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA."); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995
F. Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (characterizing City of Newburgh and, inferentially,
Cook Paint as "cases that have [merely] held it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to seek to question a union representative about statements made by an employee who the
representative was assisting in an internal disciplinary proceeding"). In fact, the Board itself
emphasized that its ruling did "not mean that all discussions between employees and stew-
ards are confidential." Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1232.
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of its decision.'" Moreover, the Board's authority to recognize such privi-
leges, "i2 while viewed with skepticism by some courts, 113 has been alluded to
in other Board cases.' 14 In any event, the analysis in Cook Paint provided the
principal support for the subsequent decision of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority ("FLRA" or the "Authority") in United States Department of Trea-
sury, Customs Service," 5 which is the first federal case explicitly recognizing a
union representation privilege." 16
"' The Board characterized the employer's interrogation of the union steward as an unfair
labor practice violative of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at
1231, 1232. However, "[i]nterrogation of a union steward about an employee being repre-
sented by the steward is not [an unfair labor practice] unless the union steward is accorded a
privilege or immunity." Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. 1021, 1051 (1992)
(emphasis added). But cf. Am. Airlines, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 155 (declining "to equate an
employer's unfair labor practice under the NLRA with the creation of an evidentiary
privilege").
112 As discussed in more detail in Section LI.A infra, the Federal Rules of Evidence gener-
ally charge the federal courts with responsibility for "formulating new privileges by resorting
to the principles of common law." In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 14, 1989, 728
F. Supp. 368, 370 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (citing FED. R. EVID. 501). However, in resolving unfair
labor practice claims, the Board acts "in a quasi judicial capacity," NLRB v. S. Materials
Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965), and "through case-by-case treatment has [long] been
developing an administrative common law concerning 'unfair' practices of employers and
unions alike." NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 83 (1973). In addition, the Board is
statutorily bound, "so far as practicable," to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence, including
the provision authorizing the common law development of evidentiary privileges. Patrick
Cudahy, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 968, 970 n.1l (1988) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1994)).
Thus, like "regular courts," the Board arguably "has authority under the Federal Rules of
Evidence to participate in the development of the 'common law' rules of privilege." Inslaw,
Inc., 89-3 B.C.A. (CCH) 22,121, at 111, 252-53 (1989) (construing the authority of a
similar board); cf. St. Clair Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Intermediate Educ. Ass'n/Mich. Educ.
Ass'n, 581 N.W.2d 707, 718 (Mich. 1998) (indicating that the "common law" may be devel-
oped by "federal administrative and judicial precedent") (emphasis added).
"l3 See, e.g., Montebello Rose Co. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 856, 876
(Ct. App. 1981) (asserting that "any attempt by the NLRB to create a new privilege ... has
been rejected") (citing Gen. Eng'g, Inc. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 367, 374-75 (9th Cir. 1965); cf.
Dean v. Veterans Admin., 151 F.R.D. 83, 86 (N.D. Ohio 1993) ("Courts have not uniformly
disregarded agency regulations restricting disclosure of documents and testimony, but rather
have reiterated that the decision whether a particular agency's privilege will apply must rest
with the court.").
114 See, e.g., Granite Constr. Co., 330 N.L.R.B. 205, 211 n.1 (1999) ("If a party seeks to
create a new evidentiary privilege in Board proceedings, the party must first convince the
Board."); Filene's Basement Store, 299 N.L.R.B. 183, 204 (1990) (referring to the existence
of privileges "previously recognized at law, or in Board precedent"); G.W. Galloway Co.,
281 N.L.R.B. 262, 262 n.l (1986) ("The Board has explicitly recognized [a] limited eviden-
tiary privilege which protects the informal investigatorial and trial preparatory processes of
regulatory agencies such as the NLRB.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
115 38 F.L.R.A. 1300 (1991).
116 See United States v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361, 368-69 & n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that
"[tihe Authority relied on Cook Paint" when "the employee-union representative privilege
[was] established in... Customs Service") (internal quotation marks omitted); Brown, supra
note 19, at 1326 (asserting that "the Authority established the employee-union representative
privilege in . . . Customs Service").
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C. Customs Service
The Customs Service case arose under the Federal Service Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Statute ("FSLMRS" or the "Statute"),"l 7 a federal labor rela-
tions act patterned after the NLRA 18 that codifies the collective bargaining
rights of most federal employees,1 19 and generally governs "the investigation
and prosecution of unfair labor practices in the federal sector."' 2 ° As in Cook
Paint and City of Newburgh, the specific issue addressed in Customs Service
was whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice12 1 by questioning an
employee's union representative about statements the employee made to the
representative during the course of the employer's disciplinary investigation. 1
22
The FLRA, which has exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice
claims arising under the FSLMRS 123 and thus functions much like the NLRB
does in the private sector, 124 characterized the issue as one of first impression
117 5 U.S.C. § 7101-35 (1994). The FSLMRS is also occasionally referred to as the Federal
Labor-Management Relations Act, or "FLMRA." See FLRA v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 137
F.3d 683, 685 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1997).
118 See Rizzitelli v. FLRA, 212 F.3d 710, 712 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Congress intended the
FSLMRS to be the public-sector counterpart to the NLRA and structured the respective
[provisions] similarly."); Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 991 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The
FSLMRS is modeled after the National Labor Relations Act ....").
119 See U.S. Dep't of Energy v. FLRA, 880 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1989); see also
Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Congress intended
the... statutory scheme to serve the twin goals of protecting the right of public employees
to organize and bargain collectively, while simultaneously strengthening the authority of
federal management to hire and fire employees in the interest of a more effective public
service.").
120 United States v. Prof I Air Traffic Controllers Org., 504 F. Supp. 432, 434 (N.D. Ill.
1980), rev'd, 653 F.2d 1134 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Yates v. U.S. Soldiers' & Airmen's
Home, 533 F. Supp. 461, 463 (D.D.C. 1982) (noting that the FSLMRS "establishes a code of
unfair labor practices" and "empowers the FLRA to take action to prevent unfair labor
practices").
121 The FSLMRS makes it an unfair labor practice for a covered federal employer "to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the employee of any right"
under the act. 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(l). Among the rights secured by the Act is the right to the
presence of a union representative during "any examination of [the] employee ... in connec-
tion with [a disciplinary] investigation." Id. § 7114(a)(2)(B).
122 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1319 (stating that the issue in the case was "whether
the designated union representative of an employee in an actual or potential disciplinary
action can be examined by management concerning statements made by the employee to his,
or her, representative").
123 See 5 U.S.C. § 7105(a)(2)(G); Steadman v. Governor, U.S. Soldiers' and Airmen's
Home, 918 F.2d 963, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1990); cf. Yates, 533 F. Supp. at 465 (concluding that
"the FLRA's unfair labor practice jurisdiction ... preempts that of state and federal courts").
124 See Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 785 F.2d 333, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Library of Congress, 699 F.2d at 1283. However, the FSLMRS "is not a carbon copy of the
NLRA," and the FLRA's authority is therefore not precisely "the same as that of the
NLRB." Karahalios v. Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 534
(1989). For example, "[i]n some respects Congress granted the FLRA broader remedial
authority than is possessed by the NLRB." Prof 1 Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685
F.2d 547, 584 n.79 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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under the FSLMRS. 12 5 However, the FLRA recognized that the NLRB
decided a similar issue in Cook Paint,126 and therefore looked to that case for
guidance in determining whether a union representation privilege should be
recognized in FSLMRS cases.
127
In Customs Service, an employee accused of misconduct asked the local
union president to represent him in connection with the employer's disciplinary
proceedings.128 When it became apparent that the employee's recollection of
the underlying events had been refreshed after his meetings with the union
president,' 2 9 the employer instructed its investigator to interview the union
president. 130
At the outset of the union president's interview, he was informed that the
focus of the interview would be on what the accused employee told him about
the events under investigation. 131 The union president was also advised that he
was required to disclose any information he possessed pertaining to that matter,
and cautioned that he would be subject to disciplinary action if he refused to
answer the investigator's questions.
1 3 2
Both the union president and his own union representative protested the
employer's attempt to interview the union president.' 33 After the union presi-
dent ultimately submitted to the interview, 134 the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer under the FSLMRS.1 35 The union argued
that the existence of an evidentiary privilege "is an integral part of an
employee's statutory right to representation and the [union's] statutory right
and duty to provide representation,"' 3 6 because those rights would be meaning-
125 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1308. The potential recognition of the privilege had
previously been discussed, but not resolved, in Dep't of Justice, Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 36 F.L.R.A. 41, 65-66 & n.6 (1990).
126 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1303, 1324 (characterizing Cook Paint as a "similar
case").
127 See id. at 1308-09 & n.1. The FLRA has elsewhere indicated that in the "absence of
Authority precedent concerning [an] issue, it is both useful and appropriate to examine
[Board] precedent." Fed. Trade Comm'n, 35 F.L.R.A. 576, 584 (1990); see also Am. Fed'n
of Gov't Employees, 785 F.2d at 336 ("It is ... appropriate [to] consider the decisions of the
NLRB in [FLRA] cases.").
128 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1301, 1316.
129 At the time of his initial interview, the employee "claimed that he was an alcoholic
subject to functional blackouts and was unable to recall anything pertinent" to the matter.
Id. at 1301. However, after meeting with the union president, the employee "remembered
some of the events ... and described them in some detail." Id. at 1316.
130 Id. at 1302, 1317.
131 Id. at 1302, 1318.
132 Id. at 1302.
133 Id. The right to union representation at investigatory interviews applies even where the
individuals being interviewed are "themselves union agents and would normally be the rep-
resentatives of the union if [another] employee were to seek representation." Keystone Steel
& Wire Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 995, 997 (1975); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 253 N.L.R.B.
1143, 1151 (1981) (noting that a union steward has "no less of a statutory right to have union
representation than any other employee"); Commercial Nat'l Bank, 67 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 163, 165-66 (1976) (Lubow, Arb.) ("[A] request ... for representation should be
honored even if the [employee] is a Union officer.").
13 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1318-19.
135 See id. at 1314.
136 Id. at 1307.
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less unless employees could communicate with their representatives without
fear that those communications might subsequently be divulged to the
employer.137 The FLRA's General Counsel subsequently issued a complaint
based on the union's charge, 138 asserting that "the union's statutory right to
represent an employee facing disciplinary action must include the right to speak
confidentially with [the] employee."
' 139
The administrative law judge1 40 relied upon the Seventh Circuit's analysis
in Memorial Hospital v. Shadur14 1 in deciding whether the claimed privilege
should be recognized.1 4 1 While acknowledging the court's indication that evi-
dentiary privileges are disfavored and "not to be granted lightly,"1 4 3 the admin-
istrative law found that the court's analysis compelled him to consider "the
importance of the relationship or policy sought to be fostered by the privilege,
and the likelihood that recognition of the privilege will in fact protect that
relationship. '"144
In considering those issues, the administrative law judge recognized that
in many cases the union official representing an employee at an investigatory
interview is unlikely to be an attorney. 145 The judge also acknowledged that
"there can be no attorney-client privilege unless the party to whom the commu-
nication was made is an attorney."1 46 The judge nevertheless viewed the union
137 See id. at 1306-07.
138 See id. at 1300, 1314. The FLRA's General Counsel is authorized to handle unfair labor
practice charges in essentially the same manner as the NLRB's General Counsel. See Clark
v. Mark, 590 F. Supp. 1, 6 & n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 1980). Thus, the FLRA's General Counsel "has
the power to investigate and act on charges of unfair labor practices." Nat'l Fed'n of Fed.
Employees v. Commandant, Def. Language Inst., 493 F. Supp. 675, 680 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
This power includes the exclusive authority to "issue and prosecute unfair labor practice
complaints before the Authority." Turgeon v. FLRA, 677 F.2d 937, 938 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
139 Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1306. The year before Customs Service was decided, the
FLRA had expressly adopted the NLRB's view that "in order for the representation to be
effective, the employee and the union representative are entitled to consult before [an inves-
tigatory] interview." Fed. Aviation Admin., 35 F.L.R.A. 645, 652 (1990) (citing Pac. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1982), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 711
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983)).
140 The FSLMRS authorizes the FLRA to delegate to an administrative law judge its author-
ity to determine whether an employer has committed an unfair labor practice. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 7105(e)(2) (1994); Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. FLRA, 944 F.2d 922, 924 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
141 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981).
142 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1320. The court in Memorial Hospital noted that in
federal court litigation, "Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the framework
for determining whether material ... is privileged," and discussed "several principles to be
used in making the determination required under Rule 501." Id. at 1061. The application of
Rule 501 is discussed in more detail in Section III.A infra.
143 Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1319.
144 Id. at 1320 (quoting Mem'l Hosp., 664 F.2d at 1061-62).
145 See id. at 1323 (discussing the "advice and . . . defense" typically provided by an
employee's union representative "[e]ven though the representative is not an attorney"). See
generally Thomas v. Bakery, Confectionary & Tobacco Workers Union, 826 F.2d 755, 763
n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) ("A union representative need not be a lawyer and should not be held to a
lawyer's standard of care.").
146 Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1319 (citing Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 627 (9th Cir.
1960)); see also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 340
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representative's role in employer disciplinary investigations to be analogous to
that of an attorney.'
47
In particular, the judge found that, as in the attorney-client relationship,1 48
an employee must feel "free to make full and frank disclosures to his, or her,
representative in order that the employee have adequate advice and a proper
defense." 149 He therefore concluded that confidential communications between
employees and their union representatives, like those between clients and their
attorneys,1 50 should be protected by an evidentiary privilege. 151
The FLRA affirmed the administrative law judge's ruling and, with slight
modifications, adopted his decision.152 In particular, the FLRA agreed with the
judge's determination that an employer violates the FSLMRS by requiring a
union official to reveal, under threat of discipline, the substance of statements
made to him by an employee in the course of his representation of the
employee. 53 In language strikingly similar to that of the Board in Cook
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege does not extend to shield an [employee's]
communications with union representatives."); Rawlings v. Police Dep't of Jersey City, N.J.,
627 A.2d 602, 609 (N.J. 1993) (holding that an employee's conversation with his union
representative was not privileged because "the union representative was not a lawyer").
147 The judge indicated that "[w]hat this case involves, and all that it involves" is a determi-
nation of "whether the relationship between a union representative and an employee is analo-
gous to the attorney-client privilege [sic]." Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1319. The judge
then effectively answered the query in the affirmative, relying in part upon the employee's
explicit statutory right to be represented in employer disciplinary proceedings not only by a
union representative, but alternatively by "an attorney or other representative, other than the
[union] representative." Id. at 1323 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(5) (2000); see also Presi-
dent v. I11. Bell Tel. Co., 865 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (N.D. Ill. 1994) ("In advancing grievances
on behalf of a member, 'the union functions in a manner not wholly unlike that of an attor-
ney representing a client in court[.]'") (quoting Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890
F.2d 909, 919 (7th Cir. 1989)).
148 See United States v. Zolp, 659 F. Supp. 692, 715 (D. N.J. 1987) ("Communications
between attorneys and their clients are protected from disclosure to foster the policy of pro-
moting full and frank discussion between clients and their attorneys, thereby permitting liti-
gants and their counsel to fully evaluate the merits of a particular case ...."); Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 254 n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(discussing "the policy objective of the attorney-client privilege to encourage frank and full
disclosure of the realities of a client's situation to his attorney").
149 Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1323.
1'0 Courts considering the potential recognition of new evidentiary privileges frequently
focus on whether the relationships at issue are "sufficiently analogous to the conventional
attorney-client model to warrant the assertion of. . . privileges." In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595, 614 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
151 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1313-14 ("I conclude that statements by an employee
to his, or her, designated union representative are privileged ...."); cf. Loomis Armored
Inc., 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1097, 1101 (1990) (Gentile, Arb.) ("Arbitrators have treated
communications between a grievant and the union official advising the grievant with respect
to a grievance in a manner similar to the attorney-client privilege.") (quoting GREMG &
EsES, supra note 18, at 89).
152 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1300-01.
153 See id. at 1308; see also Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. 1021, 1029 n.5
(1992) (noting that "the Authority [in Customs Service] issued [a] decision agreeing with the
Judge that the [employer] in that case had committed the unfair labor practice alleged").
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Paint,154 the FLRA explained that the recognition of an evidentiary privilege
shielding such communications from discovery by the employer is necessary to
protect "basic employee rights under the Statute, the violation of which tends to
have a chilling effect throughout the [bargaining] unit on both employees seek-
ing union assistance and employees who serve in a representational
capacity."t55
The decision in Customs Service represents perhaps the broadest interpre-
tation of the union representation privilege by any tribunal to date. 156 Not only
did the FLRA characterize its holding as the recognition of an evidentiary privi-
lege,' 57 but the administrative law judge whose decision it adopted based his
recognition of the privilege on a perceived analogy to the attorney-client rela-
tionship that both the NLRB' 58 and the courts (including the court in City of
Newburgh v. Newman)' 59 have generally found unconvincing.1 61
'54 See Cook Paint, 258 N.L.R.B. at 1232 ("[An employer's] probe into [such] protected
activities... cast[s] a chilling effect over all of its employees and their stewards who seek to
candidly communicate with each other over matters involving potential or actual
discipline.").
155 Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1310; see also id. at 1306 ("[T]he chilling effect that
results from an interrogation of a union steward will interfere with both the employee who
seeks union assistance and the employees who represent the union .... ").
156 An employee's right to union representation at an investigatory interview is not explicit
in the NLRA, but instead was "quite belatedly" found by the NLRB to be implicit in the
language of section 7 of the Act. See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1321 n.6 (citing J.
Weingarten, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 446, enforcement denied, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973),
rev'd, 420 U.S. 251 (1975)). Because Congress specifically codified the right in the
FSLMRS, see 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)(2)(A)&(B), the parameters of the right - including the
extent to which it encompasses an evidentiary privilege - may "evolve differently" under the
two acts. Headquarters Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Wash., D.C., 50 F.L.R.A. 601,
608 n.5 (1995), enforced, 120 F.3d 1208 (1lth Cir. 1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. 229 (1999).
157 In particular, the FLRA "adopt(ed] the Judge's ... conclusion[ I" that "there is a privi-
lege that protects communications between an employee and a union representative." Cus-
toms Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1301, 1304. Interestingly, even the employer had conceded that a
"communication between a union representative and an employee is entitled to some level of
privilege." Id. at 1304.
158 See, e.g., United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus.,
242 N.L.R.B. 1203, 1203 n.3 (1979) ("A union's duty to an employee is not analogous to
that of an attorney to a client."); Serv. Employees Int'l Union, 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 692 n.2
(1977) ("[W]e do not adopt any implication that, in the informal, investigative, or bargaining
stage of a grievance, a collective-bargaining representative's duty to an employee it repre-
sents is analogous to that owed by an attorney to a client."); Int'l Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union, 122 N.L.R.B. 1390, 1401 (1959) ("[T]he rule of secrecy governing the conduct of
attorneys has special significance for the legal profession ... and is not a rule of general
application to the relationship between a labor organization and its agent.").
'59 421 N.Y.S.2d 673, 676 (App. Div. 1979) (describing as "without merit" the contention
that the union representation privilege is "on a par with that of attorney-client").
160 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 339
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("Membership in a union cannot be described as 'an institutionalized sub-
stitute' for the attorney-client relationship.") (quoting Kandel v. Tocher, 256 N.Y.S.2d 898,
902 (App. Div. 1965)). The Supreme Court has identified some of the reasons for this
skepticism:
The . . . analogy is inadequate in several respects .... Unlike employees represented by a
union, a client controls the significant decisions concerning his representation [by an attorney].
Moreover, a client can fire his attorney if he is dissatisfied with his attorney's performance. This
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Despite the broad potential ramifications of this analogy, 161 the FLRA's
recognition of a union representation privilege (and, prior to that, the implicit
recognition of such a privilege in City of Newburgh and Cook Paint & Var-
nish) 16 2 is persuasive, 16 3 at least as a matter of labor-management relations
law.' 64 One of the principal purposes of the right to union representation in an
investigatory interview is "to eliminate the inequality of bargaining power
between employees and employers"' 165 by permitting the union representative
"to provide assistance and counsel to the employee being interrogated."'
166
While the employee's apparent lack of candor at the outset of the
employer's investigation"' is not to be commended, 168 the facts in Customs
Service illustrate one of the potential benefits of giving union representatives
this advisory role in employer investigations. 169 In particular, an unrepresented
option is not available to an individual employee who is unhappy with a union's representation,
unless a majority of the members of the bargaining unit share his dissatisfaction.
Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 568-69 (1990).
161 The attorney-client privilege is "the oldest and most revered of the legally recognized
privileges protecting confidential communications." United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504,
512 (9th Cir. 1997). To the extent the union representation privilege is deemed analogous to
the attorney-client privilege, the union representation privilege may be "virtually sacro-
sanct." McClary v. Walsh, 202 F.R.D. 286, 294 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
162 In Customs Service, the FLRA specifically asserted that "the principle applied by the
NLRB [in Cook Paint] is no different" than the evidentiary privilege it was recognizing.
Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1303.
163 See United States Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361, 369 & n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
("We do not question [the] reasoning [of Customs Service and Cook Paint] insofar as it
applies to management.").
164 Labor-management relations has been described as a "unique and pervasively regulated
area," Donovan v. Master Printers Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 1140, 1148 (N.D. 111. 1981), with
"rules which are not necessarily applicable" in other areas of the law. Bd. of Educ. of
County of Berkeley v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439, 445-56 (W. Va. 1977).
165 NLRB v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 730 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1984) (internal punc-
tuation and citation omitted); see also Morais v. Cent. Beverage Union Employees' Supple-
mental Retirement Plan, 167 F.3d 709, 714 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that a union
representative's "primary function is to equalize the mismatch between the employer and an
individual employee").
166 N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 277, 279 (1992) (citing NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc.,
420 U.S. 251, 262-63 (1975)); see also Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 890 F.2d 909,
920 (7th Cir. 1989) (observing that "the union official serves as advocate for and counselor
to the grievant").
167 See Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. at 1317 (referring to the employee's "apparent" recov-
ery of memory); cf. Monroe Mfg., Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 24, 35 (1997) (describing another
individual who "feigned lack of memory ... in order to avoid embarrassing questions"); N.J.
Bell Tel. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. at 300 (discussing an employee who "was being uncooperative
at the interview, by failing to answer questions that he should have been able to respond to").
168 See generally North Elec. Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 1, 1 (1969) (noting that "the Board does
not condone [an employee's] lack of candor ... with the [employer]"); St. Luke's Hosp., 93
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1241, 1245 (1989) (Johnson, Arb.) ("The [employee] has a... duty
to diligently present all pertinent information which may affect a disciplinary decision.").
169 See generally Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1198 (1977) ("[O]ne of the
objectives of Weingarten is to promote good-faith discussions at the investigatory level so
that problems may be solved at this level, thus preventing needless hard feelings at a later
stage."), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
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employee accused of misconduct, fearful of the employer's intentions, 170 may
decide to "'dummy up' in the face of ... attempts by his employer to question
him" '' as appears to have occurred in Customs Service. 172 This tendency to
"stonewall" the employer's investigation171 may be less prevalent if a union
representative is present during the employer's interrogation of the
employee. 7 4 The Supreme Court itself alluded to this benefit when it recog-
nized the right to such representation in Weingarten:
A single employee confronted by an employer investigating whether certain conduct
deserves discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident
being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable
union representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts, and save
the employer production time by getting to the bottom of the incident occasioning the
interview. 
175
Significantly, a union representative cannot function properly in this role
without "an opportunity to consult beforehand with the employee to learn his
170 See generally Montgomery Ward & Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1984) ("[Tlhe fear and
confusion an employee subjected to an investigatory interview may experience is relevant in
the Weingarten context .... Simply stated, employees are accorded representation, in large
part, because they are frightened and confused.").
171 System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. 723, 727 (1988); see also Gonzales Packing Co., 304 N.L.R.B.
805, 810 n.16 (1991) (describing an employee who "had decided.., to dummy-up; that is,
to pretend to an almost total lack of recollection as the best means of ensuring that he could
not be blamed"); cf. Serv. Tech. Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 845, 847 n.11 (1972) (describing
employees who "would in all probability have refused to talk even if afforded union
representation").
172 The NLRB has indicated that an individual who asserts that he is "unable to recall" a
particular incident, and then subsequently "reveal[s] that he [does] recall," initially may have
been "withholding information through the stock answer, 'I don't remember."' Grand Cent.
Aircraft Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 1114, 1171 n.61 (1953); cf. ITT Continental Baking Co., 246
N.L.R.B. 1047, 1051 (1979) (finding that an employee's "belated recollection ... was a
contrivance").
173 See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., 280 N.L.R.B. 720, 729 (1986) (describing an employee's
"attempt to stonewall [the employer's] investigation to cover up his own wrongdoing"); cf.
Pac. Tel & Tel. Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 1048, 1052 (1982) (Hunter, dissenting) (asserting that "an
employer's wish to carry out his investigation without being unduly impeded is not ...
prejudicial to an honest employee"), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 711
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983).
171 See, e.g., N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 308 N.L.R.B. 277, 293 (1992) (describing a union represen-
tative who advised employees that if they were interviewed in connection with an employer
investigation, they should "request union representation, [and] cooperate in the investiga-
tion"). But see Manville Prods. Corp., 269 N.L.R.B. 390, 391 (1984) (referring to an
employee who "in his role as union steward, advised others not to answer"); Climax Molyb-
denum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1193 (Penello and Walther, dissenting) (predicting that some
union representatives will use the opportunity for a pre-interview consultation with the
employee to "bring[ ] pressures to bear on [the] employee to withhold the facts").
175 N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 262-63 (1975); see also U.S. Postal Serv.,
241 N.L.R.B. 141, 151-52 (1979) ("[Allthough during a Weingarten interview the union
representative is present to assist the employee . . .the union representative can properly
elicit facts favorable to the employer as well as to the employee and is not expected to render
the interview an adversary proceeding."); Customs Serv., 5 F.L.R.A. 297, 306 (1981)
("[T]he employee may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate an incident accurately[.] ...
[T]he union representative could assist the employer in eliciting the facts and get 'to the
bottom of the incident.' ").
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version of the events and to gain a familiarity with the facts." '17 6 In this regard,
an employee undoubtedly would be more inclined "to discuss the incident fully
and accurately with his union representative without the presence of an
[employer representative] contemplating the possibility of disciplinary
action." 177
This recognition of an employee's need for privacy when consulting with
a union representative 178 would be meaningless if the employer could subse-
quently compel the union representative (or, for that matter, the employee) to
disclose their confidential communications. 179 This obviously suggests the
need for some form of evidentiary privilege applicable to such communica-
tions.18° The critical unresolved question is the extent to which such a privi-
lege should apply in forums other than those (like the PERB, the NLRB, and
the FLRA) devoted exclusively to the resolution of labor-management
disputes. 181
176 Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190; see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. NLRB,
969 F.2d 1064, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Absent ... familiarity [with the matter under inves-
tigation], the representative will not be well-positioned to aid in a full and cogent presenta-
tion of the employee's view of the matter, bringing to light justifications, explanations,
extenuating circumstances, and other mitigating factors.").
177 Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1190 (emphasis added); cf. Ortonix, Inc., 173
N.L.R.B. 385, 390 n.25 (1968) (asserting that an employee, "if she did engage in.. . activ-
ity[ ] contrary to [a] company rule, would not be likely to disclose that fact to higher
management").
178 See System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. 723, 727-28 (1988) (indicating that an employee's "right
to consult with an employee representative before undergoing an [investigatory] interview"
includes the right to consult "in a candid, private setting," because "a private, candid confer-
ence with an employee representative might give him a more reliable basis for deciding how
to answer [the employer's] question[s]"); Bureau of Prisons, 52 F.L.R.A. 421, 440-41 (1996)
(Wasserman, dissenting) ("[A] union representative must be allowed to take an active role in
assisting an employee's defense .... [A] representative cannot adequately perform [that]
,active role' . . . if he or she is not permitted sufficient privacy to confer with an employee
when the employee most needs assistance.").
179 See generally Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300, 1309 n.1 (1991) ("[T]he rights of
employees to be represented by their labor organizations in disciplinary proceedings would
be seriously weakened if the confidentiality of their conversations with union representatives
could be easily violated.").
18' See HILL & SINACROPI, supra note 19, at 164 (asserting that an employee's confidential
communications with a union representative "should be privileged" because the employee's
right to union representation would otherwise be "worthless") (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co.,
86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1112, 1118 (1986) (Richman, Arb.)).
181 Compare Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 155 (Ct. App. 2003)
(questioning "why [the Board's] narrow holding [in Cook Paint] should be adopted to create
a new evidentiary privilege in civil actions") with Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A.
1021, 1029 (1992) (asserting that, "as a general principle, statements by an employee to his
or her designated union representative are privileged and information acquired by a union
official while engaged in protected [representational] activity should be protected from dis-
closure") (emphasis added).
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III. THE POTENTIAL RECOGNITION OF A UNION REPRESENTATION PRIVILEGE
UNDER RULE 501 AND THE WIGMORE TEST
A. The Courts' Authority to Recognize New Evidentiary Privileges Under
Rule 501
Neither the NLRB nor the FLRA (nor, for that matter, the New York state
court that decided City of Newburgh)18 2 is bound by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.1 8 3 However, both state courts184 and federal boards and administrative
agencies frequently look to the federal rules for guidance in analyzing eviden-
tiary issues that come before them. 85 Rule 501 of the rules addresses the sub-
ject of evidentiary privileges. 8 6 It states, in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivi-
sion thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 187
This language obviously provides no specific guidance with respect to the
possible existence of a union representation privilege. 188 However, in Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,189 the United States Supreme Court concluded
that the rule reflects "a congressional desire 'not to freeze the law of privi-
182 See New York v. Santana, 600 N.E.2d 201, 205 (N.Y. 1992) (noting that "the Federal
Rules of Evidence... [are] not binding" in New York state court proceedings); New York v.
Philips, 692 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917 (Sup. Ct. 1999) ("[Tjhe Federal Rules of Evidence do not
bind this Court .... ).
183 See Alvin J. Bart & Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 242, 242 (1978) ("[T]he Board is not bound to
follow the strict rules of evidence applicable in the Federal courts."); U.S. Dep't of Veterans
Affairs, 57 F.L.R.A. 681, 682 (2002) (noting that "the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
govern Authority proceedings"). See generally Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201, 1205
(9th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he Federal Rules of Evidence apply only to courts and proceedings
conducted by judges.").
184 See Minot Sand & Gravel Co., 231 N.W.2d 716, 727-28 (N.D. 1975) ("Even though [the
federal] rules are not mandatory upon State courts, they nevertheless constitute a reliable
guide for State courts, in the absence of statutory provisions on the subject matter or rules of
evidence declaring otherwise."); cf. Latine v. Mann, 830 F. Supp. 774, 779 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) (asserting that a federal evidence rule was "not applicable at [a] state court trial....
but [was nevertheless] useful, as are other parts of those rules, for definitional purposes"),
vacated and remanded, 725 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1994).
185 See, e.g., Guirguess v. U.S. Postal Serv., 32 Fed. Appx. 555, 563 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern Board proceedings, they provide
helpful guidance for proper [administrative] hearing practices."). For an academic discus-
sion of this issue, see Richard J. Pierce, Use of the Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal
Agency Adjudications, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (1987).
186 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 378 (3d Cir. 1990); Walker v. Lewis,
127 F.R.D. 466, 468 (W.D.N.C. 1989).
187 FED. R. EVID. 501.
188 See generally Montone v. Radio Shack, 698 F. Supp. 92, 94 (E.D. Pa. 1988) ("[W]hen
[Congress] ... adopted Rule 501, it offered little guidance by way of statutory language or
legislative history as to what constitutes a 'privilege' for the purposes of the rule."); I11.
Educ. Labor Relations Bd. v. Homer Cmty. Consol. School Dist., 514 N.E.2d 465, 470 (I!1.
Ct. App. 1987) (noting that Rule 501 "does not attempt to define or even list the various
common law privileges"), aft'd, 547 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1989).
189 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
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lege'" as it existed at the time the rule was enacted,' 90 and thus permits privi-
lege law to evolve and develop incrementally. 9 ' Thus, in the absence of a
federal constitutional or statutory provision 11 2 or Supreme Court rule'9' to the
contrary (which does not exist in this context), 19 4 Rule 501 authorizes the fed-
eral courts, and Congress, 195 to recognize new evidentiary privileges on a case-
by-case basis.
196
As a matter of policy, it might be preferable for Congress (or the state
legislatures)' 97 to take the initiative in recognizing a union representation privi-
190 Id. at 189 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
19' See Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at
47). See generally United States ex rel. Falsetti v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 915 F. Supp. 308,
310 (N.D. Fla. 1996) ("University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C. is especially important for it
sets forth the rules for determining generally whether a new privilege exists under Rule
501.").
192 See Roberts v. Hunt, 187 F.R.D. 71, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) ("Fed. R. Evid. 501 states that
other than as established by the Constitution or Congress privileges in federal court pro-
ceedings are determined under the principles of the common law and by reason and experi-
ence.") (emphasis added); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F.
Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("The federal common law is inapplicable when
Congress enacts a law governing a particular privilege.") (citing FED. R. EVID. 501), aff'd,
216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
193 See Montone, 698 F. Supp. at 95 ("Congress, in adopting Rule 501 .... did not at the
same time express an intention to ... mute the effect of other federal evidentiary rules."); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Sealed), 607 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
Rule 501 leaves the development of privilege law to the courts "in the absence of federal
statute or rule").
194 See generally Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 1960) ("We have been cited
to no federal statute or rule purporting to set up federal rules governing privilege in civil
cases."); Kelly v. San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("[T]here has been no
codification of federal privilege law.").
195 Congress clearly has the authority to recognize new evidentiary privileges. See
D'Aurizio v. Palisades Park, 899 F. Supp. 1352, 1359 (D.N.J. 1995) ("Rule 501 contem-
plates that privileges may derive from ... Act of Congress .... ); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1005 n.8 (D.N.J.) ("[T]here is
no doubt that Congress could ... fashion privileges which may give way only in certain
specified situations ...."), affd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989). However, it has not done so
in the present context. See, e.g., Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146,
154 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding nothing "that expressly or implicitly indicates Congress
intended to create a communications privilege between union representatives and
employees").
196 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Rule 501 grants
the federal courts power to create new privileges ... as the need arises ...."); Roberts, 187
F.R.D. at 75 ("The recognition of new privileges in federal court evolves on a case-by-case
basis."); Farley v. Farley, 952 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (observing that "flexi-
bility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis is the hallmark of Rule 501")
(citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
197 Prior to the adoption of Rule 501, "neither Congress nor the federal courts played a
significant role in the development of the American law of testimonial privileges; state legis-
lators and local courts largely determined what privileges would be recognized." In re
Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1322 (D. Nev. 1983) (quoting Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Inter-
personal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested
Approach, 64 GEO. L.J. 613, 614 (1976)). In addition, although the rule's provision for the
common law development of federal privileges now makes it clear that "state privilege law
is not controlling in federal question cases," Freed v. Grand Court Lifestyles, Inc., 100
F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (S.D. Ohio 1998), the Supreme Court has indicated that federal courts
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lege. 1 98 Courts expressing reluctance to recognize new evidentiary privileges
have often asserted that the legislative branch of government is better-equipped
to weigh the competing social policies at issue in considering whether a privi-
lege should be recognized. 199 As one federal appellate court has stated:
The legislature, not the judiciary, is institutionally better equipped to perform the
balancing of the competing policy issues required in deciding whether the recogni-
tion of a ... privilege is in the best interests of society. Congress, through its legisla-
tive mechanisms, is also better suited for the task of defining the scope of any
prospective privilege. Congress is able to consider, for example, society's moral,
sociological, economic, religious and other values without being confined to the evi-
dentiary record in any particular case. Thus, in determining whether a... privilege
should obtain, Congress can take into consideration a host of facts and factors which
the judiciary may be unable to consider.200
Nevertheless, balancing the competing policy interests underlying the
potential adoption of an evidentiary privilege is not exclusively a legislative
function.2 °1 The recognition of such a privilege instead "represents a determi-
nation - either judicial or legislative - that fostering certain relationships out-
weighs the potential benefit to the judicial system of compelled disclosure. ' 20 2
Indeed, because "Rule 501 was adopted precisely because Congress wished to
should "treat a consistent body of policy determinations by state legislatures as reflecting
both 'reason' and 'experience"' when considering the possible recognition of a federal com-
mon law privilege. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996).
198 See Am. Airlines, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 153 ("Although there may be various ... policy
reasons why a union representative should not be compelled during civil litigation to dis-
close factual information obtained from other union members he or she represents, that pol-
icy determination (and the parameters of any concomitant evidentiary privilege) is the
province of the Legislature, not [the] court[s]."); cf. United States ex rel. Riley v. Franzen,
653 F.2d 1153, 1160 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[C]ourts have been reluctant to create new privileges,
preferring to leave such matters to the legislature despite any policy reasons supporting rec-
ognition of a particular privilege.").
199 See, e.g., Am. Airlines, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 155 ("Whether an allegedly unfair labor prac-
tice should rise to the level of creating an evidentiary privilege, and under what circum-
stances, are questions more appropriately posed to and answered by the legislative branch.");
see also In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154 (3d Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts ... should be
circumspect about creating new privileges based upon perceived public policy considera-
tions. This is particularly so where there exist policy concerns which the legislature is better
equipped to evaluate."); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 430 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The delicate
balancing of the interests implicated [by the potential recognition of an evidentiary privilege]
is more properly a concern of the legislature of [a] state.").
20 In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d at 1154-55 (footnote omitted) (considering the potential
recognition of a parent-child privilege).
201 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 14, 1989, 728 F. Supp. 368, 370 (W.D. Pa.
1990) ("In developing the federal common law of privilege, federal courts attempt to balance
the public's need for the full development of'relevant facts in federal litigation against the
need for confidentiality in order to achieve the objectives underlying the privilege
claimed."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp.
999, 1005 (D.N.J.) ("[T]hough this balancing of interests seems incongruously legislative in
nature, we take some solace in ... the fact that our task is by no means alien to us."), affd,
879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989).
212 Diehl v. Texas, 698 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. App. 1985) (Levy, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added); see also Illinois v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 93 (111. 1988) (Simon, J., dissenting) ("In
determining which interests and relationships should be protected by privilege, and to what
extent they should be protected, courts and legislatures must balance the [public's] interest
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leave privilege questions to the courts rather than attempt to codify them,
213
the recognition of new evidentiary privileges has to a large extent now become
a "uniquely judicial function[ ]y,,o4
B. The Wigmore Test for Recognizing New Evidentiary Privileges
1. Background
Courts applying Rule 501 frequently rely upon what has come to be
known as the "Wigmore test ' '2 5 in determining whether to recognize a new
common law privilege.2 6 As one federal court stated:
[One] standard to be applied in determining whether a privilege should be recognized
is that propounded by Wigmore. The Wigmore test provide[s]:
1) The communication must originate in a confidence that it will not be
disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory
maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which, in the opinion of the community, ought to
be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communi-
cation must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal
of litigation.
20 7
in the privilege against the constraints the privilege places on the fair and effective adminis-
tration of justice.") (emphasis added).
203 United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 803 (1984); see also In re Sealed
Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Congress has preferred to leave to the
courts questions of which privileges to recognize and when to apply them."); Grand Jury
Subpoena, 728 F. Supp. at 370 (noting that Rule 501 "grants to the federal judiciary the
responsibility of developing recognized privileges and formulating new privileges").
204 Kuprion v. Fitzgerald, 888 S.W.2d 679, 688 n.2 (Ky. 1994) (Miller, J., concurring)
(emphasis added); see also Socialist Workers Party v. Grubisic, 619 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir.
1980) ("[F]ederal common law is the source of any privilege."); United States v. Cameron,
556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Rule 501[ ] places on the federal courts the responsibil-
ity of examining the policies behind the federal common law privileges so as to alter or
amend them when reason and experience demand."); Raymond F. Miller, Comment, Creat-
ing Evidentiary Privileges: An Argument for the Judicial Approach, 31 CONN. L. REv. 771,
771 & n.2 (1999) ("The federal system relies almost exclusively on the judicial recognition
of new privileges.") (citing FED. R. EvID. 501).
205 See Hanson v. Allen Mem'l Hosp., 141 F.R.D. 115, 122 n.13 (S.D. Iowa 1992). This
characterization stems from the fact that the test was originally formulated by Professor
Wigmore in his highly regarded treatise on the law of evidence. See Douglas v. Windham
Superior Court, 597 A.2d 774, 777 (Vt. 1991) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6 § 2285, at
527). Although other aspects of Professor Wigmore's treatise have become somewhat out-
dated, his view of evidentiary privileges "continues to exercise considerable sway, more than
any other part of the dean's treatise." Imwinkelreid, supra note 21, at 316.
206 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 383-84 (3d Cir. 1990); In re
Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Thomas J. Molony, Is the Supreme Court
Ready to Recognize Another Privilege? An Examination of the Accountant-Client Privilege
in the Aftermath of Jaffee v. Redmond, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 247, 286 (1998) (noting
that the judiciary's approach to recognizing new privileges under Rule 501 "appears to be
evolving toward that used by Wigmore").
207 In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1308 (D. Nev. 1983) (emphasis omitted) (citing 8
WIGMORE, supra note 6 § 2285, at 527).
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In applying this test, federal courts have generally been hesitant to recog-
nize new evidentiary privileges,2 °8 primarily because privileges exclude rele-
vant evidence and impede the search for truth.209 Nevertheless, courts have
been willing to recognize new privileges when doing so would promote "suffi-
ciently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence. '210 An
analysis of the Wigmore test suggests that the privacy interests underlying the
relationship between employees and their union representatives rise to this
level,2 11 and that the recognition of a union representation privilege would
therefore be appropriate.212
2. Walker v. Huie
The first federal court decision to apply the Wigmore test in considering
the possible recognition of a union representation privilege was Walker v.
Huie. 13 In that case, the defendant was a police officer accused of violating
the plaintiffs' rights during an arrest. 214 The plaintiffs sought to depose the
union official who represented the officer in internal police department discipli-
nary proceedings.2 15 Both the officer and the union official objected to the
deposition, asserting that any communications between them were
privileged.2 16
The court began its analysis by noting that "Professor Wigmore has
described four criteria which are useful in analyzing and determining whether
[a] court should create a new evidentiary privilege. 2 17 Under the facts
presented,21 8 the court concluded that the first two criteria of the test were
208 The "criteria of the Wigmore test" have been described as "demanding." Solarex Corp.
v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); cf. Hercules, Inc. v. Martin Mari-
etta Corp., 143 F.R.D. 266, 270 n.7 (D. Utah 1992) ("Professor Wigmore recognized that
privileges frustrate truth and are an exception to the liability of every person to give
evidence.").
209 See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690 n.29 (1972) ("The creation of new
testimonial privileges has been met with disfavor by commentators since such privileges
obstruct the search for truth."); Dixon v. Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J., 521 A.2d 1315, 1317
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) ("As privileges do not further the ascertainment of truth but
rather permit the concealment of relevant, reliable information, courts have been reluctant to
expand or create new privileges in the absence of compelling reasons.").
210 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980)); see also In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Privileges
are based upon the idea that certain societal values are more important than the search for
truth").
211 Compare Knickerbocker Plastic Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 586, 586 (1951) (discussing "employ-
ees' right to privacy in their union activities") with In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1323
(D. Nev. 1983) (noting that "interpersonal testimonial privileges serve as important protec-
tors of the right of privacy") (quoting Krattenmaker, supra note 197, at 616).
212 See Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 522 ("Professor Wigmore's privilege definition
provides [a] foothold for advancing the labor official privilege outside the administrative
realm and into common law privilege status.").
213 142 F.R.D. 497 (D. Utah 1992).
214 See id. at 498-99.
215 See id. at 499.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 500.
218 Application of the Wigmore test is often highly fact-specific. See, e.g., Zaustinsky v.
Univ. of Cal., 96 F.R.D. 622, 625 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (stating that the impact of Wigmore's
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satisfied in the union representation context.219 However, the court also con-
cluded that neither the third nor the fourth element of the test was satisfied.22°
Because satisfaction of all four prongs of the Wigmore test is ordinarily a pre-
requisite to the recognition of a new evidentiary privilege, 22 the court declined
to create a new union representation privilege.
222
The Walker court's analysis of the Wigmore test was relatively cursory,2 23
and the conclusions reached in that case are certainly debatable.224 Indeed, a
more thorough analysis of the Wigmore criteria strongly suggests that the union
representation privilege "meets Wigmore's fundamental conditions test and
should be recognized as a common-law privilege applicable to all labor
disputes. 2 2 5
fourth criterion on the potential recognition of an evidentiary privilege "cannot be resolved
in the abstract but only in the particular litigation context in which [the issue] arises");
Molony, supra note 206, at 261 (noting that "the Wigmore criteria ... facilitate a case-by-
case approach to all privileges").
219 See Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 500. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied primarily
upon affidavits submitted by the officer and his union representative, which reflected that
they both "intended that their communications remain confidential," and considered such
confidentiality to be "essential for the relationship between them." Id.
220 See id. at 500-01.
221 See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1152 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Dean Wigmore's four-factor
formula requires satisfaction of all four factors in order to establish a privilege."); FIT Corp.
v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177, 186 (M.D. Fla. 1973) ("[T]he testimonial privilege
relative to confidential communications will be available only if all four of Professor Wig-
more's conditions ... are satisfied ....") (footnote omitted); In re Inquest Proceedings, 676
A.2d 790, 792 (Vt. 1996) ("The party seeking creation of the privilege has the burden of
satisfying the four Wigmore conditions, and must satisfy all four conditions before the privi-
lege will be recognized.") (citations omitted).
222 See Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 501.
223 For example, the court's analysis of the fourth prong of the test was limited solely to the
following unexplained observations: "With respect to criteria four, there will no doubt be
injury to the relationship between [employees] and their union representatives. However the
court does not find that that injury is greater than the benefit gained 'for a correct disposal of
the litigation."' Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 501 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6 § 2285, at
527).
224 Compare Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 524 n.254 (asserting that the Walker
court "refused to recognize the important public policy behind the union/union member rela-
tionship") with In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 335
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("This court finds the reasoning of Walker persuasive ....").
225 Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 522; see also Daiske Yoshida, The Applicability of
the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications with Foreign Legal Professionals, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 215-16 & n.43 (1997) ("Wigmore himself proposed that a 'profes-
sional privilege' be recognized for non-lawyer administrative practitioners on the principle
that people who seek their advice would be in the position of clients.") (citing 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 6 § 2300a, at 582).
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C. Applying the Wigmore Test to the Union Representation Privilege
1. Communications Between Employees and Their Union
Representatives May Originate in a Confidence That They Will
Not Be Disclosed
Although the inquiry is typically fact-specific, 226 many communications
between employees and their union representatives are premised upon an
expectation that they will not be disclosed to others.2 27 In Stow Manufacturing
Co.,2 2 8 for example, a group of employees submitted signed union authoriza-
tion cards 22 9 to a union in reliance on its assurance that both the cards and the
identities of the employees who signed them would be kept confidential.2 3 °
The union's assurance presumably reflected its desire "to protect the con-
fidentiality interests of employees because of the possibility of intimidation by
employers who obtain the identity of employees engaged in organizing, ' 231 as
well as the union's own interest in obtaining signed authorization cards from
the employees.2 32  Assuring confidentiality is, in fact, a common union
organizing tactic, 2 3 3 and the Board has generally taken the position that "[a]
226 The NLRB has indicated that "not ... all discussions between employees and [their
union representatives] are confidential." Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 1230,
1232 (1981). See generally Shrecker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 74 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35
(D.D.C. 1999) (discussing the "case-by-case inquiry" necessary to determine whether a par-
ticular individual "spoke with an understanding that the communication would remain confi-
dential") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), affd in part and rev'd in part, 254
F.3d 162 (D.C. Cir. 2001).'
227 See, e.g., NLRB v. A.W. Thompson, Inc., 525 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1976) (describing
a union's use of direct mailing "as a means of employee communication because of the
privacy of the communication"); see also City of Newburgh v. Newman, 421 N.Y.S.2d 673,
675 (App. Div. 1979) (observing that "internal communications .. , like other internal union
affairs. ... may be deemed confidential by the union and the employees").
228 103 N.L.R.B. 1280 (1953).
229 Obtaining signed authorization cards from employees in a bargaining unit is the typical
means by which a union makes the preliminary "showing of interest" necessary to obtain a
Board investigation into whether the union represents a majority of the employees in the
unit. See NLRB v. Metro-Truck Body, Inc., 613 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1979); Motion
Picture & Videotape Editors Guild, 311 N.L.R.B. 801, 806 (1993); Passaic Daily News, 222
N.L.R.B. 1162, 1166 n.13 (1976).
230 See Stow Mfg., 103 N.L.R.B. 1230, 1285-86 n.6 (1953).
231 Wright Elec., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 1194, 1195 (1999), enforced, 200 F.3d 1162 (8th Cir.
2000); see also Manila Mfg. Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 1259, 1261 (1968) ("[A]n employee's desire
to conceal the fact that he has signed an authorization card has its origin in the fear of
employer retaliation.").
232 The Board has noted "the vital role played by the solicitation of authorization cards in an
organizational campaign and the chilling effect on the right of employees to signify their
union support if they know that their employer can readily ascertain their identity." Logo 7,
Inc., 284 N.L.R.B.:204, 204 (1987); see also Windee's Metal Indus., Inc., 309 N.L.R.B.
1074, 1075 n.5 (1992) ("[S]uch common organizational tools as soliciting authorization
cards ... have as their ultimate goal the union's recognition as majority representative.").
233 See Collins & Aikman Corp., 187 N.L.R.B. 620, 621 (1970) (discussing the assertion
that "union organizers 'always' assure employees that the union cards they sign are confi-
dential and would not be seen by anybody but the Union and the Labor Board"); M. Koppel
Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 975, 978 (1967) (observing that it is "common practice among labor
organizations ... [to] attempt to keep information received in connection with membership
applications or authorization cards as confidential as possible"); Consol. Rendering Co., 161
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signature on an organization card is confidential and essentially none of the
employer's business except as subsequent litigation might make it relevant. "234
Many other statutorily protected union activities may involve confidential
communications,235 such as strategic discussions between employees and their
representatives during union meetings.23 6 Indeed, the statutory protection
afforded the latter type of communication2 11 reflects the employees' expecta-
tion that their conversations during union meetings will remain confidential:
It is self-evident that when a union member goes to a closed union meeting for the
purpose of discussing his or her legal rights against the employer ... the member
rationally would expect that any statements made concerning the legal problem
would remain confidential. The fear of possible employer retribution would compel
a reasonable expectation of privacy on the member's part .... 238
The fact that employees and their union representatives may expect their
communications to remain confidential2 39 does not necessarily make those
communications privileged. 40 The Board itself has noted that "the mere fact
N.L.R.B. 1, 14 (1966) ("It is well known that it is the policy of labor unions to keep their
authorization cards confidential, and that they are loath to show such cards to employers.").
234 Foamex, 315 N.L.R.B. 858, 864 (1994); see also NLRB v. Martin's Ferry Hosp. Ass'n,
649 F.2d 445, 449 (6th Cir. 1981) ("Authorization cards are not discoverable by an employer
under the rules of the Board .. "); Int'l Union v. Garner, 102 F.R.D. 108, 114 (M.D. Tenn.
1984) ("[U]nion authorization cards signed by ... employees should be protected from
discovery as privileged communications.").
235 See, e.g., Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(discussing a union's "organizing strategy" and "other secrets"); Garner, 102 F.R.D. at 113
(discussing the potentially privileged nature of "documents or internal memoranda relating
to [a union's] policy or plan to unionize [a] plant"); Detroit Newspaper Agency, 326
N.L.R.B. 700, 751 n.25 (1998) (noting "the importance of ... bargaining strategy confidenti-
ality"); Foamex, 315 N.L.R.B. at 864 (referring generally to "the secrecy of an organizing
campaign").
236 See, e.g., Winery, Distillery & Allied Workers Union, 296 N.L.R.B. 519, 522 (1989)
(referring to "proceedings or deliberations of the Union relative to Union meetings, negotia-
tion discussions, and similar confidential communications"); Bureau of Engraving & Print-
ing, 15 F.L.R.A. 977, 982 (1984) (indicating that "union meetings between employees.., by
their nature are private").
237 The Board has described "statements ... made at a union meeting" as "intraunion activ-
ity protected under the Act." UAW, 248 N.L.R.B. 1013, 1015 (1980); see also Raytheon
Missile Sys. Div., 279 N.L.R.B. 245, 248 (1986) ("There is no question that attendance at a
union meeting ... is protected activity."). Courts also recognize that "union meeting activi-
ties" are "generally a protected area." Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n v. City of Van-
couver, 33 P.3d 74, 83 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
238 Benge v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. Rptr. 275, 281-82 (Ct. App. 1982); see also Int'l
Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (describing employees who
"claim[ed] that they had a reasonable expectation that their participation in [union] meetings
and the topics discussed therein were private"); Caldor, Inc., 319 N.L.R.B. 728, 732 (1995)
(discussing an employee who "thought that her union meetings were private").
239 See generally 52nd Street Hotel Assocs., 321 N.L.R.B. 624, 637 (1996) ("It is well
established that employees have a paramount interest in keeping their union activities confi-
dential from their employer."); Application of Dist. No. 1-PCD v. Apex Marine Ship Mgmt.
Co., 745 N.Y.S.2d 522, 526 n.2 (App. Div. 2002) (referring to "the confidentiality . . .
attaching to communications between a union member and the union with respect to repre-
sentation matters").
240 See Wagenheim v. Alexander Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983)
("[A] witness may not refuse to testify to pertinent facts in a judicial proceeding merely
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that a communication was made in express confidence or in the implied confi-
dence of a confidential relation, does not create a privilege."24 ' Nevertheless,
as suggested by the analysis in Walker v. Huie,24 2 at least the first element of
the Wigmore test - which merely requires that the communication at issue orig-
inate in a confidence that it will not be disclosed214 3 - will ordinarily be satis-
fied in the union representation context.244
2. Confidentiality Is Essential to the Relationship Between Employees
and Their Union Representatives
The second element of the Wigmore test, which may be the most signifi-
cant,2 4 5 focuses on whether confidentiality is essential to the parties' relation-
ship. 246 As one state court has noted, the theoretical basis for recognizing any
new evidentiary privilege is a determination that "secrecy and confidentiality
are necessary to promote the relationship fostered by the privilege. 24 7
because such testimony involves information obtained in confidence from another party.").
As one federal appellate court has stated: "There is a vast difference between confidential
and privileged. Almost any communication ... may be confidential .... But privileged
means that the contents are of such character that the law as a matter of public policy pro-
tects them against disclosure." Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activi-
ties Control Bd., 254 F.2d 314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
241 Talladega Cotton Factory, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 295, 306 (1953) (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 2286 (3d ed. 1940)). In addition, "certain courts have concluded that
[even] a legislative pronouncement of confidentiality does not equate to the creation of an
evidentiary privilege." Farley v. Farley, 952 F. Supp. 1232, 1238 (M.D. Tenn. 1997)
(emphasis added). For a recent academic discussion of this issue, see Fred C. Zacharias,
Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69 (1999).
242 See Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Utah 1992) (discussing a union representa-
tive's assertion that his communications with the employees he has represented were
"always ... based on the understanding that they would remain confidential") cf. McCoy v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 211 F.R.D. 381, 384 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (describing an employee who
"intended and understood his communications with [union] personnel would be confiden-
tial") (internal quotation marks omitted).
243 See In re Hampers, 651 F.2d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psycho-
logical Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1012 n.13 (D.N.J.), affd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d
Cir. 1989).
244 For example, "deliberations ... concerning collective-bargaining strategy," whether
engaged in by "union negotiating teams" or by members of management, clearly "originate
in a confidence that they will not be disclosed." Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd. v. Homer
Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 547 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill. 1989) (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6
§ 2285, at 527); see also Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 522 (discussing cases in
which "[tihe privilege was carefully construed ... and met Wigmore's first condition: that
the communications originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed") (citing City of
Newburgh v. Newman, 421 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div. 1979) and Seelig v. Shepard, 578
N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1991)).
245 See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 144 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J.,
dissenting) (referring to "[t]he second, and most important, condition of Wigmore's test").
But cf. Harold N. Bynum, Evidence - Privileged Communications - Accountant and Client,
46 N.C. L. REV. 419, 424 (1968) (characterizing Wigmore's fourth criterion as the "most
important condition" for the recognition of an evidentiary privilege).
246 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999,
1012 n.13 (D.N.J.), affd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989).
247 Danielson v. Superior Court, 754 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (citing von
Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 114 F.R.D. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)); cf. In re Grand Jury
[Vol. 5:508
Winter 2004/05] UNION REPRESENTATION PRIVILEGE
Although the Walker court indicated that "one could perhaps envision a
satisfactory union representation relationship without confidentiality, 24 8 it ulti-
mately concluded that the second prong of Wigmore's test is satisfied in the
union representation setting.249 The court was undoubtedly correct in conclud-
ing that confidentiality may be essential to the maintenance of a satisfactory
relationship between employees and their union representatives.25 °
For example, in discussing a union's statutory role as the exclusive bar-
gaining agent for the employees it represents,2 51 the Board has asserted that the
relationship between those employees and their union representatives is neces-
sarily confidential.2 52 The Board explained that confidentiality is necessary to
enable the union representative "effectively to coalesce an admixture of views
of various segments of his constituency, and to determine, in the light of that
knowledge, which issues can be compromised and to what degree."25 3
In Berbiglia, Inc.,254 a Board administrative law judge relied on this rea-
soning to revoke a subpoena issued on behalf of an employer that sought the
disclosure of union records reflecting communications between the union and
its members.255 The employer contended that a review of the records was nec-
essary to enable it to respond to the union's allegation that a strike called during
the course of unsuccessful collective bargaining negotiations was an unfair
labor practice strike.25 6
Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1988) ("Confidenti-
ality is the essential element of any privilege .... ).
248 Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Utah 1992); cf. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (asserting that "the subjective
assertions of ... union officials and [employees] that total confidentiality [is] essential to the
maintenance of their relationship are not enough to establish this element conclusively").
249 See Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 500.
250 See Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 601 ("[U]nions must be free to consult with their
members and officials in full confidence .... [11 If unions and members did not have this
privilege, it would chill full and frank communications, reduce the candor of discussions,
and not serve the public interest.").
251 See generally Cox v. C.H. Masland & Sons, Inc., 607 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1979) ("In
order to achieve the collective bargaining recognized ... as national labor policy ... the
statutory plan permits a majority of employees in a [bargaining] unit to elect a union to serve
as their collective bargaining agent.").
252 See Obie Pac., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 458, 459 (1972).
253 Id. at 459.
254 233 N.L.R.B. 1476 (1977).
255 See id. at 1495. The Board's rules authorize administrative law judges to revoke sub-
poenas if "the evidence whose production is required does not relate to any matter ... in
question in the proceedings or the subpoena does not describe with sufficient particularity
the evidence whose production is required, or if for any other reason sufficient in law the
subpoena is otherwise invalid." 29 C.F.R. § 102.31(b) (2001).
256 See Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1479, 1495-96. An unfair labor practice strike is one
"initiated or prolonged, in whole or in part, in response to unfair labor practices committed
by an employer." Gatliff Bus. Prods., 276 N.L.R.B. 543, 563 (1985). The most significant
distinction between an unfair labor practice strike and an economic strike (i.e., one that is
"not caused by an employer's unfair labor practices," Rose Printing Co., 289 N.L.R.B. 252,
275 (1989)), is that only unfair labor practice strikers have a substantially unqualified right
to reinstatement upon making an unconditional offer to return to work. See Teamsters Local
Union No. 515 v. NLRB, 906 F.2d 719, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For the author's previous
discussion of the two types of strikes, see Michael D. Moberly, Striking a Happy Medium:
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In a decision that was ultimately affirmed by the Board,25 7 and that has
since been followed in other Board and court cases,258 the administrative law
judge first noted that the employer made no offer of proof as to the nature of
the strike,2 59 presumably because it had never seen the union's records, and
thus "was in no position to indicate what they might show." 260 Characterizing
the employer's attempt to review the records under these circumstances as the
"proverbial fishing expedition, 2 61 the judge held that inspection of the records
was unwarranted, 262 "[a]t least in the absence of any indication of reasonable
ground ... to believe that the Union's files contain reasonably specific, sub-
stantial, probative evidence establishing that [the employer's] unfair labor prac-
tices played no causative role in the employees' decision to strike. 2 63
Despite her suggestion that the result might have been different if the
employer had presented some evidence that the union records contained rele-
vant information, 2 4 the administrative law judge indicated that her principal
reason for revoking the subpoenas was her view that opening such records to
The Conversion of Unfair Labor Practice Strikes to Economic Strikes, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 131 (2001).
257 See Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1476.
258 See, e.g., Champ Corp., 291 N.L.R.B. 803, 817-18 (1988) (quoting Berbiglia with
approval); Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd. v. Homer Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist., 547 N.E.2d
182, 187 (Ill. 1989) (quoting and following Berbiglia). But see Taylor Lumber & Treating,
Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 1298, 1300 n.11 (1998) (expressing "doubts not only about the soundness
of the policy reasoning advanced by the administrative law judge in Berbiglia to justify
revoking an employer subpoena for a union's bargaining-strategy records, but about the
degree to which the Board itself [has] genuinely embraced that reasoning").
259 See Berbigilia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495. Such a failure may be fatal to a party's position
in Board proceedings. See, e.g., Bremerton Sun Publ'g Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 467, 470 n.8
(1993) ("In the absence of an offer of proof detailing proposed evidence which, if credited,
would warrant a different result, we decline to find that the [administrative law] judge
erred ....").
260 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495; cf. Smitty's Supermarkets, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1377,
1380 (1993) (noting that "one cannot know without examining them" what information is
contained in "minutes and reports [a] Union refuses to produce").
261 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495. The administrative law judge specifically noted that
the employer "sought to obtain a wide-ranging examination of the Union's records, includ-
ing communications between the Union and its members and with other organizations." Id.
262 See id. at 1496. The Board has long held that "union records are generally of a confi-
dential nature and their production ought not lightly to be required over the Union's objec-
tions." Paul Uhlich & Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 679, 681 n.1 (1940); cf. United States v. Allison,
619 F.2d 1254, 1260 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that union officials have "a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in... union records" and can reasonably expect that such records will "'not
be touched except with their permission or that of union higher-ups' ") (quoting Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968)).
263 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1496.
264 As a general proposition, "a labor organization's duty to furnish information is parallel
to that of an employer," and encompasses information relevant to the parties' collective
bargaining relationship where "there is no evidence that it is confidential or otherwise privi-
leged, or that its production would be unduly burdensome." Plasterers Local Union, 273
N.L.R.B. 1143, 1144-45 (1984) (footnotes omitted). Some information, such as that pertain-
ing to represented employees' terms and conditions of employment, "is presumptively rele-
vant and must be provided on request, without need on the part of the requesting party to
establish specific relevance or particular necessity." Iron Workers, 319 N.L.R.B. 87, 90-91
(1995).
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inspection by employers "would be inconsistent with and subversive of the
very essence of collective bargaining and the quasi-fiduciary relationship
between a union and its members., 2 65 The judge explained that in order for
collective bargaining to operate effectively, "the parties must be able to formu-
late their positions and devise their strategies without fear of exposure. 266
The judge drew an analogy to "the long accepted privilege of conciliators
not to testify concerning contract negotiations, 267 which exists to encourage
the parties to conciliation proceedings to "feel free to talk without any fear that
the conciliator may subsequently make disclosure as a witness in some other
proceeding.'2 68 She concluded that employee communications with their
union representatives should receive similar protection.2 69  The judge
explained: "Statements of union representatives and agents of the employee...
should normally be protected from disclosure as a matter of law. Otherwise,
the danger of their withholding relevant information for fear of exposing cru-
cial material regarding pending union negotiations would be manifest.
270
Although the analysis in Berbiglia focused on the union's essential role in
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement, 27' the same reasoning applies to
265 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495. But cf. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 146, 153 (Ct. App. 2003) ("[Tlhere is no foundation from which to make the legal
leap from the freedom of designation, self-organization and collective bargaining to an evi-
dentiary privilege for communications between a union representative and a union
member.").
266 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495; see also Bachner v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 113 F.R.D.
644, 650 (D. Alaska 1987) ("[A] union would be unable to formulate and carry out its
collective bargaining strategy if it could not communicate confidentially ...."); Sunland
Constr. Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 685, 699 (1993) (referring to "the need for protection of privacy
with respect to the development of bargaining strategies").
267 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495 n.22 (citing Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B.
681 (1947)); see also NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 53 (9th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the "long-standing policy that mediators, if they are to maintain the appearance
of neutrality essential to successful performance of their task, may not testify about the
bargaining sessions they attend"); Nassau County Typographical Union,, 105 N.L.R.B. 902,
907 (1953) (referring to "the possibly privileged character of ... private communications to
[a] conciliator").
268 Tomlinson of High Point, 74 N.L.R.B. at 685.
269 See Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495 & n.22; see also Raytheon Missile Sys. Div., Ray-
theon Co., 279 N.L.R.B. 245, 248 (1986) (asserting that "internal recommendations concern-
ing . . . collective-bargaining proposals" constitute "confidential labor relations
information"). But cf. EEOC v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 92 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
34,070, at 44,076 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (distinguishing between the potential recognition of "a
broad federal policy holding labor negotiations nondiscoverable" and "the narrower public
policy of guarding the sanctity of labor mediators").
270 Berbiglia, 233 N.L.R.B. at 1495 (quoting Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550
F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1976)); cf. Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct.
1991) ("[U]nion leadership councils must be free to confer among themselves, exchange
views, make plans and arrive at negotiating strategies without intrusion from the organs of
official power.").
27, One Board administrative law judge has noted that "a primary function of a bargaining
representative (the Union) of employees is to negotiate a contract on their behalf." Clinton
Food 4 Less, 288 N.L.R.B. 597, 604 (1988); see also Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 691 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (E.D. Okla. 1986) ("One of the Union's primary func-
tions is to periodically negotiate collective bargaining agreements on behalf of its members
regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.").
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many of a union's other statutory functions,2 72 including its role as the repre-
sentative of bargaining unit employees in disciplinary investigations and griev-
ance proceedings.273 As one court that recognized "a species of privilege for
labor union leaders" explained:
If unions are to function, leaders must be free to communicate with their members
about the problems and complaints of union members without undue interference.
Members must be able to have confidence that what they tell their representatives on
such subjects cannot be pried out of the representatives by an overzealous govern-
mental agency.
274
In Hughes Aircraft Co. ,275 a labor arbitrator relied on similar reasoning to
recognize a union representation privilege in a labor arbitration proceeding.276
The grievant in Hughes had been terminated after a prolonged dispute with her
supervisor.27 7 At the subsequent arbitration hearing in which the grievant chal-
lenged the validity of the discharge, the employer presented testimony from a
union steward with whom the grievant had conferred that supported the testi-
mony of the grievant's supervisor.27 8
The union objected to the admission of this evidence, asserting that the
information to which the steward testified was privileged. 279 The arbitrator
concluded that the steward's testimony was admissible and not privileged,
because it involved his personal knowledge of the dispute itself,280 and did not
272 But see Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 153 (Ct. App. 2003)
("[Any [union representation] privilege.., would exist at most in the context of negotiating
'the terms and conditions' of employment.") (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (1998)). See
generally Aguinaga v. John Morrell & Co., 112 F.R.D. 671, 680 (D. Kan. 1986) ("While a
union's duties may well vary according to context - a union may take quite a different role
in a union-processed employee grievance than it does in collective bargaining negotiations -
courts have repeatedly characterized the general nature of a union's duty toward its members
as fiduciary.").
273 See Holland Am. Water Co., 260 N.L.R.B. 267, 274 (1982) (discussing a union's "role
in collective bargaining and grievance resolution"); cf. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Work-
ers of Am., 230 N.L.R.B. 406, 407 n.8 (1977) (noting that "grievance adjustors by their
involvement in the enforcement of the collective-bargaining agreement further[ ] the whole
process of collective bargaining").
274 Seelig, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 967. But cf. Smitty's Supermarkets, Inc., 310 N.L.R.B. 1377,
1379-80 (1993) (rejecting the contention that records reflecting "the internal affairs of [a
union] and its interunion [sic] activities" are "insulated from production by legal privilege").
275 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1112 (1986) (Richman, Arb.).
276 See id. at 1117-18. It is not uncommon for the courts to "look to the common law of
labor arbitration to devine statutory meaning." Devine v. White, 697 F.2d 421, 425 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). As one court observed, "there is not the slightest doubt about the all-important
role of the labor arbitrator in the developing federal common law of labor relations." Hill v.
Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
277 See Hughes Aircraft, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1113-16.
278 See id. at 1117.
279 See id.; cf. City of Sterling Heights, 80 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 825, 827 (1983) (Ellman,
Arb.) (discussing testimony of a union representative that "was excluded because of privi-
leged information between the grievant and his representative").
280 See generally Canteen Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 815, 819 (1987) (Keefe, Arb.)
("It is proper for [a union steward] ...to testify to the facts which he personally saw
transpire or heard being expressed.").
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require him to disclose confidential information he had obtained from the
grievant in the course of representing her.28" '
However, the arbitrator also indicated that information the grievant dis-
closed to the steward in confidence would have been privileged.282 The arbi-
trator asserted that the recognition of a privilege covering confidential
communications between employees and their union representatives is "consis-
tent with the [statutory] protection afforded employees in their insistence on
union representation during the grievance process. 28 3 The arbitrator explained
that the right to such representation recognized in Weingarten would be of little
value to an employee if the content of such communications could subse-
quently be discovered by the employer for the purpose of attacking the credibil-
ity of the employee's testimony.284
3. Relationships Between Unions and Employees Should Be Fostered
Wigmore's third criterion for recognizing a new evidentiary privilege
requires that the relationship be one that in the community's opinion ought to
be sedulously fostered.285 As one federal appellate court has explained, "the
existence of a confidential relationship the law should foster is critical to the
establishment of a privilege. '2 86 Thus, an essential factor in assessing any pro-
posed new evidentiary privilege is the importance of the relationship at
issue.287
The Board has characterized the relationship between a union and the
employees it represents as a complex one governed in large part by "the
prescripts of Federal labor law."' 288 In Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board v. Homer Community Consolidated School District289 the Illinois
Supreme Court in turn noted that those prescripts include a policy of keeping
the parties' respective bargaining strategies confidential. 290  Relying on the
Board's analysis of that policy in Berbiglia, Inc. ,291 the Homer court concluded
that the third element of the Wigmore test is satisfied in the collective bargain-
ing context:
[T]here exists a strong public policy protecting the confidentiality of labor-negotiat-
ing strategy sessions .... [T]his policy sufficiently satisfies that portion of the four-
prong test for the establishment of a common law privilege which requires that the
opinion of the community sedulously fosters this privilege. Accordingly, we hold
281 See Hughes Aircraft, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1118.
282 See id.; see also Loomis Armored Inc., 94 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1097, 1101 (1990)
(Gentile, Arb.) ("[Tlestimony that is sought from a union steward concerning confidences
obtained from a grievant in the course of representing [her] should be privileged in an arbi-
tration proceeding.") (emphasis omitted) (quoting HILL & SiNICROPI, supra note 19, at 164).
283 Hughes Aircraft, 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 1117.
284 See id. at 1118.
285 See EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 551 F. Supp. 737, 741 (N.D. Ind. 1982), rev'd on
other grounds, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
286 United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1998).
287 See Corman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1997).
288 Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 302 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1009 (1991).
289 547 N.E.2d 182 (Ill. 1989).
290 See id. at 187 (citing Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.
1976)).
291 233 N.L.R.B. 1476 (1977) (discussed supra notes 254-70 and accompanying text).
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that some type of privilege is necessary to prevent disclosure of either party's negoti-
ating strategy during an unfair labor practice proceeding .... 292
Because most relationships for which a privilege is claimed are deemed
sufficiently important to satisfy this requirement, 293 the third prong of the Wig-
more test is, in fact, rarely an impediment to the recognition of an evidentiary
privilege.294 Nevertheless, in contrast to the analysis in Homer, the court in
Walker v. Huie2 9 5 concluded that this element of the test is not satisfied in the
union representation context.29 6 The court reached this conclusion primarily
because the relationship between a union and the employees it represents, while
admittedly important,291 is not one of "the special relationships heretofore pro-
tected by the federal common law of privileges. 29 8
The Walker court's focus on whether the relationship between employees
and their union representatives is "the type of relationship.., that over time the
common law has considered important enough to sustain as privileged ' 29 9 is
not unique.3" However, the court's treatment of that issue is inconsistent with
the principles underlying Rule 501.301 As noted previously,3 0 2 that rule reflects
292 Ill Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 547 N.E.2d at 187 (internal punctuation omitted); see
also People ex rel. Birkett v. Chicago, 686 N.E.2d 66, 72 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he Homer
court was.., recognizing.., a labor negotiations privilege applicable ... to a union and a
nongovernmental employer and based on the confidentiality of the information sought."),
aff'd, 705 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1998).
293 See Deborah A. Ausburn, Circling the Wagons: Informational Privacy and Family Tes-
timonial Privilege, 20 GA. L. REV. 173, 180 (1985) ("Most proposed privileges easily meet
this requirement."); cf. People v. Suarez, 560 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (Sup. Ct. 1990) ("[T]he rela-
tionships to which [a] privilege could apply are diverse.").
294 See William Fullmer,Protecting an Independent Accountant's Tax Accrual Workpapers
from an Internal Revenue Service Summons, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 763 (1983) ("Wigmore's
third requirement is ... quite easily satisfied .....
295 142 F.R.D. 497 (D. Utah 1992).
296 See id. at 501.
297 See id.; cf. EEOC v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 92 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 34,070, at
44,076 (N.D. Ill. 1981) ("[L]abor negotiations are entitled to a higher degree of protection
than other forms of information because there is a 'policy favoring private, extra-legal judi-
cial resolutions of labor-management disputes.' ") (quoting Affiliated Food Distribs., Inc. v.
Local Union, 483 F.2d 418, 419 (3d Cir. 1973).
298 Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 501; cf. Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 71 (3d Cir. 2000) (assert-
ing that potential privileges that "would be unlike any currently recognized Rule 501 privi-
lege" are "poor candidates for the protection of a Rule 501 privilege").
299 Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 500-01.
300 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 867 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[O]ur
discretion under Rule 501 is limited to the development of privileges extant in the common
law .. "); see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An
Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 121 (1973) ("There
is a real danger, reflected in the reported cases, that [Rule 501's] reference to 'common law
principles' will be taken to exclude automatically recognition of any claim of privilege not
grounded in nineteenth century common law opinions.") (footnote omitted).
301 In In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1392 (S.D. Ind. 1993), for
example, the court noted that "cases rest[ing] their decision not to recognize [a] privilege on
the mere fact that such a privilege was not recognized at common law" are "inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 501, which emphasizes the 'flexible' nature
of privilege development in the federal courts and the need for case-by-case development of
the law of privilege - not the mechanical freezing of privilege as it existed at the common
law." Id. at 1398 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)); see also In re
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"Congress' desire for an evolutionary development of the federal law of privi-
leges, an evolution which is to occur by the careful evaluation of the asserted
privileges in the context of concrete disputes. 3°3
Thus, the fact that no union representation privilege existed at common
law 3 °4 is no impediment to the judicial recognition of such a privilege, 30 5
because the courts "are empowered to adopt new common law privileges pur-
suant to Rule 501 ... on a case by case basis. ' 3 6 As one court stated:
[T]his court does not view Congress' decision to enact Rule 501 ... as an intendment
that the federal common law of privileges should be frozen as it existed at the time
the Federal Rules of Evidence took effect. Rather, Rule 501 is a mandate to the
courts to develop the federal common law of privileges as reason and experience
dictate.
30 7
This point is illustrated by a closer examination of the analysis in Walker
itself.30 8 In particular, the court in that case emphasized that the relationship
between employees and their union representatives is "no more deserving of a
privilege than other important relationships that courts have found are not privi-
leged."30 9 However, since Walker was decided, one of the other "unrecog-
nized" privileges to which the court made reference - the parent-child
Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1328 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he view that Rule 501 limits the development
of privileges to those recognized by the common law . . . [is] contrary to the teaching of
Trammel 'not to freeze the law of privilege.' ") (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47).
302 See supra notes 186-96 and accompanying text.
303 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1005
n.8 (D.N.J.) (emphasis added), affd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Smith v. Smith,
154 F.R.D. 661, 673 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("Rule 501 does not 'freeze' the law of privilege, but
expressly envisions that the law will develop incrementally.") (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at
47).
30 The early common law did not recognize the existence of union representation, let alone
a union representation privilege. See Krystad v. Lau, 400 P.2d 72, 75 (Wash. 1965) (noting
that "under the common law, unions were not only unlawful but were held to be a criminal
conspiracy which workingmen had neither the right to organize nor join").
305 See generally In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F. Supp.
1487, 1493 (E.D. Wash. 1996) (observing that courts are "not bound to consider only judi-
cially created 'common-law rulings' as the source of new privileges"); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. at 1004 ("[Tlhe common law's
failure to recognize [a] privilege is not determinative.").
306 Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (emphasis
added); see also In re Int'l Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996, 1003 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Rule 501
clearly provides federal courts with the statutory power to recognize new or 'novel' eviden-
tiary privileges."); Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)
("[Ulnder Rule 501 the federal courts have authority to declare new privileges .... ).
307 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. at 1012;
see also Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 279 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (Fahy, J., concurring)
("When reason and experience call for recognition of a privilege which has the effect of
restricting evidence the dead hand of the common law will not restrain such recognition.").
See generally Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys., 210 F.R.D. 597, 606 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (noting
that "there must always be, in the absence of legislation, that court which takes the first step
into an area left to common law development").
308 The Walker decision has attracted relatively little scholarly interest. However, one com-
mentator has criticized the court for "belittling the labor relationship" and failing to take into
consideration "fundamental labor policy realized in important labor statutes." Gruwell
Anderson, supra note 17, at 524 n.254, 525 n.256.
309 Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 501.
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privilege31° - has been recognized by another federal court using the prevailing
Rule 501 analysis. 3 1 In addition, another unrecognized privilege discussed by
the Walker court - the accountant work-product privilege 3 12 - also recently has
begun to receive favorable statutory 31 3 and judicial attention. 3 14
The Walker court also advanced an alternative argument in support of its
finding that the third element of the Wigmore test is not satisfied in the union
representation context. 31 5 This argument was premised upon the fact that in
1973,316 the Supreme Court, acting on a recommendation from the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence,317 proposed to Con
gress that "nine specific nonconstitutional privileges" be included in the Fed-
310 See id. (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings of John Doe v. United States, 842 F.2d 244
(10th Cir. 1988)). For the author's previous analysis of the frequently debated privilege, see
Michael D. Moberly, Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard: Advocating the Recognition
of a Parent-Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 515 (2003).
311 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Unemancipated Minor Child, 949 F. Supp. 1487,
1493-94 (noting that Rule 501 authorizes the courts "to define new privileges by interpreting
'common law principles... in the light of reason and experience,"' and that "[b]oth reason
and experience mandate the recognition of some form of a parent-child privilege") (internal
punctuation and citations omitted).
312 See Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 501 (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805 (1984)).
313 See Vellone v. First Union Brokerage Servs., 203 F.R.D. 231, 233 (D. Md. 2001) (dis-
cussing a state statute that "could be interpreted to protect any part of the accountant's work
product, so long as it was derived from the client directly or from the client's material")
(citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Juo. PROC. § 9-110(b)(2) (1998)); cf. Cannon F. Allen,
Aftermath of United States v. Arthur Young & Co.: Surveying the Damage Done to the
Accountant-Client Relationship, 6 VA. TAX REv. 753, 761-62 n.44 (1987) (noting that com-
mentators have "called for Congress to enact some form of limited work-product immunity
or privilege for accountants").
314 See Vellone, 203 F.R.D. at 234 n.6 (suggesting that "an accountant, working as the
representative of a client in anticipation of litigation, would . . .be covered by the work
product protection provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)") (citing United
States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1204 (2d Cir. 1998)); see also Miller, supra note 204, at
794 n. 158 ("In addition to the example of the parent-child privilege, the accountants' work
product privilege has also been actively considered by the federal judiciary.").
315 See Walker, 142 F.R.D. at 501 ("[T]his relationship is not one that the Supreme Court
found important enough to address in its Article V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence which
dealt with evidentiary privileges.").
316 The privilege rules discussed here were promulgated by the Supreme Court, as part of
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, on November 20, 1972, and sent to Congress for
consideration on February 5, 1973. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treat-
ment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (D.N.J.), affd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989); Jessica
G. Weiner, "And the Wisdom to Know the Difference": Confidentiality vs. Privilege in the
Self-Help Setting, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 243, 265 n.127 (1995).
317 The advisory committee was appointed by Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1965 for the
purpose of drafting federal evidence rules. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497
F. Supp. 1105, 1123 n.103 (E.D. Ky. 1980). It consisted of federal judges, experienced trial
lawyers, and distinguished evidence scholars. See United States v. Zubkoff, 416 F.2d 141,
143 (2d Cir. 1969); Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 615 (D. Utah 1990). The committee
worked for several years, through a number of different drafts, before submitting its proposal
to the Court. See United States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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eral Rules of Evidence,318 and "the union relationship was not among those
specifically enumerated for the protection of a privilege." '319
Although this argument has more superficial appeal than the court's first
argument, 320 it is ultimately no more persuasive. 321  The advisory committee
unquestionably viewed evidentiary privileges with disfavor,32 2 and it therefore
intended to limit the privileges available in federal court litigation.323 How-
318 Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Ott v. St. Luke
Hosp. of Campbell County, 522 F. Supp. 706, 707-08 (E.D. Ky. 1981) ("The Advisory
Committee which originally drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed nine specific
privileges to be made applicable in actions in federal courts. The Advisory Committee's
recommendations were accepted by the Supreme Court and referred to Congress.") (footnote
omitted).
319 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 335 (E.D.N.Y.
1998). The enumerated privileges were "a privilege protecting required reports privileged
pursuant to other statutes; an attorney-client privilege; a psychotherapist privilege; a hus-
band-wife privilege; a privilege covering communications to the clergy; and privileges pro-
tecting political votes, trade secrets, the identity of an informer, and secrets of state and other
official information." In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 379-80 n.8 (3d Cir.
1990).
320 Other courts have alluded to the potential "impediment" to the recognition of a privilege
"caused by the Advisory Committee's decision to not list [the] privilege in its draft,"
Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347 (D.N.M. 1998), and the courts' rejec-
tion of other potential privileges has occasionally been "based in part on the fact that these
asserted privileges were not included in those recommended by the Advisory Committee."
Spencer Sav. Bank, SLA v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 842 n.10 (D.N.J.
1997); see also Tesser v. Bd. of Educ., 154 F. Supp. 2d 388, 392 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
("Other courts have also looked to the proposed rules for guidance in recognizing new privi-
leges and developing the contours of existing privileges.").
321 As another commentator has noted:
Some courts ... have examined whether the nine privileges spelled out in the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence include the privilege claimed in the current litigation, viewing the proposals
as a reflection of dominant common law analysis. The proposed rules are useful only as guides,
however, and are rarely dispositive.
Jayna Jacobson Partain, A Qualified Academic Freedom Privilege in Employment Litigation:
Protecting Higher Education or Shielding Discrimination?, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1397, 1407
n.63 (1987) (emphasis added); cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 378 (noting
that the evidence rules "do[ ] not contain ... [an] exclusive list of privileges recognized in
the federal courts"); In re Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996, 1003 (11th Cir. 1982) ("Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 does not purport to enumerate a finite list of evidentiary privileges that
are to be recognized in federal courts.").
322 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999,
1011 (D.N.J.), affd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that "the Advisory Committee
which drafted the original Federal Rules of Evidence did not look favorably upon privileges
in general"); Michael W. Mullane, Trammel v. United States: Bad History, Bad Policy, and
Bad Law, 47 ME. L. REv. 105, 117 (1995) ("The committee's conceptual approach.., was
antithetical to all evidentiary privileges."); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 501[01], at 501-13 (1988) ("[T]he Advisory Committee ...
viewed privileges as hindrances which should be curtailed.").
323 See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1324 (D. Nev. 1983) (referring to "the Advisory
Committee's proposal to severely restrict the testimonial privileges for confidential commu-
nications available to individuals in federal courts"); Mullane, supra note 322, at 117 ("The
Advisory Committee wished to expand admissibility to encompass all relevant information.
Whenever possible, privileges would be eliminated. If this was not possible, they would be
pared to the bone in scope and applicability.").
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ever, the committee's proposal generated a "storm of controversy," '3 24 and its
hostility to evidentiary privileges, in particular, has been characterized as an
"extreme view, unwelcome to the bar and the general public. 325 As a result,
the committee's attempt to codify federal privilege law through the promulga-
tion of enumerated privileges was ultimately rejected by Congress.326
In refusing to codify the federal law of privilege,327 Congress did not dis-
approve of any of the committee's proposed privileges,3 28 but instead rejected
the proposition that the evidentiary privileges applicable in federal cases should
be limited to those the committee had proposed.32 9 Indeed, Congress's refusal
to adopt the committee's enumerated privileges has prompted some courts and
commentators to suggest that the omission of a particular privilege from the
enumerated list "shows an ultimate desire for the Courts to develop such a
privilege."33 °
324 Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1324 (quoting Krattenmaker, supra note 197, at 638); see also
United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 802 n.21 (1984) (referring to "the
controversy surrounding the proposed provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence governing
privileges"); In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 379 n.l (3d Cir.
1976) ("The history of the privilege article of the Federal Rules of Evidence was a stormy
one."); Walker v. Lewis, 127 F.R.D. 466, 468 (W.D.N.C. 1989) ("From the outset, it was
clear that the content of the proposed privilege provisions was extremely controversial.")
(quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7053).
325 Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1324; see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, An Hegelian Approach
to Privileges Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501: The Restrictive Thesis, the Expansive
Antithesis, and the Contextual Synthesis, 73 NEB. L. REv. 511, 529 (1994) ("[Tlhe vast
majority of the criticisms ... faulted the Advisory Committee for cutting back on evidentiary
privileges.").
326 See Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 377 ("Congress chose not to codify the draft
Rules comprehending specific privileges."); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 n.45 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) ("In adopting Rule 501 Congress rejected a set of rules proposed by the Supreme
Court that would have codified the law of privileges ....").
327 If Congress had acquiesced in the committee's attempt "to reduce federal privilege law
to a comprehensive set of rules," the result would have been the "codification" of the com-
mittee's enumerated privileges. Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653, 656 (N.D. Cal.
1987); see also Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 379 (noting that the advisory commit-
tee was charged with responsibility for "codifying federal rules of evidence").
328 See Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d at 380 ("Although Congress chose not to adopt
the proposed rules on privileges, it did not disapprove them."); United States v. Freund, 525
F.2d 873, 878 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[T]here is no indication that Congress, in rejecting the
entire privilege article of the proposed rules, intended to express disapproval of any specific
rule.").
329 For example, the proposed rules included "no rule of privilege for a newspaperperson,"
and yet it is clear that Congress' rejection of those rules "permits the courts to develop a
privilege for newspaperpeople on a case-by-case basis." Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21,
1975, 541 F.2d at 379 n.11 (quoting 120 CONG. Rac. H12253-54 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1974));
see also Douglas H. Frazer, The Newsperson's Privilege in Grand Jury Proceedings: An
Argument for Uniform Recognition and Application, 75 J. C iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 413,
428-29 n.80 (1984) ("Because the proposed rule did not include the newsperson's privilege
in its original list of privileges and because the draftsmen later deleted the enumerated privi-
leges, the Third Circuit [has] inferred that Congress' ultimate desire was for the courts to
develop such a privilege.") (citing Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir.
1979)).
330 Williams v. Am. Broad. Cos., 96 F.R.D. 658, 663 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (emphasis added)
(discussing Riley, 612 F.2d at 714); see also Robert J. Bush, Stimulating Corporate Self-
Regulation - The Corporate Self-Evaluation Privilege: Paradigmatic Preferentialism or
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That the privileges applicable in federal court are not limited to those pro-
posed by the advisory committee is further illustrated by the fact that, as origi-
nally submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court at the time it recommended
adoption of the committee's enumerated privileges,"' Rule 501 would have
precluded the judicial recognition of any privilege not specifically provided for
in the Court's proposed rules3 32 or, alternatively, in a federal statutory or con-
stitutional provision.3 3 3 However, like the committee's enumerated privileges,
the original version of Rule 501 was rejected by Congress 334 in favor of a
common law approach that permits the judiciary to develop evidentiary privi-
leges on a case-by-case basis.335
Pragmatic Panacea, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 597, 614 n.112 (1993) (indicating that "Congress's
[sic] rejection of the proposed [r]ules could be interpreted as an implicit mandate to federal
courts to develop privileges" that were not proposed by the advisory committee).
331 The proposed rule stated:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of
Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by the Supreme Court,
no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object
or writing.
PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 501, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (1973).
332 In Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co., 57 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court indi-
cated that under Rule 501 as originally proposed by the Supreme Court, evidence was "not to
be considered privileged" unless it was "defined as an exception" to the rule. Id. at 512; see
also In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (citing the original version of
Rule 501 for the proposition that "only the privileges therein specified should be recognized
in the absence of action by the Supreme Court or Congress").
13 See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[P]roposed Rule 501
provided that only the enumerated privileges and those required by the federal Constitution
or Act of Congress need be recognized by the federal courts.") (citation omitted); In re
Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1323 (D. Nev. 1983) ("Proposed Rule 501 provided that no
testimonial privilege would be recognized if it was not contained in the Rules themselves or
in an Act of Congress, or in the Constitution ....").
33, See Brink's, Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[O]f the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rules 501-513 were not adopted by Congress although
Rule 501 was amended by the Congress and became a substitute for all of the court's
promulgated privilege rules."); In re Lewis, 384 F. Supp. 133, 137 (C.D. Cal. 1974) ("[T]he
House Judiciary Committee ... refused to go along with the proposed Rule 501 of the new
Federal Rules of Evidence submitted to Congress by the United States Supreme Court.");
Imwinkelried, supra note 325, at 526 ("The Advisory Committee's draft of Rule 501 would
have expressly mandated that the courts recognize only the privileges codified in proposed
Rules 502-10 and in other statutes. Whatever else Congress did, it rebuffed that version of
Rule 501.").
331 See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) ("Congress substituted the pre-
sent language of Rule 501 for the draft proposed by the Advisory Committee ... to provide
the courts with greater flexibility in developing rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.");
Hucko v. City of Oak Forest, 185 F.R.D. 526, 530 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("In declining to adopt
the proposed rules ... Congress expressed the view that the law of privilege was still evolv-
ing and did not want codification to stifle that evolution."); Torres v. Kuzniasz, 936 F. Supp.
1201, 1208 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Congress declined to reduce federal privilege law to a compre-
hensive set of rules, leaving federal courts to develop privilege doctrine on a case-by-case
basis.").
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This legislative history3 36 demonstrates that the Walker court's reliance on
the advisory committee's enumerated privileges was misplaced.3 37 The fact
that no union representation privilege was included in the unenacted evidence
rules the Supreme Court submitted to Congress in 1973 is simply no impedi-
ment to the judicial recognition of such a privilege.338
4. Weighing the Competing Interests
The fourth element of the Wigmore test is closely related to the third,3 39
and involves balancing the potential benefit the disclosure of confidential com-
munications may have on the administration of justice against the potential
harm such disclosure might have upon the relationship at issue. 3 40 Because this
aspect of the test obviously requires the weighing of competing interests that
militate "both for and against disclosure, ' 34 1 it generally presents the courts
336 For a more detailed discussion of Rule 501 's legislative history see, Note, The Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence: Of Privileges and the Division of Rule-Making Power, 76 MICH.
L. REv. 1177, 1191-95 (1978).
"I One federal court has asserted that because Congress chose not to codify the law of
privilege, "no inference regarding the validity of [a] privilege ought to be gleaned from [the
committee's] proposed rule[s]." In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1392,
1396 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The court properly recognized that "Congress' failure to enact spe-
cific privileges was not meant to inhibit courts from developing and recognizing specific
privileges to protect important relationships." Id.; see also Riley v. City of Chester, 612
F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979) (asserting that "[t]he legislative history of Rule 501 manifests
that its flexible language was designed to encompass" privileges that the advisory committee
"failed to include among the enumerated privileges"); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236,
238 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The legislative history of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence makes it clear that Congress intended that the courts should continue to develop the
federal common law of privilege on a case-by-case basis.").
338 Cf. Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1347 (D.N.M. 1998) (recognizing a
"self-critical analysis privilege" even though the privilege "was not included in the Advisory
Committee's proposed privilege rules"); Amee A. Shah, The Parent-Child Testimonial Privi-
lege - Has the Time for It Finally Arrived?, 47 CLEV. ST. L. Rev. 41, 57 (1999) ("The
physician-patient privilege was not included in the proposed rules and has since gained wide
recognition."). In fact, "[w]hen reason and experience lead [courts] in a different direction
than a rejected provision in the proposed rules, [they] are bound by law to follow the for-
mer." In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 1999).
"I See In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 48 (Idaho 1985) (Bistline, J., concurring)
("Wigmore's fourth requirement is interrelated to the third requirement. ... ); Bynum,
supra note 245, at 423 (noting that Wigmore's third criterion, "the extent to which the rela-
tionship is to be fostered," must be evaluated "in relation with condition four"); Molony,
supra note 206, at 260 n.92 (asserting that "both the second and third [Wigmore] criteria
require evaluation in light of the fourth criterion").
340 See In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1193 (2d Cir. 1983); Car v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d
384, 388 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6 § 2285, at 527-28); Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970); EEOC v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 551
F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D. Ind. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983).
341 Hanson v. Rowe, 500 P.2d 916, 919 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); cf. Am. Airlines, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 158 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the potential recogni-
tion of a union representation privilege "presents a backdrop of competing social policies: a
union member's right to organize and collectively bargain, a union's obligations to its mem-
bers . . . and a search for truth in the adversarial process").
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with the most analytical difficulty.3 42 Not surprisingly, it is also the issue upon
which courts contemplating the recognition of new privileges often focus.
343
In applying the fourth Wigmore criterion, the court in Walker v. Huie34 4
acknowledged that "there will no doubt be injury to the relationship between
[employees] and their union representatives" if their communications are not
protected by an evidentiary privilege. 34 5 The court nevertheless concluded that
this potential injury did not outweigh the potential harm to the administration of
justice that would result from recognizing the privilege. 346 However, the court
failed to offer any explanation for this conclusion.
347
The court's failure to explain its weighing of the competing interests may
have been based upon the absence of any meaningful empirical evidence con-
cerning the actual impact of comparable evidentiary privileges, 348 and the fact
that the balance a court ultimately strikes under the fourth Wigmore criterion
necessarily depends upon "its own normative predilections. '349 As one state
court judge has stated: "One can never prove that costs outweigh benefits or
vice versa with regard to a particular privilege; such arguments inevitably
degenerate into simple unsupported assertions. 35 0
However, the lack of empirical evidence does not excuse courts and other
tribunals from articulating the reasons for their decisions,35 1 nor does it justify
342 See, e.g., In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D. Nev. 1983) ("The fourth component
of Wigmore's test presents a more difficult problem in analysis ...."); cf. Molony, supra
note 206, at 260-61 (asserting that "in any privilege debate, the fourth condition [is] the
[expected] battleground").
343 See, e.g., Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 455 N.E.2d 1203, 1207 (Mass. 1983) ("In
the last analysis, the question comes down to a balancing of the public's interest in obtaining
every person's testimony against public policy considerations in favor of erecting a testimo-
nial privilege in the circumstances."); cf. United States v. Friedman, 636 F. Supp. 462, 463
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing another court's analysis of an asserted privilege that "focussed
on the balancing required by the fourth of Wigmore's conditions").
344 142 F.R.D. 497 (D. Utah 1992).
345 Id. at 501.
346 See id.
347 See id.
348 Opponents of an evidentiary privilege often note that "empirical evidence of the alleged
benefits of the privilege is speculative at best," while assuming that "the adverse impact of
the privilege on the fact-finding function of the courts is immediate and unquestionable."
United States ex. rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see also
Broun, supra note 14, at 793 ("There is little empirical evidence on the value of evidentiary
privileges in promoting the free flow of information in the cases of protected
relationships.").
341 In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1010
(D.N.J.) (considering the potential recognition of a psychotherapist-patient privilege), affid,
879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989); see also SEC v. Touche Ross & Co., 438 F. Supp. 258, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (asserting that the determination of "whether creating a new privilege...
would serve the public better than adherence to [the] basic premise that courts and adminis-
trative agencies ... are entitled to every man's evidence" involves a "value judgment").
350 Gale v. State, 792 P.2d 570, 624 n.25 (Wyo. 1990) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (quoting
Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1666); see also Mullane, supra note 322, at 137
("[N]o solid empirical data exists to support the estimates of either critics or proponents as to
either the costs or the benefits of privileges.").
31, See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 901
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (asserting that "the courts have an obligation to explain their decisions");
Pendleton Citizens for Cmty. Schs. v. Marockie, 507 S.E.2d 673, 682 (W. Va. 1998) ("A
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striking the balance required by the fourth element of the Wigmore test in favor
of the nonrecognition of a privilege.352 Instead,
[t]he debate must... focus on the values that society seeks to protect in a particular
area or particular relationship. Once these values are identified, the evaluation of the
privilege must rest not merely on an attempted cost-benefit analysis, but also on
considerations of personal privacy and the social acceptability of a legal system that
intrudes into particular areas.
353
There undoubtedly may be cases in which the disclosure of information
pertaining to a party's confidential negotiating strategy would assist a trier-of-
fact in reaching "a more just result. '354 However, "this does not mean that [the
parties] should or must disclose all such information, 355 because disclosure
would have "a tendency to frustrate the overall purpose of collective bargaining
between the parties. 3 56 As one court has explained:
"[T]he basic assumption underlying collective bargaining ... [is] that the parties
proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic viewpoints and concepts of self-
interest." Moreover, these "antagonistic" parties are engaged in a process of "bar-
gaining" or "negotiation." Each presents a self-interested demand or proposal, which
the other evaluates from its own point of view. Necessarily, the bargainers are not
obliged to reveal their strategies; the planned sequences of demands and proposals.
For if the parties do have full strategic information, then the process of offer and
counteroffer becomes superfluous, and the bargaining process is transformed into
something else entirely.
357
court cannot shirk its responsibility to articulate the alternatives forming a basis for its deci-
sions, for well reasoned and fully articulated opinions are a major safeguard against abuse of
judicial power.") (quoting Robert M. Bastress, Jr., The Less Restrictive Alternative in Consti-
tutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Justification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REv.
971, 1035 (1974).
352 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. at
1007 ("[M]erely because empirical data are lacking, [courts] should not assume the asserted
benefits flowing from [a] privilege are non-existent when the costs imposed by the existence
of the privilege are no more certain."); Gale, 792 P.2d at 624 n.25 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting)
("Both camps in the privilege debate are hampered by empirical uncertainty.") (quoting
Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1666); Broun, supra note 14, at 793 (asserting
that "[t]here is little evidence that ... privileges are not effective") (emphasis added); Mul-
lane, supra note 322, at 137 ("[A]lthough the benefits attributable to privileges are difficult
to estimate, there is little reason to assume that they are necessarily small.").
353 Gale, 792 P.2d at 624 n.25 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) (quoting Developments in the Law,
supra note 13, at 1666). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F.
Supp. 332, 336 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The inability ... to reach agreement on the costs and
benefits of a union privilege strongly cautions against . . . finding that such a privilege
should . . . be enshrined in common law.").
3" Boise Cascade Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. 422, 432 (1986); see also NLRB v. FLRA, 952 F.2d
523, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("The collective bargaining process arguably is optimized if
unions and [employers] have all relevant information about the subjects of collective
bargaining.").
35- NLRB, 952 F.2d at 531; cf. Boise Cascade, 279 N.L.R.B. at 432 (holding that an
employer was not obligated to provide a union with confidential information pertaining to its
"negotiating strategy," even though the information "would potentially be relevant to the
Union in processing [a] grievance it filed").
356 Boise Cascade, 279 N.L.R.B. at 432.
357 NLRB, 952 F.2d at 530 (quoting Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464
U.S. 89, 107-108 (1983)); cf. Century Elec. Motor Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 1051, 1058 (1970)
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Thus, at least in the ordinary collective bargaining context, 358 a balancing
of the competing interests generally weighs in favor of permitting parties to
withhold confidential information pertaining to their negotiating strategies. 359
Indeed, it was primarily on this basis that the Board in Berbiglia, Inc. 360 recog-
nized a "collective bargaining and strike strategy" privilege protecting the con-
fidentiality of internal union communications pertaining to such matters.361
In Boise Cascade Corp. ,362 the Board engaged in similar balancing to hold
that comparable information pertaining to the employer's negotiating strategy
is likewise "either confidential or privileged in nature. ' 36 3 The rationale for
treating the employer's negotiating strategy as privileged mirrors the reason for
according privileged status to the union's strategy:
The very existence of a successful working relationship between labor and manage-
ment is dependent upon the ability to negotiate freely in the spirit of compromise
toward which the collective bargaining process strives. Disclosure of the . . .
employer's internal discussions concerning negotiations, including its strategies,
options and proposals, whether accepted or rejected, could seriously endanger the
(observing that "collective bargaining traditionally involves a give-and-take process aimed
toward mutually acceptable compromise").
358 See Pennsylvania ex rel. Gallas v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 636 A.2d 253, 265
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[C]ollective
bargaining . . . typically involves negotiation over wages and other financial terms of
employment."); Joseph C. Collins & Co., 184 N.L.R.B. 940, 946 (1970) (referring to "the
conventional type of collective bargaining where all terms [of employment], including the
economic, are open for discussion").
159 See Boise Cascade, 279 N.L.R.B. at 432 ("[A] balancing of the parties' interests must be
weighed in favor of [a party] being allowed to withhold ... [information pertaining to] its
future negotiating strategy."); see also Mallick v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 749 F.2d 771,
785 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing a union's "negotiating plans" and "other secrets"); Detroit
Newspapers, 326 N.L.R.B. 700, 751 n.25 (1998) (referring to "the importance of... bar-
gaining strategy confidentiality").
36 Maple Shade Nursing Home, 223 N.L.R.B. 1475, 1476 (1976); see supra notes 254-270
and accompanying text.
361 Adams, supra note 19, at 573-75, 579 (discussing Berbiglia); see also Food Lion, Inc. v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1011 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(discussing the contention that "documents concerning confidential union strategies and tac-
tics in the context of collective bargaining relationships are subject to a qualified privilege");
Barrington Sch. Comm. v. R.I. State Labor Relations Bd., 608 A.2d 1126, 1139-40 (R.I.
1992) (referring to "data concerning contract proposals being formulated" as "privileged
labor relations materials").
362 279 N.L.R.B. 422 (1986).
363 Id. at 432; see also Jim Water Resources, Inc., 1987 NLRB GCM LEXIS 113, at *39
(Aug. 10, 1987) (recognizing that information possessed by an employer "might constitute
privileged negotiating strategy"); Morton Int'l, Inc., 1993 NLRB LEXIS 1098, at **25-26
(Sept. 30, 1993):
Notes of a strictly factual nature, reporting only when, where, what, and by whom something
was said during bargaining sessions ... are not privileged as the confidential "work product" of
the Company's bargaining committee .... Anything else included in the notes, not of a purely
factual nature, is, however ... privileged .... There is no requirement for the Company to
disclose its bargaining strategy or tactics, or the opinions, mental thought processes, or conclu-
sions and observations of its bargaining team members.
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success of pending negotiations or otherwise give an unfair advantage to the bargain-
ing agent for the employees.
3 6 4
Similar reasoning applies to the less typical "collective bargaining" that
often occurs in connection with employer disciplinary investigations.36 5
Although "Weingarten interviews are not bargaining sessions,' 3 66 the right to
union representation at an investigatory interview is nevertheless an aspect of
the broader statutory right of employees to bargain collectively 367 and other-
wise act in concert for their mutual aid and protection.36 8 Indeed, the right to
representation reflects recognition of the fact that union officials who partici-
pate in such interviews "may be able, through informal discussions and persua-
sion conducted at the threshold, to serve as the catalyst in the amicable
resolution of disputes. 36 9
Significantly, the right to union representation likewise encompasses a
right to prior consultation in order to "facilitate expeditious and equitable reso-
lution of the matter under investigation. '370 This right to prior consultation in
36 Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Employees, 667
N.E.2d 458, 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); see also Fisher Scientific Co. v. New York, 812
F. Supp. 22, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (effectively acknowledging that forcing an employer "to
reveal confidential bargaining goals and strategies... would compromise its collective bar-
gaining position"); Case Corp., 304 N.L.R.B. 939, 951 (1991) (referring to "labor relations
information of the Employer that, if divulged to the Union, would clearly prejudice the
Employer's bargaining strategy in negotiations with the Union").
365 See Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Collective bargaining has
been defined as bargaining by an organization or group of workmen on behalf of its mem-
bers with the employer, as well as the settlement disputes by negotiation between an
employer and the representative of his employees.") (emphasis added); Fed. Aviation
Admin., 35 F.L.R.A. 645, 649 (1990) ("[T]he role of a union at an investigatory examination
falls within the ambit of collective bargaining... ").
16 N.J. Bell Tel. Col, 308 N.L.R.B. 277, 306 (1992); see also Pac. Tel. & Tel. Col, 262
N.L.R.B. 1048, 1049 (1982) ("The employer, under Weingarten, has no obligation to bar-
gain with the representative .... ), enforced in part and enforcement denied in part, 711
F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1983).
367 See Materials Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1021 (1982) (Hunter, concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[A]lthough the employer is under no duty to bargain with the
union representative who is in attendance at... an investigatory interview, it is clear that the
Weingarten right to the presence of a steward or other union official flows from the status of
the union as collective-bargaining representative.").
368 See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting that
"the Weingarten right [is] a derivative of the right of employees to act in concert for mutual
aid and protections"); System 99, 289 N.L.R.B. 723, 727 (1988) (observing that "an
employee's right under Section 7 of the Act to act in concert with fellow employees ... is
the source of Weingarten protections").
369 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 724 F.2d 1061, 1065 (3d Cir. 1983), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 733 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1984); cf Papcin v. Dichello Dis-
tribs. Inc, 697 F. Supp. 73, 79 (D. Conn. 1988) (referring to the "dispute resolution aspects
of the collective bargaining process"). See generally Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227
N.L.R.B. 1223, 1224 (1977) ("[U]nion stewards all over the nation adjust thousands of
grievances every day in an informal, expeditious, and satisfactory manner.").
370 Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1191 (1977) (Fanning, concurring),
enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978). Although the Court in Weingarten
stated that "the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be
permitted to attend [an] investigatory interview," NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S.
251, 259 (1975), the Board has taken the position that "there is a duty, based on Weingarten,
to 'deal' with the representative by allowing him or her to speak, to make proposals and
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turn demonstrates the need to afford the union representative "sufficient pri-
vacy to confer with [the] employee when the employee most needs assis-
tance. '371 Thus, in the Weingarten context no less than in more traditional
collective bargaining situations, 372 the balancing of interests required by Wig-
more's fourth criterion appears to favor the recognition of a union representa-
tion privilege.3 73
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that compelling an employee to
testify about confidential communications with a union representative (or vice
versa) 374 would not necessarily further the public's interest in ascertaining the
truth.375 Union members and their representatives typically experience conflict
over the prospect of testifying against one another,37 6 due in part to the exis-
tence of an "unwritten law ' 37 7 or "code of ethics ' 378 (and perhaps in some
suggestions or to offer alternative forms of discipline." Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120,
127 (3d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
371 Bureau of Prisons, Office of Internal Affairs, 52 F.L.R.A. 421, 441 (1996) (Wasserman,
dissenting).
372 See generally Arizona Portland Cement Co., 281 N.L.R.B. 304, 307 (1986) (referring to
"the various phases of a complex collective-bargaining relationship"); Patrick v. Mich. Corr.
Org., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17789, at *16 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2000) ("Collective bar-
gaining has taken on many forms in different contexts.").
373 The recognition of a right to union representation under Weingarten reflects a policy
determination that "industrial stability... would result form a union's presence during inter-
views that might lead to discipline." Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230, 255 (1985),
overruled on other grounds in Epilepsy Found. Of N.E. Ohio, 331 N.L.R.B. 676 (2000),
enforced in part and rev'd in part, 268 R.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S.
904 (2002); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1144 (1981) (indicating that
the right to union representation under Weingarten is intended to "advance the effectuation
of employee rights" and "contribute to the stability of industrial relations"). In that regard,
one federal appellate court has specifically concluded that "industrial stability [is] a public
interest sufficiently great to outweigh the interest in obtaining every person's evidence."
174 It has occasionally been suggested that the union representation privilege should apply
"only to communications from employees to union representatives, and not communications
from representatives to employees." U.S. Customs Serv., 57 F.L.R.A. 319, 325 n.4 (2001).
However, no tribunal appears to have adopted this position, which is at odds with the fact
that, at least under federal law, "communications in both directions" are generally protected
by the analogous attorney-client privilege. United States v. Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1268
n.12 (9th Cir. 1979).
375 See Bay County Div. on Aging, 98 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 188, 193 (1991) (Daniel,
Arb.) ("[I]t is [a union representative's] responsibility to attempt to paint every fact and
circumstance in as favorable a light for the grievant as possible."). See generally United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing "the view that cer-
tain forms of compelled evidence are inherently unreliable"); State v. Samuel, 643 N.W.2d
423, 429 (Wis. 2002) ("[S]tatements that are the product of coercion are more likely to be
inherently untrustworthy than voluntary statements.") (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 320 (1959)).
376 See Dist. Council of Painters, 326 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1081 (1998) (observing that an indi-
vidual "called as a witness . . . to testify against his own bargaining representative" is
"placed in a highly uncomfortable position"); Gulf Oil Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 475, 477 (1985)
(noting the "potential conflict" facing an employee "who may be called upon to . . . testify
against a [fellow] union member"); Hine v. Dittrich, 278 Cal. Rptr. 330, 331 (Ct. App. 1991)
(discussing the "conflict of interest for one union member to testify against another").
377 Cannery Warehousemen, 190 N.L.R.B. 24, 27 (1971).
378 Freight Drivers Local Union, 218 N.L.R.B. 1117, 1119 (1975).
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cases a more formal obligation)379 prohibiting one union member from testify-
ing against another.38 ° As a result, many employees and union representatives
might refuse to testify against fellow union members 381 and other members of
the bargaining unit"' - or worse, commit perjury383 - even if no evidentiary
privilege was recognized.3 84
Given this possibility, any benefit to the administration of justice derived
from the rejection of a union representation privilege may be relatively mod-
171 See, e.g., Gulf Oil Co., 274 N.L.R.B. at 477 (discussing "a union member's oath to
refrain from making statements against brothers") (internal punctuation omitted); Building
Material & Dump Truck Drivers, 266 N.L.R.B. 1057, 1057 (1983) (describing an employee
who, upon joining a union, took "an oath to abide by the Union's constitution and bylaws
and promising not to harm fellow union members").
380 See Cannery Warehousemen, 190 N.L.R.B. at 27 (discussing a union official's assertion
that "there is an unwritten law that one union member does not testify against another mem-
ber"); Gen. Motors Corp., 2 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 491, 502 (1938) (Hotchkiss, Arb.)
("Experienced practitioners in the field of industrial relations accept without rancor, whether
they approve or not, the so-called 'code' which estops one member of an organization and
frequently one member of an unorganized working force from testifying against another.").
381 See, e.g., Champion Parts Rebuilders, Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 731, 740 (1982) (discussing a
former shop steward and bargaining unit member who "was clearly biased in favor of the
Union's case ... , even to the degree [that] he initially refused to testify at all when called by
[the employer]"); Freight Drivers Local Union, 218 N.L.R.B. at 1120 (describing a union
member who assured the union that he would not "testify against a fellow union member");
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 67 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 861, 866 (1976) (Lubow, Arb.) (discuss-
ing an employee who was "asked... to testify but.., declined to do so because he could not
testify against a fellow union member").
382 See Carter-Wallace, Inc., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 587, 589 (1987) (Katz, Arb.) (noting
"the great difficulty to be experienced by [an] Employer in persuading knowledgeable
employees to testify against ... their fellow worker and fellow Union member"); Alfred M.
Lewis, Inc., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 621, 624 (1983) (Sabo, Arb.) (acknowledging "the
existence of a 'code' which inhibits or discourages Co-workers from testifying against one
another"); Am. Smelting & Ref. Co., 48 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1187, 1190 (1967) (Leonard,
Arb.) ("[T]here frequently is a strong personal reluctance on the part of employees to testify
against a fellow employee.").
383 See Peoria Dry Wall, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 434, 435-36 n.4 (1971) (referring to testimony
of "the kind which one employee would be apt to fabricate about a fellow employee, particu-
larly another union member"); Alfred M. Lewis, 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 624 (noting that
"there is an inherent bias or interest in the testimony of any Co-worker where it involves
conflict with another Co-worker," and that "[tiestimony colored by interest or bias can often
take the form of deliberate falsification"); cf. Int'l Laborers Union of N. Am., 276 N.L.R.B.
1396, 1398 (1985) (finding that the testimony of two union officers "was deliberately
fabricated" due to their "willing[ness] to give whatever testimony would help the Union's
cause"); Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, 164 N.L.R.B. 491, 497 (1967) (describing a
witness who "was obviously unhappy to have been called to testify against his union and...
gave untruthful testimony").
384 In Cook Paint, the administrative law judge opined that "[a]bsent a specific provision,
contractually or otherwise established, calling for mandatory process, there is no apparent
reason why any employee (or any nonemployee) may not with impunity decline to appear
and testify in an arbitration proceeding." Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 246 N.L.R.B. 646, 652
(1979), enforcement denied, 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cf. NLRB v. Int'l Union of
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, 759 F.2d 533, 534 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing the contention
that unions are entitled to "prevent[ ] employers from forcing union members to testify ...
against other union members").
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est.385 Indeed, the recognition of new evidentiary privileges arguably tends to
"promote truth seeking by avoiding [the] conflicts of interest that could lead to
perjury." '386 This suggests that the balancing required by the fourth element of
the Wigmore test favors the recognition of a union representation privilege.38 7
As one court has noted:
[Ilf a . . . privilege is foreclosed, the truth may yet remain elusive and even just as
unobtainable, in light of the perjury which could take place if such testimony is
coerced. In explaining Wigmore's fourth criterion for the recognition of a testimo-
nial privilege, then, the expected benefit to justice, used as a rationale for a bar of the
privilege, is perhaps illusory.
388
IV. PoTENTIAi LIMITATIONS ON THE UNION REPRESENTATION PRIVILEGE
A. Applicability of the Privilege in Criminal Proceedings
1. Judicial Hostility to the Privilege in Criminal Cases
Despite potential pressure to do otherwise,389 many union members and
representatives compelled to testify against one another undoubtedly would
give truthful testimony.39° Thus, as with any other evidentiary privilege, the
recognition of a union representation privilege would occasionally result in the
385 See generally Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 429 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond, J., concurring)
(asserting that "the truth-finding function of the courts would not be advanced by nonrecog-
nition of [a] privilege" if compelling the witness to testify would not be "effective in breach-
ing ... existing confidentiality").
386 Rancho Publ'ns v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 274, 280 n.6 (Ct. App. 1999)
(emphasis added) (citing David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion:
Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 114-15 (1956)); see also In re
Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1309 (D. Nev. 1983) (discussing the possibility that "privileges
were originally enacted to prevent courts from being subjected to [perjured] testimony");
Wendy Meredith Watts, The Parent-Child Privilege: Hardly a New or Revolutionary Con-
cept, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 583, 614 (1987) (suggesting that "privileges actually aid the
ascertainment of truth by eliminating those situations in which perjured testimony is more
likely").
387 See Gruwell Anderson, supra note .17, at 524 (concluding that Wigmore's fourth
requirement is "fulfill[ed]" in the union representation context because "the injury to the
union/unionmember's relationship by disclosure would be greater than the benefit gained by
disclosure").
388 Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1310 (considering the possible recognition of a parent-child
privilege); see also J. Tyson Covey, Making Form Follow Function: Considerations in Cre-
ating and Applying a Statutory Parent-Child Privilege, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 896 n. 142
(observing that "[florced testimony" may be "so unreliable that the interests of adjudication
are not furthered").
389 See, e.g., Johnson v. Teamsters Local 559, 102 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting the
"harassment" suffered by an employee "after testifying against other Union members"); Jae-
ger Mach. Co., 55 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 850, 852 (1970) (High, Arb.) (describing a union's
"instructions to [two of its officials] to not testify after they had been sworn and taken the
stand," presumably "because their testimony would have tended to support the Company").
390 See, e.g., Horsehead Res. Dev. Co., 321 N.L.R.B. 1404, 1420 (1996) (describing a union
member who had the "courage ... to tell the truth in the face of... coercion put on him by
... fellow union members"); see also Ball-Foster Glass Container Co., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep.
(BNA) 1209, 1214 (1996) (Howell, Arb.) (observing that "union members are not necessa-
rily prejudiced witnesses").
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suppression of truth3 9 ' and the defeat of justice.392 In the view of some courts,
this result, however infrequently it may occur,3 93 is too high a price to pay in
criminal cases, 394 where the search for truth is deemed most critical, 3 9 5 and the
public interest in the production of evidence may be of constitutional
magnitude.3 96
391 See Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 153 (Ct. App. 2003)
("[C]reating [a union representation] privilege ... could severely compromise the ability of
employers to conduct investigations pertaining to. .. employer rules violations .... "). See
generally In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (asserting that "evidentiary
privileges by their very nature hinder the ascertainment of the truth"); Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509, 521 (8th Cir. 1984) (observing that "the law of privileges
tends to suppress the truth"); United States v. Sabri, 973 F. Supp. 134, 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1996)
(noting that the recognition of any evidentiary privilege "functions as an obstacle to the fact-
finder in the search for truth").
392 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that
"occasional injustice" is "the cost of every rule which excludes reliable and probative evi-
dence"); N.Y. State Inspection Employees v. N.Y. State Pub. Employment Relations Bd.,
629 F. Supp. 33, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (observing that "every privilege engenders some risk
of an erroneous decision"); Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152, 157 (Colo. 1999) ("[I1t is the
very nature of evidentiary witness privileges to 'sacrifice some availability of evidence rele-
vant to an administration of justice.'") (misquoting 1 MCCORMICK, supra note 1 § 72, at
101).
393 The Supreme Court has indicated that the evidentiary "cost" of recognizing new privi-
leges actually may be relatively modest: "Without a privilege, much of the desirable evi-
dence to which litigants ... seek access - for example, admissions against interest by a party
- is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken 'evidence' will therefore serve no greater
truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged." Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.
Thus, a "primary consideration in privilege cases should be whether the exclusion of the
evidence in question would actually promote the creation of information which might not
otherwise exist; if so, the exclusion is justified." Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 92 (S.D.
Iowa 1987) (citing Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers & Psychia-
trists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 600 n. 9 (1980)).
391 See generally United States v. Allison, 619 F.2d 1254, 1260 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the high cost to society of suppressing evidence
which could otherwise be used at trial against criminal defendants.") (citing Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976)). Courts have been particularly hesitant "to create privileges in the
criminal context where none existed at common law." United States v. Burtrum, 17 F.3d
1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Hade v. City of Fremont, 233 F. Supp. 2d 884, 887
(N.D. Ohio 2002) ("Some courts distinguish between civil and criminal proceedings when
allowing a claim of privilege, holding that, because there is little or no public interest in the
outcome of civil litigation, privilege claims should more readily be accepted in civil cases.");
United States v. Markiewicz, 732 F. Supp. 316, 319 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (observing that the
"invocation of a privilege is not as likely to be successful in a criminal setting as it is in a
civil setting"), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 978 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992).
115 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 585 (3d Cir. 1977) ("We recognize the
friction between the ancient maxim that the law is entitled to every man's evidence and the
existence of any privilege. Particularly in the criminal field, the search for truth should be
hampered as little as possible."); United States v. King, 194 F.R.D. 569, 585 (E.D. Va. 2000)
("There is a compelling interest in having every man's evidence at a criminal trial to the
extent that it is relevant.") (internal punctuation and citations omitted); United States v.
Gullo, 672 F. Supp. 99, 104 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[Tlhere is a strong policy in favor of full
development of facts and admissibility in criminal cases.").
396 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) ("The right to the production of all
evidence at a criminal trial ... has constitutional dimensions."); cf. Brink's Inc. v. City of
New York, 717 F.2d 700, 709 (2d Cir. 1983) ("In civil matters ... there is generally no
constitutional interest underlying a particular claim of privilege .... ").
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Although based on a questionable premise,397 this is essentially the con-
clusion reached by the court in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated January 20,
1998.398 That case involved a union's opposition to grand jury subpoenas
issued to union officials who had represented and advised several employees in
connection with the grand jury's investigation. 399 The union asserted that any
communications between the union officials and the employees were protected
by a "privilege generally shielding communications between union members
and their representatives on matters of union concern. '"40
The court asserted that the sole support for the union's claim of privilege
came from cases such as Customs Service4 0 1 and City of Newburgh,40 which
held only that an employer commits an unfair labor practice by questioning a
union official about communications with a represented employee pertaining to
internal disciplinary proceedings.4 °3 The court concluded that whatever privi-
lege may have been recognized in those cases does not apply "against any party
other than the employer." 4'
In reaching this conclusion, the Grand Jury Subpoenas court relied prima-
rily upon the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis in United States Depart-
ment of Justice v. FLRA ("DOJ r'),4 "5 which involved an investigation by the
Inspector General 4° 6 into the potential theft of government property by an
397 The constitutional interest in the production of evidence in criminal cases stems prima-
rily, if not exclusively, from the Fifth and Sixth Amendment due process and fair trial rights
of the defendant, see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711, who typically "has more at stake than a civil
litigant," and whose "evidentiary needs" therefore "may weigh more heavily in the balance."
United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus, even established evidentiary
privileges must "in some circumstances yield to a... criminal defendant's federal constitu-
tional right to a fair trial." Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 949 n.23 (Cal. 1990).
However, these constitutional rights would be protected, rather than impaired, by the recog-
nition of a union representation privilege where (as typically would be the case) the privilege
is applied to prevent a union representative from testifying against the defendant. Cf. United
States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.D.C. 1997) ("The attorney-client privilege ... is
key to the constitutional guarantees of the right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair
trial.... [Slubstantial questions of fundamental fairness are raised where, in connection with
a criminal prosecution, the government invades that privilege.").
398 995 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
399 See id. at 333.
400 Id.
401 See id. at 336 n.3 (citing Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300 (1991)).
402 See id. at 336 (citing City of Newburgh v. Newman, 421 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div.
1979)).
403 See id.; see also Poray, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 697, 703-04 (1966) (holding that an employer
committed an unfair labor practice by questioning an employee about "communications to
her from the Union which the Union had delivered to her privately," because the employer's
questioning "invaded [the employee's] privacy regarding a matter as to which employees...
are entitled to be protected from an employer's prying").
404 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 336; see also Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d
965, 967 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (citing City of Newburgh in support of the proposition that "tjhere
arises, in the context of rules regulating relations between management and labor, a species
of privilege for labor union leaders") (emphasis added).
405 39 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
406 Congress has established in each of several specified federal government agencies,
including the Department of Justice (of which the Immigration and Naturalization Service is
a part), an Office of Inspector General "as an 'independent and objective unit,' charg[ed] ...
with the responsibility of conducting and supervising audits and civil and criminal investiga-
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employee of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the "INS"). 4 0 7 The
FLRA held that the Inspector General's representative committed an unfair
labor practice by questioning the employee and his union representative "about
their 'privileged' conversations. ' '4°8
However, the appellate court vacated the FLRA's ruling.4 °9 The court had
no quarrel with the agency's recognition of an evidentiary privilege protecting
confidential union-related communications from disclosure to management.41°
However, because the FLRA's authority is limited to federal labor relations
matters,4 1 1 the court held that the privilege the agency had recognized could
only protect such communications from disclosure to management, and was not
enforceable "against the world.
4 12
Because the Inspector General's office operates relatively indepen-
dently,413 and its investigatory procedures are not subject to collective bargain-
ing obligations, 4 14 the court concluded that its investigator was not acting on
behalf of "management" (i.e.; the INS) when he investigated the INS
employee's alleged wrongdoing.4 5 And because the court concluded that the
union representation privilege is only enforceable against management, it held
tions relating to that agency's operations." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n v. FLRA, 25
F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4(a)(1) (2000)).
407 See DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 363.
408 Id. at 364.
409 See id. at 370.
410 See id. at 369 ("We do not question [the] reasoning [of Customs Service] insofar as it
applies to management.").
411 See id.
412 Id.; cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Mattingly, 89 F.R.D. 301, 304 (D. Colo.) (finding "no author-
ity whatsoever for [an administrative agency] to restrict the availability of evidence in a
judicial proceeding or to confer a testimonial privilege"), rev'd and remanded, 663 F.2d 68
(10th Cir. 1980). To illustrate this point, the DOJ I court posed - and answered - the
following question involving a hypothetical criminal investigation:
Are we to suppose that the ... Authority, through its administration of [the FSLMRS] and the
prospect of the Justice Department being held responsible for the investigation, may oversee
questioning by FBI agents and [Drug Enforcement Administration] agents and Assistant United
States Attorneys in cases involving union members? It is impossible to believe Congress
intended anything of the sort.
DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 366 (footnote omitted).
413 See DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 369. Specifically, representatives of the various Inspector Gen-
eral's offices are, by statute, generally "shielded with independence" from interference by
the agencies they are responsible for investigating. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 25
F.3d at 234 (citing 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 3(a) & 6(a)(2) (1994)).
414 See DOJ I, 39 F.3d at 369; see also U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 25 F.3d at 234
("[Plroposals which concern investigations conducted by the Inspector General ... are not
appropriately the subject of bargaining between an [employer] and a union."). The DOJ I
court noted that the union did not represent employees of the Inspector General's office, but
employees of the INS, and observed that the FSLMRS actually "forbids the formation of
bargaining units containing employees primarily engaged in investigating other agency
employees to ensure they are acting honestly - an apt description of investigators working
for the Inspector General." DOJ I, 39 F.3d at 365-66 & n.5.
415 See DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 368 ("The Inspector General does not stand in the shoes of
management. To perform his duties independently and objectively, the Inspector General
cannot side with management .... ).
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that the investigator was not prohibited from pressuring the employee or the
union representative to reveal their confidential communications to him.
4 16
The DOJ I court's analysis has been undermined by the Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in National Aeronautics and Space Administration v.
FLRA ("NASA"), 4 17 and the District of Columbia Circuit's own ensuing inter-
pretation of NASA in United States Department of Justice v. FLRA
("DOJ Hj",).418 Both NASA and DOJ 11 held that the Inspector General's inves-
tigators are representatives of the agency whose employees they investigate,49
thus effectively overruling the DOJ I court's finding that they do not act on
behalf of management when conducting their investigations.42°
Nevertheless, in refusing to extend the union representation privilege to
federal grand jury proceedings, the Grand Jury Subpoenas court did not rely on
the DOJ I court's characterization of the Inspector General's office, but on its
assertion that the privilege does "not shield a conversation between an
employee and his union representative from disclosure in court, or before a
grand jury." 4 2' This dicta in DOJ I was not overruled by NASA or DOJ 11,422
neither of which addressed the scope of an employee's right to union represen-
tation in a criminal investigation conducted by "law enforcement officials with
a broader charge" than the Inspector General.42 3
Because federal grand juries and the prosecutors that appear before them
clearly are independent from management,4 24 the Grand Jury Subpoenas court
indicated that the union representation privilege applies in federal grand jury
proceedings only if it is indeed good "against the world. ' 425 With respect to
that issue, the court concluded that the union had failed to establish that soci-
416 Id. at 369.
417 527 U.S. 229 (1999).
418 266 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
419 See NASA, 527 U.S. at 240-41; DOJ 1I, 266 F.3d at 1229.
420 Long before NASA and DOJ II were decided, the Third Circuit had also concluded that
the Inspector General's investigators are representatives of the agency whose employees
they are investigating. See Def. Criminal Investigative Serv. v. FLRA, 855 F.2d 93, 100 (3d
Cir. 1988).
421 DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 369. Noting that the union had cited "no case in which a federal or
state court has ruled that some form of union privilege bars a prosecutor or grand jury from
inquiring into conversations between a union member and his union representative," the
Grand Jury Subpoenas court held that "no union privilege... bar[red] the examination of
the subpoenaed witnesses before the grand jury." Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at
334, 337.
422 The portion of DOJ I on which the Grand Jury Subpoenas court relied is dicta because
the parties in DOJ I "apparently conceded that a union [representation] privilege 'would not
shield a conversation between an employee and his union representative from disclosure
before a grand jury."' Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 337 (emphasis added and
ellipses omitted) (quoting DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 369).
423 DOJ II, 266 F.3d at 1232 (quoting NASA, 527 U.S. at 244 n.8).
424 See Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 337 ("[B]oth the federal grand jury that has
subpoenaed the [union] witnesses and the federal prosecutor who seeks to question them
before that body are even more independent from management than was the Inspector Gen-
eral's Office .... "). See generally United States v. Ogden, 703 F.2d 629, 636 (1st Cir.
1983) (discussing "the constitutionally mandated independence of the grand jury and the
prosecutor").
425 Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 336 (quoting DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 369).
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ety's interest in encouraging confidential union communications outweighs its
interest in having all relevant evidence of criminal conduct explored.4 26 The
court therefore declined to interpret the privilege to afford the broad protection
from disclosure in criminal proceedings advocated by the union.42 7
2. The Applicability of Weingarten in Criminal Investigations
Although the Grand Jury Subpoenas court's interpretation of the union
representation privilege is not surprising,42 8 it is inconsistent with the prevail-
ing interpretation of Weingarten .429 In Department of Treasury, Internal Reve-
nue Service, Jacksonville District,43 ° for example, the FLRA specifically held
that the right to union representation applies to interviews conducted in connec-
tion with criminal investigations, and "not just to examinations of employees in
connection with non-criminal matters. 431
The NLRB has similarly held that an employee's right to union represen-
tation at an investigatory interview applies in criminal investigations, 4 32 and
even the federal appellate court that decided DOJ I has acknowledged that
"Weingarten protections have been accorded to private sector employees sus-
pected of criminal conduct. '43 3 The Board has explained this view on the fol-
lowing basis:
126 See id. at 337; see also id. at 335 ("[T]he [union] has ... failed to show that the union
relationship is so highly valued by ... society that its confidences warrant protection even at
the cost of losing evidence important to the administration of justice.").
427 See id. at 333.
428 The balance struck by the court reflects the widely-held view that the "need for evidence
relevant to the truth-seeking process" is "especially important in the context of federal grand
jury investigations." In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710
F. Supp. 999, 1010 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 879 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989); see also In re Sealed Case,
676 F.2d 793, 806 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Nowhere is the public's claim to each person's evi-
dence stronger than in the context of a valid grand jury subpoena."); In re Grand Jury
Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976) (asserting that society's interest
in having "every relevant fact ... developed and presented to the fact-finder" is "particularly
compelling in the context of a grand jury").
429 In addition, although society's interest in the full disclosure of evidence in criminal cases
has been described as "compelling," United States v. King, 194 F.R.D. 569, 585 (E.D. Va.
2000), it is also in criminal cases that the countervailing interest in protecting confidential
relationships is likely to be most urgent. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77
(2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he important social interests in the free flow of information that are
protected by [a] privilege are particularly compelling in criminal cases.").
430 23 F.L.R.A. 876 (1986).
431 Id. at 878. While the pertinent legislative history contains "no hint of Congress's inten-
tion with respect to the interface of criminal and administrative investigations," Congress's
codification of the right to union representation in the FSLMRS "literally applies to any
examination in connection with an investigation aimed at a [bargaining] unit employee,"
including those involving suspected criminal activity. Dep't of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, 24 F.L.R.A. 521, 534 (1986) (emphasis added).
432 See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv., 303 N.L.R.B. 463, 467 (1991) ("The Board has rejected the
argument that it is inappropriate to apply an employee's Section 7 right of prior consultation
to a criminal investigation .... ") (citing cases), enforced, 969 F.2d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Internal Revenue Serv., 23 F.L.R.A. at 878 ("[T]he NLRB has applied Weingarten rights to
the examination of ... employees ... in connection with criminal investigations.").
431 U.S. Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also U.S.
Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 266 F.3d 1228, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the right to
union representation "applie[s] to ... criminal investigations").
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[W]ere we to accept [the] argument that legitimate employer prerogatives and the
public safety require the exclusion of all union representatives from criminal investi-
gations ... while at the same time permitting [an employer] to administratively
discipline employees based on the fruits of such criminal investigations, we would in
effect be nullifying the Weingarten rights of any ... employee who might be admin-
istratively disciplined as the result of a criminal investigation. Such an outcome is
clearly repugnant to the... right [of] an employee to refuse to submit without union
representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result in his
discipline.
4 34
3. Implications of Weingarten's Applicability in Criminal
Investigations for the Union Representation Privilege
The NLRB and the FLRA are the federal agencies charged with primary
responsibility for implementing national labor policy. 435 Thus, their interpreta-
tions of Weingarten have ordinarily been give substantial deference by the
courts4 3 6 and labor arbitrators.43 7 However, for reasons the court did not ade-
quately explain, those agencies' extension of the right to union representation
(and, inferentially, the attendant evidentiary privilege recognized in Cook Paint
and Customs Service)438 to criminal investigations was not accorded any mean-
ingful deference in the Grand Jury Subpoenas case.4 39
"I U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 142 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).
435 See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957) ("The func-
tion of striking [the] balance [between conflicting legitimate interests] to effectuate national
labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which Congress committed prima-
rily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review."); EEOC v.
FLRA, 744 F.2d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("To ... establish labor-management relations
policy [in the federal sector], Congress created the Federal Labor Relations Authority."),
cert. dismissed, 476 U.S. 19 (1986).
436 See, e.g., NLRB v. Columbia Univ., 541 F.2d 922, 932 (2d Cir. 1976) (discussing "the
special deference that is to be accorded a Board determination of whether or not the need for
union assistance at an interview exists in light of changing industrial practices and the
Board's cumulative experience in dealing with labor management relations") (internal punc-
tuation and citation omitted). See generally Henry Ford Health Sys. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d
1139, 1144 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The Board has the primary responsibility for developing and
applying national labor policy, and [courts] therefore accord Board rules considerable defer-
ence."); Albright v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1119, 1124 (1992) ("FLRA decisions are enti-
tled to deference because of the FLRA's expertise in the area of labor law.").
"I See, e.g., Simkins Indus., Inc., 106 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 551, 557 (1996) (Fullmer,
Arb.) ("It appears to the arbitrator that the National Labor Relations Board is the primary
custodian of the Weingarten doctrine."); Lancaster City Schs., 81 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1024, 1028 (1983) (Abrams, Arb.) ("The National Labor Relations Board enforces Wein-
garten, not labor arbitrators.").
438 See, e.g., Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300, 1307 (1991) ("[T]he existence of the privi-
lege is an integral part of an employee's statutory right to representation .... ).
439 In a footnote, the court did acknowledge that employers "cannot seek to learn from a
union official the statements of an employee made in the course of union representation." In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 336 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
However, the court made no mention of the federal statutory right to union representation on
which this prohibition is based, but instead asserted that "[n]either the collective bargaining
process nor the state laws that protect that process can limit the scope of a federal criminal
investigation." Id. at 337 (emphasis added). Once the court cast the issue as a matter of
state law, its ultimate holding appears to have been a foregone conclusion, because the
Supreme Court itself has held that the "federal interest in the enforcement of federal criminal
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The court's oversight may be attributable to the fact that, in contrast to the
NLRB, the FLRA and other policy-making administrative agencies," courts
tend to favor evidentiary rules that assist them in the search for truth, 44 1 while
attaching relatively little weight to the countervailing policy interests, "external
to the adjudicatory process," 2 that are served by evidentiary privileges. 443
When the pertinent confidentiality interests are given due consideration,' it
seems clear that if the right to union representation applies to interviews con-
ducted in criminal investigations," 5 the correlative evidentiary privilege arising
statutes" must prevail over "any concern for federal-state comity in the area of evidentiary
privilege." In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp.
999, 1010 (D.N.J.) (citing United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980)), affid, 879
F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1989).
440 The recognition of an evidentiary privilege is "[u]ltimately ... a policy decision."
Ulibarri v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 449, 456 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, 924 P.2d
109 (Ariz. 1996); see also United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1055
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (characterizing "questions of testimonial privilege" as "policy issues").
Thus, legislatures, federal administrative agencies, and other policy-making bodies may be
"institutionally better equipped" than courts "to perform the balancing of the competing pol-
icy issues required in deciding whether the recognition of a . . .privilege is in the best
interests of society." In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1154 (3d Cir. 1997).
441 See Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 67 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a "principal feature"
of the federal common law approach to the development of evidentiary privileges "is that the
considerations against the recognition of new privileges that would impede access to proba-
tive evidence are granted very significant weight"); People v. Sanders, 457 N.E.2d 1241,
1245 (I11. 1983) (observing that "courts, as institutions, find it easy to perceive value in
public policies.., favoring the admission of all relevant and reliable evidence which directly
assist the judicial function of ascertaining the truth").
442 Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 959 (Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J., concurring);
see also Grand Jury Subpoena (Psychological Theatrical Records), 710 F. Supp. at 1009
("Rules of privilege... are not designed to achieve a more effective and truthful result in the
litigation process.") (quoting 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 322 501 [01 ], at 501-13).
13 See, e.g., In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. 1981) (contrasting "the public policy
served by a new privilege" with "normally dominant truth-seeking considerations" in dis-
cussing the judiciary's "notable hostility ... to recognizing new privileges") (footnote omit-
ted); Sanders, 457 N.E.2d at 1245 ([I]t is not [the courts'] primary function to promote
policies aimed at broader social goals more distantly related to the judiciary."); Mullane,
supra note 322, at 136 (finding it "hardly surprising" that a court's treatment of a privilege
issue "begins with the presumption that courts have a need for and right to compel all
evidence from all sources").
4I4 One federal court has asserted that "testimonial privileges should never be considered as
merely a frustration of the effective administration of justice or the circumvention of the best
interests of society and the state." In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1326 (D. Nev. 1983).
Privileges instead "serve as important protectors of the right of privacy," assuring that "our
system of justice functions at its optimal integrity." Id. at 1323, 1326 (quoting Krattenmaker,
supra note 197, at 616); see also United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1986)
("Privileges are recognized because lawmakers and courts consider protecting confidential
relationships more important to society than ferreting out what was said within the
relationship.").
"5 See U.S. Postal Serv., 288 N.L.R.B. 864, 866 (1988) ("Weingarten rights are not sub-
servient to Federal criminal proceedings, even when Miranda rights have been accorded
those accused of violations of law."); U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 153 (1979)
("Weingarten rights extend to interviews regarding alleged criminal acts.").
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from that right44 6  should also apply in criminal and other judicial
proceedings.44 7
Extending the privilege to judicial proceedings would promote union rep-
resentation by enabling employees to confide in their union representatives
"without concern that such confidences may be divulged to outsiders."44 As
one court has explained:
If unions are to function, leaders must be free to communicate with their members
about the problems and complaints of union members without undue interference.
Members must be able to have confidence that what they tell their representatives on
such subjects cannot be pried out of the representatives by an overzealous govern-
ment[ ] .... 449
This was essentially the conclusion reached in United States Department
of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, Kansas City, Mo. ("Farm Service"),
450
where an FLRA administrative law judge specifically rejected the analysis in
DOJ t'451 the case on which the Grand Jury Subpoenas court primarily relied
in refusing to extend the union representation privilege to federal grand jury
proceedings .452 The judge in Farm Service began by noting that confidential
communications between employees and their union representatives are pro-
tected by an evidentiary privilege.4 53 He then asserted that this privilege, first
recognized by the FLRA in the Customs Service case,454 had also been "recog-
446 As alluded to earlier, the union representation privilege traces its origins to the
employee's right to union representation at an investigatory interview under Weingarten, and
in particular to the employee's derivative right to consult confidentially with the union repre-
sentative prior to that interview. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361, 369
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("The privilege ... derive[s] from the ... right of an employee to union
representation in an investigation .... "); Hughes Aircraft Co., 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
112, 1117 (1986) (Richman, Arb.) (noting that recognition of the privilege is "consistent
with the protection afforded employees in their insistence on union representation" under
Weingarten).
44' In SEC v. Touche Ross & Co., 438 F. Supp. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), for example, the
court noted that the potential recognition of "a new privilege of confidentiality" is a "policy
issue" that, at least in the first instance, should be left to the federal agency "charged ... with
special expertise and rule-making power in administering the federal laws" at issue. The
courts, by contrast, should "defer making such a policy judgment until the [agency] itself
[has] expressed its official views clearly." Id. But cf Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers Local
Union No. 537, 334 F.2d 381, 384 (10th Cir. 1964) ("It is for the Court, and not the govern-
mental agency or executive branch, to determine whether [information] sought to be with-
held under a claim of privilege [is] entitled to the protection of that privilege.").
418 In re Estate of Colby, 723 N.Y.S.2d 631, 633 (Sur. 2001) (describing the attorney-client
privilege); see also Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 412 (1988) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting that an evidentiary privilege "promotes trust in the representational
relationship").
49 Seelig v. Shepard, 578 N.Y.S.2d. 965, 967 (Sup. 1991).
450 F.L.R.A. ALI Dec. No. 130, 1997 FLRA LEXIS 141 (Oct. 23, 1997).
45I U.S. Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
452 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 336-37
(E.D.N.Y. 1998).
453 See Farm Serv., 1997 FLRA LEXIS 141, at *41.
454 Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300 (1991).
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nized with approval" by the court in DOJ 1,'4 5 5 although that court had con-
cluded that the privilege is only "good as against management. "456
Addressing this purported limitation on the scope of the privilege, the
judge in Farm Service first noted that even before the Supreme Court effec-
tively overruled DOJ I in NASA, 457 the FLRA had rejected the DOJ I court's
conclusion that employees have no right to union representation in criminal
investigations conducted by the Inspector General.4 58 The FLRA instead holds
that Weingarten rights apply in "criminal investigations as well as . . . non-
criminal investigations,9459 including those conducted by the Inspector
General. 4 °
In fact, the FLRA has held that, at least in FSLMRS cases, the right to
union representation applies to "any examination in connection with an investi-
gation aimed at a [bargaining] unit employee. 461 The judge in Farm Service
therefore concluded, "contrary to [the DOJ I] Court," that the evidentiary privi-
lege stemming from the right to union representation recognized in Customs
Service should likewise be enforceable "against the world." '46 2
The judge's conclusion that the union representation privilege should
apply in criminal cases was foreshadowed by the FLRA's analysis of an
employee's right to union representation in Department of Justice, Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS"). 463 In INS, an employee questioned in con-
nection with a criminal investigation requested that his union representative be
present during the interview." One of the investigators initially acknowl-
edged that the employee was entitled to have his representative present during
the interview.46 5
However, the investigator then proceeded to inform the employee that he
was being interviewed in connection with a criminal investigation and not
merely an administrative investigation, and cautioned the employee that his
communications with his union representative would not be privileged in any
455 Farm Serv., 1997 FLRA LEXIS 141, at *41 n.5.
456 Id. (quoting DOJ 1, 39 F.3d at 369).
457 Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. FLRA, 527 U.S. 229 (1999).
458 See Farm Serv., 1997 FLRA LEXIS 141, at *41 n.5 (citing Headquarters, Nat'l Aero-
nautics & Space Admin., 50 F.L.R.A. 601, 612-19 (1995), enforced, 120 F.3d 1208 (11 th
Cir. 1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. 229 (1999)); see also U.S. Dep't of Justice, 56 F.L.R.A. 556, 570
(2000) (asserting that DOJ I was "wrongly decided," and that "the Authority has respectfully
declined to follow" the court's decision in that case). See generally U.S. Geological Survey
Caribbean Dist. Office, 53 F.L.R.A. 1006, 1040 (1997) (noting that a lower federal appellate
court decision is "not binding on the Authority unless and until it specifically embraces the
decision, or is reversed by the Supreme Court").
459 Farm Serv., 1997 FLRA LEXIS 141, at *40 (citing Dep't of Treasury, Internal Revenue
Serv., 23 F.L.R.A. 876, 878-79 (1986)).
46 See, e.g., Dep't of Def., Def. Crim. Investigative Serv., 28 F.L.R.A. 1145, 1148-51
(1987), enforced, 855 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1988); see also FLRA v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 137
F.3d 683, 688 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The FLRA has ... made clear its position that [Weingarten]
applies to questioning by [the Inspector General's] agents .... ").
461 Dep't of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 24 F.L.R.A. 521, 534
(1986) (emphasis added).
462 Farm Serv., 1997 FLRA LEXIS 141, at *41 n.5.
463 36 F.L.R.A. 41 (1990), enforcement denied, 939 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1991).
46 See id. at 42-43.
465 See id. at 43.
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ensuing criminal proceedings.46 6 After the investigator assured the employee
that he could interrupt the interview at any time to seek advice from legal coun-
sel or his union representative, the employee elected to be interviewed without
his union representative present.4 67
Although the employee was, in fact, subsequently subpoenaed to testify
before a grand jury,46 8 the administrative law judge ruled that the investigator's
reference to the lack of a privilege in those proceedings misled the employee
into concluding that he was not entitled to full Weingarten rights during his
investigatory interview.4 69 The FLRA agreed that the investigator's tactics
coerced the employee into foregoing his right to union representation.470
Because the employee's decision to be interviewed without a union representa-
tive present could not be considered knowing and voluntary, 47 t his right to
union representation during the interview had been violated.47 2
In reaching this conclusion, the FLRA found it unnecessary to decide
whether communications between the employee and his union representative
41 See id. The investigator further stated that the union representative "would or could be
subject to subpoena and/or interview by [the investigators], to subpoena by a grand jury, or
to subpoena at trial," and thus "could become a witness against [the employee] and for the
Government as to any communication that indicated possible culpability on the part of [the
employee]." Id.
467 See id.
468 See id. at 53. It is not clear whether the union representative was also subpoenaed to
testify before the grand jury. However, one labor arbitrator has noted that while it would be
"improper" for a union representative to testify voluntarily against an employee he repre-
sented, "it would not be wrong for him to respond to a properly executed subpoena." Can-
teen Corp., 89 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 815, 819 (1987) (Keefe, Arb.)
469 See INS, 36 F.L.R.A. at 45 ("The Judge found that [the] statement conveyed the errone-
ous impression that [the employee] was not entitled to his full statutory right to a union
representative at the examination because the interview was in connection with a criminal
investigation.").
470 See id. at 51 ("[T]he manner, nature, and repetition of [the investigator's] statements to
[the employee], when [the employee] asserted his right to union representation ... intimi-
dated [the employee] to give up his expressed desire for, and right to, union
representation.").
471 See id. at 52 (concluding that the investigator "discouraged and dissuaded [the
employee] from remaining firm in his request and resolve for union representation, and...
coerced [the] surrender of that protection"). An employee "may, even after having requested
that a steward be present, waive the right to representation during a Weingarten interview."
U.S. Postal Serv., 275 N.L.R.B. 430, 432 n.6 (1985). However, any claim that the right has
been waived is carefully scrutinized. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223,
1223 (1977). The Board has explained the reason for viewing such alleged waivers with
skepticism:
Before inferring that a waiver has occurred the Board must assure itself that the employee acted
knowingly and voluntarily. The right being waived is designed to prevent intimidation by the
employer. It would be incongruous to infer a waiver without a clear indication that the very
tactics the right is meant to prevent were not used to coerce a surrender of protection.
Id. (internal punctuation omitted) (quoting Theodore C. Hirt, Union Presence in Disciplinary
Meetings, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 329, 350 (1974)).
472 See INS, 36 F.L.R.A. at 66 (holding that the employer "constructively denied [the
employee's] request for a Union representative to which he was entitled"); cf. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. at 1228 (finding remarks that "discouraged and intimidated...
employees from exercising their right[ ]" to union representation to be "just like a denial of
this right") (emphasis added).
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actually would have been privileged in the subsequent criminal proceeding.47 3
However, the administrative law judge noted that the FLRA was then consider-
ing the potential recognition of a union representation privilege in the Customs
Service case,474 and the FLRA ultimately did recognize the privilege in that
case. 475 Thus, when read together, INS and Customs Service strongly suggest
that the privilege should apply in criminal proceedings47 6 in order to "prevent
employers from coercing employees" into waiving their Weingarten rights4 77
in the manner described in the INS case.47 8
4. Policy Considerations Supporting Recognition of the Privilege in
Criminal Cases
a. Recognizing the Privilege Would Promote Communications
Between Employees and Their Union Representatives
The FLRA is not alone in concluding that the union representation privi-
lege should be "good as against the world. '479 As one federal court recently
noted, "[p]rivileges usually do not vary depending upon the nature of the action
as their very purpose is to bar compelled disclosure irrespective of the nature of
the proceeding in connection with which they may arise."'48 ° Thus, most evi-
473 See INS, 36 F.L.R.A. at 51 (rejecting the employer's contention "that the legality of its
conduct turned on the truthfulness of the statements [concerning the lack of a privilege]
made by [the investigator]"). The administrative law judge also did not reach this issue, but
appeared to favor the recognition of such a privilege:
Except for the fact that [the employee and the union representative] did not have an attorney-
client relationship, [the employer] cites no other authority to support [the investigator's] asser-
tion that the conversations between [the employee] and his Union representative would not be
privileged and that [the representative] could be compelled to be a witness against [the
employee] as to any admissions which [he] made. The truth of these assertions are [sic] not free
from doubt. They need not be resolved in this case for it is enough to note that Congress has
provided the employee the right to the presence of a union representative ... and it is for the
employee himself to determine whether to exercise the right and obtain the full measure of
protection which Congress envisioned.
Id. at 65-66 (footnote omitted).
474 See id. at 66 n.6.
475 See Long Beach Naval Shipyard,, 44A F.L.R.A. 1021, 1031 (1992) (referring to "the
privilege accorded by Customs Service").
476 Although the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the FLRA's decision in INS, the court -
like the FLRA - found it unnecessary to decide whether the employee had been "correctly
advised ... that no privilege arises out of the employee-union representative relationship."
Dep't of Justice Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. FLRA, 939 F.2d 1170, 1175 (5th Cir.
1991).
177 Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602; see also Fiber Glass Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 807 F.2d
461, 463 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Employer interviews or 'interrogations' become illegal.., when
'the words themselves or the context in which they are used . . . suggest an element of
coercion or interference.' ") (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 339 F.2d 498, 500 (5th Cir.
1964)).
478 In fact, the Authority in INS characterized such "intimidation by the employer" as one of
"the very tactics the right is meant to prevent." INS, 36 F.L.R.A. at 52 (quoting Southwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1223 (1977)).
479 U.S. Dep't of Agric. Farm Serv. Agency, F.L.R.A. ALJ Dec. No. 130, 1997 FLRA
LEXIS 141, at *41 (Oct. 23, 1997).
480 Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301, 304 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); cf. Nilavar v. Mercy
Health Sys., 210 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 2002):
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dentiary privileges apply in both civil and criminal cases, 481 as well as in
administrative proceedings, 48 2 and the union representation privilege should be
accorded the same treatment.
4 83
For example, to the extent it enables employees to seek the advice of their
union representatives without fear that their communications will subsequently
be used to incriminate them,48 4 the union representation privilege is, once
again, analogous to the attorney-client privilege. 48 5 Thus, in order to be effec-
tive, the union representation privilege, like the attorney-client privilege, should
apply "regardless of whether the proceeding is civil, criminal or
administrative. ' 4 86
[A] privilege should either be recognized in the common law, or it should not. Its application
should not turn on whether, for example, the claim .. .is one arising under malpractice law,
discrimination law, or antitrust law.
This observation is not in conflict with the notion that even extant privileges should be strictly
construed. To say that a privilege must be strictly construed is not to limit its applicability to
certain causes of action ....
Id. at 606 & n.17 (citation omitted).
481 See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("Common law evidentiary privileges based on encouraging
frank and candid communication apply equally in criminal and civil cases."); New Mexico v.
Roper, 921 P.2d 322, 324 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (indicating that an evidentiary privilege
"generally applies to both criminal and civil cases unless [a] rule expressly limits [the] privi-
lege to the latter") (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 6 § 2385).
482 See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 339 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 173 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1508, 1508 (2003) (holding that "the work product [privilege] as reflected in Rule 26(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' applies to [Board] unfair labor practice proceed-
ings"). See generally Ashokan v. Nevada Dep't of Ins., 856 P.2d 244, 247 (Nev. 1993)
("Any privilege that is based on substantive policy is obviously as appropriate for an agency
proceeding as for a court proceeding.") (quoting 3 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 16.10, at 263 (2d ed. 1980)); In re Grimm, 635 A.2d 456, 464 (N.H. 1993)
("The general rule is that rules of evidence do not apply to administrative tribunals, though
privileges [do] apply ....") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
483 See Alexander A. Myers, A Study of the Proposed "Protective Function Privilege:"
Compelling Secret Service Testimony, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 43, 83-84 ("There are few
... privileges which apply to only one context, specifically because the importance of the
relationship and the preservation of privacy outweighs the need for testimony regardless of
the nature of the proceeding. It makes little sense to treat a [new] privilege any differ-
ently.") (emphasis added).
484 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 266 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting
that an employee who "is concerned about the possible testimony of [a] union representa-
tive" may "decide not to ask for one"); cf. U.S. Postal Serv. v. NLRB, 969 F.2d 1064, 1072
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (alluding to the potential "impact .. .on [a] union representative-
employee conversation" if the union representative could be "compelled to testify in court as
to his knowledge of criminal conduct").
485 See, e.g., United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 839 (D.D.C. 1997) ("To provide
effective assistance, a lawyer must be able to communicate freely without fear that his or her
advice and legal strategy will be seized and used against the client in a criminal proceed-
ing."); Illinois v. Knight, 486 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]o compel a civil
attorney to disclose privileged communications in a criminal proceeding would defeat the
basic policy underlying the privilege, that of encouraging full and frank consultation
between a client and his attorney by removing any fear of compelled disclosure of that
information.").
486 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 188 F.R.D. 189, 199 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); see also Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Profession-
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Indeed, one prominent labor lawyer, Mitchell Rubinstein,48 has noted that
limiting the union representation privilege's application to traditional labor
relations disputes would not adequately protect the interests the privilege is
intended to serve.48 8 He argues that because agencies like the FLRA and the
NLRB have no authority to control discovery in other forums,4 89 their recogni-
tion of the privilege would be largely academic unless its application is
extended to courts and other tribunals "outside the context of administrative
unfair labor practice .. proceedings. '490
While Rubinstein's discussion of this issue is rather cursory, his conclu-
sion is clearly correct.4 91 He specifically notes that an administrative agency's
potential application of the privilege is likely to be "moot" in cases where a
court has already compelled disclosure of the communications at issue.4 92
However, to the extent the privilege is intended to encourage confidential com-
als: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1226
& n.1 (1962):
The .. .lawyer may remain silent about the confidential communications of his client (if the
client desires silence) even when asked to disclose them as a witness in any kind of a courtroom
proceeding - civil or criminal.
Although the case law is scanty, and the issue far from clear, it is at least arguable that the
attorney-client privilege is also applicable in other proceedings such as administrative and con-
gressional investigations.
487 In addition to practicing labor and employment law, see Rubinstein, supra note 18, at
595 n.*, Rubinstein has authored a number of articles addressing labor-related topics. See
id. at 599 n.37, 600 n.38 (citing articles); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221,
1236-37 n.28 (3d Cir. 1994) (relying on one of Rubinstein's articles).
488 See Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602 ("Limiting the union privilege to unfair labor
practice proceedings... is inadequate."); cf. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 241 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[L]imiting the scope of [a] privilege deters 'full and frank'...
communication ....") (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)),
rev'd sub nom. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
489 Rubinstein specifically states that the Board and comparable state agencies "do not have
subject matter jurisdiction to quash a subpoena issued by an unrelated administrative body."
Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602. However, his observation is equally applicable to judi-
cially issued subpoenas:
The Labor Management Relations Act [of which the NLRA is now a part] was not intended to
preclude or obstruct the obtaining of evidence for judicial proceedings. Nor does it vest any
authority in the National Labor Relations Board to prescribe, in relation to suits to prosecute or
defeat justiciable rights, what evidence courts are entitled to receive or the parties are entitled to
present, just because the suit is one between an employer and an employee or an employer and a
labor union ....
NLRB v. Katz Drug Co., 207 F.2d 168, 171 (8th Cir. 1953) (citation omitted).
490 Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602.
491 As one federal appellate court has noted, "[flew would confide in their [representatives]
on the assurance that certain courts would find these communications privileged while other
courts would not." In re Int'l Horizons, Inc., 689 F.2d 996, 1004 n.18 (1 1th Cir. 1982).
Thus, "some form of categorical protection is necessary to accomplish the social goal for
which the privilege is fashioned, i.e., inducing one group to place its confidence in another."
In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 807 n.43 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
492 Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602; see also In re Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230,
233 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Disclosure of [confidential information] will destroy [an] alleged privi-
lege and moot the question."); Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. 1021, 1052 (1992)
("Information which was privileged loses its immunity upon public disclosure.").
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munications between employees and their union representatives, 493 administra-
tive recognition of the privilege may be equally academic494 unless it is also
clear that the courts will uphold the privilege in future cases.49 5
For example, regardless of how confident employees may be that the
NLRB would not compel the disclosure of their communications with union
representatives concerning collective bargaining strategy,4 96 "the prospect of
future public disclosure through court records may ... [nevertheless] impede
the uninhibited expression of opinion and exchange of ideas necessary to arrive
at an acceptable proposal or strategy. 4 97 In this regard, the judiciary's failure
to recognize a union representation privilege is likely to make the administra-
tive recognition of the privilege relatively meaningless.49 8
493 See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 595 (asserting that the privilege "will foster
public policy by encouraging free and open communication"). See generally In re Grand
Jury Subpoenaes dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[F]or a
privilege to be recognized it must ... promote confidential communications valued by the
parties ....") (discussing Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996)).
494 The terms "moot" and "academic" are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., State v.
Turner, 658 P.2d 658, 659 (Wash. 1983) ("A case is moot if the issues it presents are 'purely
academic.' ") (quoting Grays Harbor Paper Co. v. Grays Harbour County, 442 P.2d 967, 969
(Wash. 1968)). However, mootness is actually a somewhat narrower concept, in that a case
is generally considered moot "if the issues have become academic so that judgment, if ren-
dered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy." Dubuque v. Pub.
Employment Relations Bd., 339 N.W.2d 827, 831 (Iowa 1983) (emphasis added). The reso-
lution of an issue may be academic, on the other hand, if it is, in a more general sense, "of
little practical significance." Colon v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 877 F.2d 148, 152
(1st Cir. 1989); see also WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (10th ed. 1997) (defin-
ing "academic" as "having no practical or useful significance").
495 See, e.g., Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 500 (D. Utah 1992) (describing an employee
who "would not have.., sought the advice and representation" of a union official "had he
not been assured that [their] communications ...would remain confidential"); see also
Nixon v. Freeman, 670 F.2d 346, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that "fear of disclosure may
chill.. . candid advice and discussion"). See generally Martin v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
54 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 40,079, at 63,300 n.7 (D.D.C. 1990) ("If the proposed privi-
lege's uncertain application destroys its purported benefits, the privilege does not warrant
recognition.").
496 See, e.g., Berbiglia, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 1476, 1495-96 (1977). See generally Boise Cas-
cade Corp., 279 N.L.R.B. 422, 432 (1986) ("A proper bargaining relationship between the
parties mandates that [each party] be able to confidentially evaluate possible interpretations
of the existing labor agreement and that it be able to plan in confidence a strategy for altering
or changing its [terms].").
197 Springfield Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio Ass'n of Pub. Sch. Employees, 667
N.E.2d 458, 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added); see also N.Y. News, Inc. v. New
York, 745 F. Supp. 165, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Compelled to produce documents and testify
under oath, setting forth their bargaining positions, the parties will be unable to be fluid and
change positions or make concessions without embarrassment.") (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
498 See, e.g., Gregory T. Stevens, The Proper Scope of Nonlawyer Representation in State
Administrative Proceedings: A State Specific Balancing Approach, 43 VAND. L. Rv. 245,
262 (1990) ("[O]nce the ... judiciary possesses jurisdiction over an appeal from an adminis-
trative proceeding, prior communications between a nonlawyer and his client may be subject
to discovery."). Similarly, "to narrowly interpret [a] privilege as being applicable only in
criminal and civil trials ... but not in administrative proceedings, would be to substantially
diminish its effectiveness to accomplish the purposes for which the privilege was created."
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b. Recognition of the Privilege Avoids "Punishing" Unionized
Employees for Being Represented by Nonlawyers
Rubinstein also suggests that judicial recognition of the privilege would
reflect the fact that attorneys hold no monopoly on representation in labor mat-
ters,4 99 and that "much of labor relations, negotiation, arbitration and mediation
is carried out by labor professionals who are not lawyers."5 Indeed, many
employees being interviewed in connection with employer disciplinary investi-
gations undoubtedly would prefer to be represented by, and confide in, a union
representative, 50 1 rather than an attorney.50 2 The same may be true of employ-
ees selecting a representative to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement on
their behalf.5 0 3
Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Corbin, 527 So. 2d 868, 872 (Fla. Ct. App.
1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
'99 See Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 600; see also Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics and Conduct of
Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Mahoney, 402 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1987) ("Doing ... labor
negotiation is not necessarily the practice of law and properly may be done by nonlawy-
ers."); Montebello Rose Co. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 856, 874 (Ct. App.
1981) (asserting that "labor negotiations could [be] conducted by a nonattorney").
'0 Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 600; see also Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1258
(9th Cir. 1985) ("Labor grievances and arbitrations frequently are handled by union employ-
ees or representatives who have not received any professional legal training at all."); Eisen v.
Minnesota, 352 N.W.2d 731, 737 (Minn. 1984) (asserting that representation by "a skilled
union representative," rather than by an attorney, is "the common form of representation in
labor relations controversies"); Matull & Assocs., Inc. v. Cloutier, 240 Cal. Rptr. 211, 215
(Ct. App. 1987) (noting that "collective bargaining and labor contract administration" are
"functions which nonlawyer labor relations consultants regularly perform").
501 In Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit Sys. Comm'n, 619 P.2d 1036 (Ariz.
1980), for example, an employee "wanted to be represented at [her disciplinary] hearing by
... a person not a lawyer but a representative of... [her] union." Id. at 1038 (parenthesis
omitted). She explained that "her union representative [was] skilled in [the] special field of
employer-employee relations," id. at 1040, and, unlike an attorney, "was not charging any
fee for his representation." Id. at 1038; see also At. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 820 n.14
(1979) (describing an employee who "preferred that his case be presented by the Union's
business agent rather that [sic] the Union's attorney"); Weeks v. State, 603 N.Y.S.2d 249,
250 (App. Div. 1993) (discussing the situation in which "a party to a disciplinary arbitration
proceeding chooses to be represented by a union representative who is not an attorney").
502 On the other hand, there undoubtedly are circumstances under which such an employee
would prefer to be represented by an attorney. See, e.g., Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58
F.3d 1171, 1179 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Employment disputes often involve complex issues of
labor law, and it is understandable that an employee receiving union representation would
... wish to speak to a private attorney about his case."); TCC Ctr. Cos., 275 N.L.R.B. 604,
609 (1985) (describing an employee who sought "the personal and private assistance of his
own attorney when faced with possible loss of employment"). As one court explained:
Members of our society often require information and guidance of a nature that lawyers are
uniquely capable of conferring. The intricacies of our labor law often will mean that a layman
will be either confused by or wholly ignorant of its provisions. Employees have a legitimate
interest in discussing their rights and obligations under the law with an informed but neutral third
party. This is especially true where the interests of the union might deviate from those of an
individual employee.
Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 209-10 (5th Cir. 1982).
503 See, e.g., Crockett-Bradley Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 435, 442 (1974) (discussing an
employer's demand that its employees "deal with [it] through a committee or attorney and
give up their preference for representation by a union") (emphasis added), For various rea-
sons, "many employers [also] prefer to utilize the services of a nonlawyer ... in their collec-
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For one thing, union representatives are likely to be familiar with the
terms of any existing collective bargaining agreement."° In addition, a union
representative who lacks formal legal training505 may nevertheless have "con-
siderable expertise and extensive knowledge of labor relations law as it per-
tain[s] to the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements, '0 6 and "may
also have been specially trained by his or her union in assisting employees at an
investigatory interview."50 7 On the other hand, there undoubtedly are many
attorneys (and perhaps particularly criminal attorneys) 50° who are not suffi-
ciently familiar with "the intricacies and subtleties of labor law and Board stan-
tive bargaining activities." Matull & Assocs., 240 Cal. Rptr. at 215. See generally Robert
Feinerman, Collective Bargaining Techniques and Tactics, 9 PRAc. LAW. 19, 19 (1963)
("The lawyer's place at the bargaining table has been seriously questioned by many employ-
ers and unions, primarily because of the failure of many attorneys to realize that they cannot
apply the methodology of the law office to the labor relations arena."); Carlton J. Snow,
Building Trust in the Workplace, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 465, 504 (1997) ("Lawyers in a
collective bargaining arena using traditional adversarial skills may well exacerbate differ-
ences between parties and severely undermine the prospect of a trusting relationship at the
same time.").
504 See Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower, 786 F.2d 242, 245 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that a union representative "may know the ins and outs of the collective bargaining agree-
ment without having a trial lawyer's skills"); Jenkins v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
Pension Plan, 713 F.2d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 1983) (observing that an employee in a "tradi-
tional labor-management arbitration proceeding" is often "assisted in the presentation of his
case ... by a union representative who is knowledgeable with the provisions of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement").
505 See Connelly v. Nitze, 401 F.2d 416, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[U]nion representatives,
like laymen generally, are not notably sensitive to legal niceties."); Ruffin v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 141 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2756, 2758 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ("Union representatives are usually
coworkers and are not lawyers or experts .... "); Toledo World Terminals, Inc., 289
N.L.R.B. 670, 706 (1988) (asserting that most union officials "lack legal training"); Case v.
Monroe Cmty. Coll., 677 N.E.2d 279, 281 (N.Y. 1997) (referring to "a union representative
unschooled in the law").
506 Anderson v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 484 F. Supp. 76, 78 n.1 (D. Minn. 1980),
vacated and remanded, 641 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1981); see also NLRB v. Hayden Elec., Inc.,
693 F.2d 1358, 1367 n.9 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (describing a union representative who had "dedi-
cated his professional career to understanding the nuances of collective bargaining"); Hous-
ton County Elec. Coop., Inc., 285 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1224 (1987) (discussing a union
representative with "extensive labor relations experience and training" who had "negotiated
nearly 75 collective-bargaining agreements" and "become familiar with labor law principles
by attending labor law seminars and [through] independent study").
507 E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 630 (1985), review denied sub nom.
Slaughter v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989); see also O'Brien v. Leidinger, 452 F. Supp.
720, 726 (E.D. Va. 1978) (indicating that union representatives may be "skilled in presenting
employee grievances [and] discussing employment matters on behalf of union members");
Int'l Chem. Workers Union, Local No. 190, 251 N.L.R.B. 1535, 1543 (1980) (discussing the
"expertise and sophistication" a full-time union representative can "be reasonably expected
to bring to grievance processing").
508 Given the "complex nature of practicing criminal law today," Louisiana v. Wigley, 624
So.2d 425, 430 (La. 1993) (Dennis, J., concurring), there are many attorneys who "special-
ize[ ] exclusively in the practice of criminal law." Ryan v. Louisiana, 314 F. Supp. 1047,
1049 (E.D. La. 1970). Many such attorneys undoubtedly would "experience[ ] difficulties
... in connection with civil matters," In re Brade, 473 N.Y.S.2d 467, 468 (App. Div. 1984),
including specifically the "sometimes esoteric field" of labor law. Overnite Transp. Co., 209
N.L.R.B. 691, 695 (1974).
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dards"' to represent employees effectively in employer disciplinary
investigations 51° or collective bargaining negotiations."'
Thus, even when an employee's alleged misconduct rises to the level of a
potential violation of the criminal law,5t 2 the choice of an appropriate represen-
tative in an ensuing investigatory interview5"3 - if the employee even has such
a choice5 14 - may not be entirely clear.5 15 As one Board administrative law
judge has explained:
509 Menlo Foods Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 337, 345 (1999); see, e.g., Vic Koenig Chevrolet,
Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1255, 1268 (1996) (describing an attorney "who [had] no particular
expertise in labor law"); Redway Carriers, Inc., 274 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1385 (1985) (discussing
a party's consultation with an attorney who "was not a labor relations specialist"). One
Board administrative law judge has noted that "the intricacies of labor law fall into a special-
ized field even within the legal profession." Purolator Prods., Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 694, 712
(1984).
510 See Penn-Dixie Steel Corp., 253 N.L.R.B. 91, 95 (1980) (observing that even "many
experienced labor lawyers" lacked a thorough understanding of an employee's rights in an
investigatory interview "until the Supreme Court spoke definitively" on the subject); Maui
Pineapple Co., 86 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 907, 911 (1986) (Tsukiyama, Arb.) (noting that the
right to representation at an investigatory interview is "a sophisticated legal right many law-
yers ... are unaware of'). But cf. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1941 v. FLRA, 837
F.2d 495, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Starr, J., dissenting) ("It seems beyond cavil that any protec-
tions afforded by a union representative to a besieged employee in an investigative interview
were more than adequately provided by a lawyer of [the employee's] own choosing.").
511 See, e.g., Houston County Elec. Coop., 285 N.L.R.B. at 1224 (describing an attorney
who "had never before bargained... on a labor agreement," and whose labor law experience
prior to being asked to do so was "limited to some study of it in a... law school course on
contracts"); see also Vanderbilt Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 297 F.2d 833, 833 (2d Cir. 1961)
(discussing the potential ramifications of a party's decision to "put all authority for the con-
duct of collective bargaining negotiations in the hands of a newly engaged attorney,
unskilled ... in labor matters").
512 See, e.g., Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 497 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing "alle-
gations of work-related misconduct which was potentially violative of both internal policy
and criminal law"); Seymour v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 202, 209 n.5 (5th Cir. 1982) (referring
to situations in which "there is a potential for criminal proceedings arising out of the incident
that gives rise to [an employee] grievance").
513 See generally U.S. Postal Serv., 288 N.L.R.B. 864, 866 (1988) (discussing the applica-
tion of Weingarten at an investigatory interview in which the employee reasonably believes
"that discipline or criminal charges could, or would, result from the interview") (emphasis
added); U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 141, 153 (1979) (referring to the extension of Wein-
garten "to interviews regarding alleged criminal acts").
5, There is considerable authority for the proposition that "[e]mployees have no statutorily
protected right to be represented by outside counsel in investigative or disciplinary inter-
views requested by their employer." Sentry Investigation Corp., 249 N.L.R.B. 926, 936 n.20
(1980); see also Garcia v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1180 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting
that a bargaining unit employee has "no right to be represented by his own counsel at any
step of the grievance process"); McLean Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. 459, 472 (1982)
("[Employees have no statutorily protected right to be represented at investigatory and/or
disciplinary interviews by their private counsel from the outside."). However, an employee
under investigation may have a "contractual right to consult an attorney and/or a Union
representative." Cerrone v. Cahill, 84 F. Supp. 2d 330, 334 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis
added), vacated and remanded sub nom. Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194 (2d Cir. 2001).
515 See, e.g., Driebel v. City of Milwaukee, 298 F.3d 622, 648 (7th Cit. 2002) (describing an
employee who upon being "advised he was under a criminal investigation" made a "request
to contact a union representative"); United States v. Doxen, No. S77 Cr. 801, 1978 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19030, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1978) ("[T]he right to make a phone call is usually
[Vol. 5:508
Winter 2004/05] UNION REPRESENTATION PRIVILEGE
While an attorney would likely be more familiar than a union representative with the
employee's rights under the criminal law, a union representative would likely be
more familiar with the employee's bargaining agreement rights regarding the ...
retention of his job, and the disciplinary and grievance-arbitration procedure. Fur-
thermore, the union representative costs the employee no money, the representative is
ordinarily . . .immediately available, and the employee is likely to have had some
firsthand opportunity to assess the representative's competence. On the other hand,
the employee would have to affirmatively seek out an attorney, might well have
difficulty finding one whose abilities he knew something about, and would probably
have to pay him.
5 16
While the wisdom of an employee's preference for union representation in
this situation may be debatable,5 17 there is no persuasive policy reason for dis-
couraging employees from choosing such representation.5 18 In fact, federal
labor relations law generally discourages any other choice of a representa-
tive, 5 9 as perhaps most notably reflected in the existence of Board authority
implicitly urging unions and employers to eliminate attorneys from the labor-
management relationship.
520
utilized by detainees to consult an attorney. In this case the defendant claims that he wished
to call his union delegate ... "); Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 755 N.E.2d 817, 819 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2001) (describing an employee who, upon being questioned by a police officer,
"demanded to see his ... Union representative").
516 U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 152; see also Dep't of Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco & Firearms, 24 F.L.R.A. 521, 532 (1986) ("[W]hile an attorney would be skilled in
criminal law, the union representative should be more conversant with contract and other
employment rights and relevant grievance or arbitration decisions - in short with the law of
the shop.").
517 See, e.g., Nat'l Treas. Employees Union v. FLRA, 721 F.2d 1402, 1406 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("[R]epresentation by attorneys, who are formally trained and certified in the practice of law,
is demonstrably different from representation by ... [union] stewards."); U.S. Postal Serv.,
241 N.L.R.B. at 152 (discussing the contention that "representation by a lay union steward
during a criminal investigation might disadvantage the employee").
518 See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. at 152 (noting that "the choice of whether to
be represented by a union steward, an attorney, both, or neither during an investigation is
normally confided to the employee and/or his bargaining representative"). See generally In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (refer-
ring to "society's interest in encouraging confidential communications between union mem-
bers and their representatives").
519 See, e.g., Johnson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 843 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Pa.)
("Federal law provides that unions are to be the exclusive bargaining representatives for
workers in union shops and, as such, disfavors attorney involvement in grievance resolu-
tion."), aff'd, 37 F.3d 1487 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, unlike a request for union representation,
"a request by an employee ... that his or her private attorney be present at an investigatory
and/or disciplinary interview is not protected concerted activity" under the NLRA. TCC
Ctrs. Cos., 275 N.L.R.B. 604, 609 (1985); see also McLean Hosp., 264 N.L.R.B. at 472
("Representation by private counsel is not tantamount to union representation within the rule
of Weingarten nor does representation of an employee by his private counsel constitute con-
certed activity within the purview of the Act ....").
520 See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 1223, 1225 & n.7 (1977) (Penello &
Walther, dissenting) ("It is time for the chief parties to sit down and say what can we do to
get lawyers out of our business?") (quoting former Secretary of Labor John Dunlop, Address
before the Chairman's Task Force on the National Labor Relations Board (July 12, 1976));
Current Problems of Arbitration, 35 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 963, 966 (1961) (noting that
former NLRB member William M. Leiserson "urged that lawyers be kept out of grievance
arbitration and collective bargaining"); cf. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 178 N.L.R.B. 351, 357
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Because a contrary result would run afoul of this apparent policy objective
by encouraging attorney involvement in labor relations matters, 521 an
employee's confidential communications with a union representative "should
not be given any less protection simplybecause the person with whom he com-
municates is a nonlawyer." '522 Rubinstein and other commentators therefore
advocate the recognition of a broad union representation privilege,5 23 compara-
ble to the attorney-client privilege,524 that would apply not only in unfair labor
practice proceedings,5 25 but also in criminal and civil proceedings as a means
of assuring effective union representation "in any context. "526
& n.9 (1969) (asserting that "many labor lawyers tend to prefer to try lawsuits than to find
peaceful solutions," which may enable them to "eat higher on the hog" but "does not other-
wise lead to good labor relations") (internal quotation marks omitted).
521 See, e.g., McPherson v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 670, 672 (1983) (describing an
employee pursuing a grievance who "retained non-Union counsel because of the possibility
that any statements [he] made.., to Union representatives could be used against him in [a]
pending criminal investigation"); Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 338 ("[A]n
[employee] who wishes to ensure that anything he says relating to a criminal matter is
shielded by [a] privilege should wait to discuss the particulars with... counsel ...."); cf.
Stevens, supra note 498, at 262 ("[P]ersons selecting a nonlawyer representative may be at a
disadvantage in relation to [a] party who is represented by an attorney and, therefore, enjoys
a privilege of confidentiality.").
522 Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 600; see also Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300, 1307
(1991) (acknowledging that there may be "no justification whatsoever for applying a [less
protective] standard to communications with union representatives than to communications
with attorneys"); Montebello Rose Co. v. Agric. Labor Relations Bd., 173 Cal. Rptr. 856,
873 (Ct. App. 1981) (discussing the "unfair[ness]" of "reward[ing] those ... able to hire
attorneys as their negotiators because their communications concerning pending negotiations
would be protected, whereas [similar] communications . . . with lay negotiators would not
receive protection").
523 See, e.g., Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 601 ("A labor union privilege ... advances the
public policy of this country, which, through its labor laws, recognizes that employees have
the right to organize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing."); Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 521 (asserting that "the labor official privilege
should assume the effect of a common law privilege across the board").
524 See Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 600 ("The... analogy to the attorney-client privilege
is a good one. The attorney-client privilege, like the labor union privilege, serves a vital
public purpose ... by 'encouraging full and frank communication ....') (quoting Upjohn
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); cf. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd. v. Homer
Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 208, 547 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Ill. 1989) ("Protecting these types
of communications .. . from disclosure is not unlike the protection afforded by the attorney
work-product privilege.").
525 See Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602 ("[T]he recognition of a privilege outside the
context of administrative unfair labor practice ...proceedings[ ] is necessary."). There
appears to be little dispute over the ability of the NLRB and the FLRA to recognize the
privilege for purposes of their own administrative proceedings. See generally In re USLIFE
Credit Corp. 91 F.T.C. 984, 1037 (1978) ("It is well-settled that, subject to applicable stat-
utes and constitutional privileges, independent agencies need not apply any particular evi-
dentiary rules or procedures, and courts are not free to impose on agency proceedings the
rules and privileges developed in the exercise of their supervisory power over federal court
trials.").
526 THR Am., Inc. v. NSK, Ltd., 917 F. Supp. 563, 567 (N.D. Iil. 1996) (characterizing the
analogous attorney-client privilege); see, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 291 F.3d 127, 142
n.10 (2d Cir. 2002) (referring to "the efforts of [an employee's] union representative to help
him with the criminal case against him").
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c. Recognition of the Privilege Would Accommodate the
Employee's Limited Role in Choosing a Representative
Rubinstein's arguments for recognizing a union representation privilege
are bolstered by the fact that once an employee bargaining unit designates a
union as its exclusive statutory representative,527 individual members of the
bargaining unit must look to the union for the protection of their rights and
interests. 528 Thus, although employees theoretically have the right, "acting
through their union, .. to select their representatives for the processing of
",529thgrievances and discussion of workplace matters, it is actually the union that
ultimately decides who will represent an employee, or group of employees,
during collective bargaining negotiations530 and in connection with grievance
processing and other matters pertaining to their employment.5 3 1
527 The designation of employee bargaining representatives is ordinarily accomplished
through representation elections. See United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d
1054, 1067 (3d Cir. 1980) ("The [Supreme] Court has noted the 'acknowledged superiority
of the election process' as a method for selecting a majority representative of employees.")
(quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969)). For the author's previous
discussion of the NLRB election process, see Michael D. Moberly, Corrections Before Rep-
resentation Elections: Restoring "Laboratory Conditions" By Repudiating Unfair Labor
Practices, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 375, 380-85 (2002).
528 See Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. NLRB, 595 F.2d 808, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[T]he
Act grants to the majority representative power to act as the exclusive bargaining agent for
all the employees in the bargaining unit. Individual employees have no separate negotiating
rights; they must look exclusively to the union for protection of their interests.") (footnotes
omitted); Crenshaw v. Allied Chem. Corp., 387 F. Supp. 594, 599 (E.D. Va. 1975)
("[C]ollective action ... necessarily involves extinguishing many of the... rights belonging
to union members and, instead, vesting the power to act on their behalf with their chosen
representative, the union."); Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1148 (2000)
(Fox, dissenting) (noting that the Act "require[es] the employer and the employees them-
selves to look exclusively to the union to represent the employees' interests") (emphasis
added).
529 Missouri Portland Cement Co., 284 N.L.R.B. 432, 433 (1987).
-53 See Meter v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 273 F. Supp. 659, 667 (D. Minn. 1967)
("[U]nions may select union members, or union officers, or lawyers, or outside laymen, or
anyone to represent them at the bargaining table .... "), rev'd on other grounds, 385 F.2d
265 (8th Cir. 1967); Butcher Boy Refrigerator Door Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 1360, 1377 (1960)
(referring to "the Union's right to designate its representatives at the bargaining table");
Alcan-Toyo Am., 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 566, 574 (1993) (Draznin, Arb.) ("In a union
shop, whatever individual employees may say on an individual basis, the Union bargaining
committee is... the only entity that can [speak for] the employees in the bargaining unit.").
-51 See Castelli v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 752 F.2d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1985) (Ferguson, J.,
concurring) (noting that the union generally has the authority to decide "whether a lawyer or
a nonlawyer representative of the union should represent an employee at a particular pro-
ceeding"); Lehigh Portland Cement Co., 287 N.L.R.B. 978, 984 (1988) (discussing "a
union's right to designate its own representatives for purposes of grievance processing");
Fed. Prison Sys., Fed. Corr. Inst., 25 F.L.R.A. 210, 231 (1987) ("It is the union which
designates its representative under [the FSLMRS], not the employee subject to the examina-
tion, although the employee must, inter alia, request representation."); Pac. Gas. & Elec.
Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 1143, 1143 (1981):
The Supreme Court in Weingarten neither stated nor suggested that an employee's interests can
only be safeguarded by the presence of a specific representative sought by the employee. To the
contrary, the focus of the decision is on the employee's right to the presence of a union represen-
tative designated by the union to represent all employees.
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In many instances, the representative chosen by a union will not be an
attorney. 532 As a practical matter,5 33 an employee dissatisfied with that deci-
sion is powerless to compel a different choice. 534 The fact that an employee
who would prefer to be represented by an attorney may be compelled to accept
the union's choice of a nonlawyer representative 535 - thereby effectively
"waiving" the attorney-client privilege536 - provides an additional compelling
532 See Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1258 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the handling
of labor grievances "often is performed by a union's business agents or representatives");
Johnson v. United Steelworkers of Am., 843 F. Supp. 944, 947 (M.D. Pa.) ("It is common
and, indeed, preferable for union representatives to conduct arbitrations."), affd, 37 F.3d
1487 (3d Cir. 1994); Mullen v. Bevona, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2856, 2859 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("[It is not uncommon ... for unions to send non-attorneys to represent their members in
hearings."); Edgar L. Warren & Irving Bernstein, A Profile of Labor Arbitration, 16 Lab.
Arb. Rep. (BNA) 970, 981 (1951) ("Generally speaking, where.., labor unions have in their
own ranks representatives who are sufficiently articulate the use of attorneys ...is not
desirable.").
133 The Board has noted that "[u]nit employees, if dissatisfied with the Union's performance
.... may petition for an election to oust it as their collective-bargaining representative."
Henry Bierce Co., 328 N.L.R.B. 646, 650 (1999), afJd, 234 F.3d 1268 (6th Cir. 2000).
However, "the difficulty of decertifying a union once it [has been] certified," Action Auto
Stores, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 875, 905 (1990), makes decertification an inherently unsatisfac-
tory remedy for a union's decision to provide nonlawyer representation to an individual
employee, who "has an immediate stake in the outcome of the disciplinary process [because]
it is his job security which may be jeopardized in any confrontation with management."
Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931, 933 (1980) (emphasis added).
531 See, e.g., At. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 820 n.14 (1979) (noting that an employee
"requested permission of the Union to permit his own personal attorney to appear at [an]
arbitration and that the Union denied him such permission"); see also Castelli, 752 F.2d at
1483 ("[N]o court has adopted the rule that [unionized] employees are entitled to indepen-
dently retained counsel in arbitration proceedings ...."); Consol. Casinos Corp., 266
N.L.R.B. 988, 1008 (1983) (rejecting the contention that "an employee may request the
presence of any person, including his personal lawyer, and thus invoke Weingarten rights");
Fed. Prison Sys., 25 F.L.R.A. at 231 ("[The FSLMRS] accords the employee subject to the
examination no right to have his own representative present at his examination, be he an
attorney or non-attorney.").
535 See, e.g., Lettis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 39 F. Supp. 2d 181, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) ("A
grievant has no right to a private attorney, or to require a union to utilize a lawyer, at an
arbitration."); Shufford v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 355, 954 F. Supp. 1080, 1091-92
(D. Md. 1996) ("A union has the right to be the sole representative of its members, and it can
refuse to include private counsel in its handling of a grievance if it chooses."); Handley v.
Phillips, 715 F. Supp. 657, 667 n.6 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("The union need not have an attorney at
[an] arbitration hearing nor permit the grievant to bring an attorney to participate in the
hearing.").
536 As a general proposition, "the attorney-client privilege is personal to the client and may
only be waived by the client." Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112,
115 (D. Colo. 1992). However, in the collective bargaining context the attorney's principal
client is the union, rather than the individual employee. See Peterson, 771 F.2d at 1258;
Best v. Rome, 858 F. Supp. 271, 276 (D. Mass. 1994), affd, 47 F.3d 1156 (1st Cir. 1995).
In any event, the NLRA "contemplates that individual rights may be waived by the union so
long as the union does not breach its duty of good-faith representation." Metro. Edison Co.
v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 706-07 n.Il (1983). A union's decision to have a union representa-
tive rather than an attorney represent an employee does not constitute such a breach. See
Vance v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 932 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Ind. 1996).
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argument for extending a comparable privilege to confidential communications
between employees and their union representatives.
537
B. The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Union Representation Privilege
Neither Rubinstein nor any other commentator has indicated precisely
what form an administratively and judicially recognized union representation
privilege should take.5 3 However, delineating the full scope of the privilege is
not a prerequisite to its recognition. 53 9 As one federal appellate court has
observed: "Just as the recognition of privileges must be undertaken on a case-
by-case basis, so too must the scope of the privilege be considered."'"
Indeed, under the common law approach prevailing in the federal
courts,54 all evidentiary privileges, including the analogous attorney-client
privilege, 54 2 are in a constant state of evolution.543 Thus, at any given time, the
precise contours of the union representation privilege, or any other evidentiary
537 See Gruwell Anderson, supra note 17, at 518 ("[L]abor officials who are not lawyers
carry out much of the union's labor-management relationship, including day-to-day rela-
tions, arbitrations, negotiations, and mediations .... [Tihe labor official privilege[ ] recog-
nizes this reality.") (footnotes omitted); cf John Labatt Ltd. v. Molson Breweries, 898 F.
Supp. 471, 476 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("[Where Congress allows non-attorneys to practice...
before federal agencies, a commensurate . . . privilege arises over communications with
clients necessary to practice in the areas authorized.").
538 Rubinstein did assert that the privilege should be sufficiently broad to protect "all confi-
dential communications concerning union matters and strategies between union officers and
union members." Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 602; cf. State Employment Relations Bd. v.
Rudolph, 5 OPER (LRP) 5706, at 8 (1988) ("[O]nly confidential communications between
the employee and the union representative would be subject to being privileged, as persons
claiming the privilege are not entirely disqualified as witnesses.").
531 See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (asserting that "it is neither necessary nor
feasible to delineate [the] full contours" of an evidentiary privilege in "the first case in which
[it is] recognized"); In re Grand Jury, 821 F.2d 946, 955 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating that "a court
must first decide whether a... privilege exists or should exist before deciding how to apply
it to a particular case.").
540 In re Zuniga, 714 F.2d 632, 639 (6th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Hansen, 955
F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mont. 1997) (noting that the "precise contours" of a particular
evidentiary privilege are to be "developed in specific cases.").
541 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 34 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 1994)
("The Federal Rules of Evidence specifically provide that common law governs privileges
recognized by federal courts.") (citing FED. R. EvID. 501); In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing,
144 F.R.D. 111, 113 (D. Or. 1992) ("The federal common law of privileges governs in
federal question cases.").
542 See Whitehouse v. United States Dist. Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1358 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[T]he
common law of attorney-client privilege is still evolving .. "); State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66,
80 n.14 (Haw. 1997) ("[T]he federal construct of the attorney-client privilege derives from
the ever-evolving 'common law."'); People v. Soma, 276 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981) ("[T]he common-law attorney-client privilege is not immune from development by
case law .... ").
513 See In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 621 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("Changing circum-
stances require courts constantly to review the need for and extent of existing privileges.");
L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (referring to
the courts' "moulding [of] federal privileges under the common law development approach")
(quoting 10 JAMES WM. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 501.08 (2d ed. 1976)).
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privilege, may be unclear. 5 In addition, to the extent that recognition of the
privilege is treated as a matter of state rather than federal law545 (as occurred in
both In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated January 20, 1995546 and City of New-
burgh v. Newman), 54 7 the parameters of the privilege may vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction.5 48
Nevertheless, some understanding of the general contours of the privilege
is essential to any practical ability of employees and their union representatives
to rely upon it.54 9 In this regard, it is clear that even the broad privilege
favored by Rubinstein and other commentators would not be an absolute
one. 550 For example, even the more established and venerable attorney-client
privilege,55 upon which the development of the union representation privilege
54 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 1990) ("The
[clergy-communicant] privilege is a common law rule. The precise scope of the privilege
and its additional facets ... are, therefore, most suitably left to case-by-case evolution.");
Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1345 (D.N.M. 1998) ("[T]he nature and
scope of the self-critical analysis privilege is [sic] undefined."); Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co.,
891 F. Supp. 607, 611 (N.D. Ga. 1995) ("[T]he law of peer review privilege has not ceased
evolving.").
545 See generally Warner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1347, 1351 n.6 (8th Cir. 1984)
("[Pirivileges may be matters of state law."); Farley v. Farley, 952 F. Supp. 1232, 1236
(M.D. Tenn. 1997) ("[S]tate privileges and the policies underlying them may not be ignored
in applying Rule 501 to discovery disputes arising in federal question cases."); Rubinstein,
supra note 18, at 600 ("In some labor law situations ... state law is more highly developed
than federal law in the private sector, and astute litigators may look to state law.").
546 995 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). Specifically, the Grand Jury Subpoenas court dis-
cussed state legislative efforts "to codify some form of union privilege in New York." Id. at
335-36.
547 421 N.Y.S.2d 673 (App. Div. 1979).
548 See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Mower, 219 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Evidentiary
privileges [that] are the subject of state law ... vary by jurisdiction."); Mason Ladd, Privi-
leges, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORuD. 555, 590 n.83 (asserting that "state created privilege[s]" are
"as varied as there are states").
141 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("[If the purpose of [a]
privilege is to be served, the [parties] must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which pur-
ports to be certain, but results in widely varying application by the courts, is little better than
no privilege at all."); United States v. D.F., 857 F. Supp. 1311, 1320 n.20 (E.D. Wis. 1994)
(noting that individuals "are not as likely to rely on the existence of a ... privilege when its
application and scope varies from case to case"), aff'd, 63 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995), vacated
and remanded, 517 U.S. 1231 (1996).
550 Rubinstein himself acknowledges that the privilege is "not absolute." Rubinstein, supra
not 18, at 599; see also Customs Serv., 38 F.L.R.A. 1300, 1307 (1991) (discussing a union's
acknowledgment that the privilege "is not absolute"). See generally In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena (Psychological Treatment Records), 710 F. Supp. 999, 1013 (D.N.J.) ("Privileges judi-
cially created under Rule 501 are not absolute but remain capable of being overcome in the
context of specific cases in which their justifications are not implicated."), aff'd, 879 F.2d
857 (3d Cir. 1989).
551 The attorney-client privilege has been described as the "most venerated of the common
law privileges of confidential communications." United States v. Edwards, 303 F.3d 606,
618 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Bauer, 132 F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1997)
("[T]he attorney-client privilege is, perhaps, the most sacred of all legally recognized privi-
leges ... .").
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is likely to be patterned,55 2 does not apply when an individual communicates
with an attorney "for the purpose of committing a crime or perpetrating a fraud
in the future (as opposed to referring to prior wrongdoing)." '55 3
In particular, where a communication is made for the purpose of commit-
ting a crime or fraud, the Board holds that an exception to the privilege applies
"to permit the disclosure of the otherwise privileged [evidence]., 554 The courts
have uniformly reached the same conclusion.55 5 As one jurist has observed:
[N]o privilege is absolute. Even the attorney-client privilege - one of the oldest
privileges of confidentiality known to the common law, often described as essential
to the functioning of the adversary system - is inapplicable where a client seeks or
obtains the services of an attorney in furtherance of criminal or fraudulent
activities.
556
Although this "crime-fraud exception" 557 may not apply to all evidentiary
552 The substantial body of existing case law interpreting and applying the attorney-client
privilege sets that privilege apart from other evidentiary privileges, see Yaron v. Yaron, 372
N.Y.S.2d 518, 522 (Sup. Ct. 1975), and frequently provides courts with guidance in develop-
ing less established privileges. See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Baird, Kurtz & Dobson LLP, 305
F.3d 813, 816 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that the court's interpretation of the accountant-client
privilege was "guided by cases construing the attorney-client privilege"); Ravary v. Reed,
415 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (construing the scope of a private detective-
client privilege "by analogy to the attorney-client privilege").
553 Patrick Cudahy, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 968, 969-70 (1988); cf. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (M.D.N.C. 1996) ("Even the attorney-client privi-
lege.., gives way in the face of communications made for the purpose of furthering a crime
or a fraud.").
554 Patrick Cudahy, 288 N.L.R.B at 970; see also BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc., 337
N.L.R.B 887, 895, 2002 NLRB LEXIS 377, at *46 (July 29, 2002) (describing the crime-
fraud exception as one of the "most obvious exceptions" to the attorney-client privilege).
556 D.C. v. S.A., 670 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Il. App. Ct. 1996) (Lytton, J., dissenting), rev'd
and remanded, 687 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 1997).
551 See United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292-93 (5th Cir. 1986):
Once the party seeking disclosure makes a prima facie case that the attorney-client relationship
was used to promote an intended criminal activity, the confidences within the relationship are no
longer shielded. These precepts have ... been applied consistently and have come to be known
as the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
556 D.C. v. S.A., 670 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (Lytton, J., dissenting), rev'd
and remanded, 687 N.E.2d 1032 (Ill. 1997).
55' Despite its widespread recognition, the exception is not without detractors. See, e.g,
Zacharias, supra note 241, at 104 (referring to the courts' "strained justifications for the
exception"). Critics contend that its application may deny protection to, and thus discour-
age, attorney-client communications precisely when they are likely to be most socially bene-
ficial - "where a client seeks counsel's advice to determine the legality of conduct before the
client takes any action." United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1989). As
one court has explained:
Broadening the exception ... might lead, at least initially, to greater disclosure (more evidence
with which to get at the truth), but in the long run surely the effect would be to discourage clients
from attempting to conform their conduct to legal requirements and to discourage lawyers from
seeking information from clients in order to advise them effectively.
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 748 P.2d 283, 291 (Wyo.
1987) (quoting 2 DAVID W. LoUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 213, at 823-24 (rev. ed. 1985)).
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privileges, 55 8 there is no persuasive reason for refusing to extend it to the union
representation privilege. 55 9 In fact, the FLRA effectively applied the exception
to the representation privilege in United States Department of Treasury, United
States Customs Service, Customs Management Center ("Customs Management
Center").56 °
In that case, an employer questioned one of its employees, under threat of
discipline and criminal prosecution, concerning an allegation that his union rep-
resentative instructed him to lie during the employer's investigation of the
employee's alleged misconduct. 6 1 When the employee indicated that the
union representative had given him no such instruction,562 the employer elected
not to investigate the allegation further.56 3 The union nevertheless filed an
unfair labor practice charge with the FLRA,56 4 and the FLRA's General Coun-
sel subsequently issued a complaint based on that charge alleging that the
employer acted unlawfully in questioning its employee about his privileged
communications with a union representative. 65
The FLRA began its analysis by noting that communications between
employees and their union representatives are ordinarily privileged,56 6 and that
absent a waiver of the privilege an employer may question an employee about
558 Compare In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir.
1999) ("We hold that the crime-fraud exception applies to the psychotherapist-patient privi-
lege."), and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[G]enerally
the crime-fraud exception applies to the work product as well as to the attorney-client privi-
lege .... "), with United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1448 (10th Cir. 1984) (Logan, J.,
concurring) ("I would not adopt a crime-fraud exception to the privilege for confidential
marital communications .... "), and State v. Wilson, 26 P.3d 1161, 1166 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001) (declining to recognize "any 'crime-fraud exception' to the physician-patient
privilege").
59 Although the exception "grew up in the shadow of the attorney-client privilege," Grand
Jury Proceedings (Gregory P. Violette), 183 F.3d at 75, it "has been interpreted... to apply
to other privileges." Smith v. United States, 193 F.R.D. 201, 209 (D. Del. 2000); see, e.g.,
Multinational Force & Observers v. Arrow Air, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 162, 163 (S.D. Fla. 1987)
(applying the exception to the accountant-client privilege by "[dirawing [on] crime-fraud
cases involving an attorney-client privilege for analogy").
560 57 F.L.R.A. 319 (2001).
561 See id. at 320 (observing that the employee "was advised that he could be subject to
disciplinary action for failure or refusal to answer proper questions and subject to criminal
prosecution for any false answer").
562 See id. (describing the employee's assertion "that he was never instructed to lie about
what he was going to say or what he was going to put on paper").
563 See id. at 325 (noting that the employer's investigator "ended this line of questioning
immediately on being told by the employee that there had been no instruction to provide
false information").
564 See id. at 326.
565 In particular, the General Counsel contended that the employer interfered with "privi-
leged communications made in the context of official union business between a bargaining
unit employee and a Union representative," without demonstrating the "overriding need that
would warrant investigation into the privileged communications" under existing FLRA pre-
cedent. Id. at 324 (citing Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. 1021, 1037 (1992)).
566 See id. ("Confidential communication between a union representative and an employee
made during the course of representation constitutes protected activity under [the
FSLMRS].") (citing Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. at 1037-38).
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such communications only if it can demonstrate an overriding need to do SO. 5 6 7
However, the FLRA concluded that the employer's interest in investigating the
union representative's alleged misconduct5 68 was sufficient to overcome the
right of the employee and the union representative to keep their communica-
tions confidential.56 9
In reaching this conclusion, the FLRA noted its general agreement with
the administrative law judge's analysis, 570 and particularly with his assertion
that a union representative "may not aid and assist an employee to engage in
conduct that the representative knows is criminal or fraudulent."57 In particu-
lar, the administrative law judge characterized the union representative's
alleged instruction to the employee as fraudulent 572 and a potential violation of
federal criminal law,573 and held that such communications are not protected
by the privilege:
The general social benefit of providing for confidential communications between a
union representative and an employee so that the employee may have adequate
advice and a proper defense cannot be assumed where the purpose is to enable or aid
the employee to commit a crime or fraud .... If a union representative knowingly
aided and assisted an employee in the preparation and presentation of an official
response to an [employer] containing fraudulent or false statements regarding a mate-
rial matter .... such action would ... not [be] protected activity .... 574
567 See id. (citing Long Beach Naval Shipyard, 44 F.L.R.A. at 1038; and Customs Serv.,, 38
F.L.R.A. 1300, 1309 (1991)).
568 The administrative law judge noted that "the allegation that [the union representative]
had instructed the employee to lie . . .if true, would be considered by the [employer] to
constitute misconduct on [the union representative's] part." Id. at 320.
569 See id. at 324-25:
[T]he [employer was] justified in attempting to verify the... [alleged] instruction by the Union
[representative] to falsify an official investigation. This is a serious allegation, and the record
does not reveal any way that the [employer] could have determined whether a formal investiga-
tion was warranted without questioning the employee ... engaged in protected activity....
Under these circumstances, the [employer has] established a need for [its] very limited investiga-
tion sufficient to override the right of the employee to keep the conversation confidential.
(Footnotes omitted.)
570 See id. at 320 ("Upon consideration of the Judge's decision and the entire record, we
adopt the Judge's findings and conclusions as modified .. "); id. at 324 ("We conclude that
the Judge did not err in finding that [the employer] established a sufficient need to justify the
... questions asked by the [investigator].").
571 Id. at 323; see also Gazette Pbl'g Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1694, 1726 (1952) ("[A]cts of fraud
... cannot be said to be protected concerted activities."); W.T. Rawleigh Co., 90 N.L.R.B.
1924, 1968 (1950) (characterizing "a violation of criminal law" as "unprotected").
572 See Customs Mgmt. Ctr., 57 F.L.R.A. at 330 (indicating that the union representative
was alleged to have "aided and assisted [the] employee in the preparation and presentation of
... fraudulent or false statements").
173 The judge indicated that the allegations against the union representative involved "prob-
able violations of Federal law" prohibiting conspiracies to defraud federal agencies, and the
making of "false statements" in connection with federal agency investigations. Id. (citing 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001 (2000)).
574 Id.; cf. Climax Molybdenum Co., 227 N.L.R.B 1189, 1198-99 (1977) (asserting that the
right to union representation at an investigatory interview "should not be used by the Union
to suppress the facts," and that "[s]uch conduct on the part of... a union representative is
not protected by the Act"), enforcement denied, 584 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1978).
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V. CONCLUSION
The traditional judicial hostility to evidentiary privileges 575 is gradually
abating in the face of societal pressure for the protection of additional relation-
ships and privacy interests from governmental intrusion.5 76 This phenomenon
was fueled in part by Congress' rejection of a restrictive approach to the recog-
nition of testimonial privileges when it enacted Rule 501.577 Thus, despite con-
tinued resistance on the part of many federal courts, 578 there has been a notable
increase in the number of judicially-recognized privileges in the nearly three
decades 579 since the rule was enacted.5 80
The judiciary's willingness to recognize new evidentiary privileges has
been particularly pronounced in cases involving professional relationships. 581
The relationship between employees and their union representatives at least
171 See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 430 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981) ("[T]here has been a
notable hostility on the part of the judiciary to recognizing new privileges .... "); In re
Parkway Manor Healthcare Ctr., 448 N.W.2d 116, 121 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing
"the longstanding judicial hostility towards evidentiary privileges").
576 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (discussing "increasing pressures for the creation of entirely new privileges ... and
the expansion of older privileges predicated upon expanding concepts of privacy."); cf. In re
Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298, 1324 (D. Nev. 1983) (characterizing an overly restrictive
approach to the recognition of new testimonial privileges as a view "unwelcome to the bar
and the general public.").
577 See Spencer Sav. Bank, SLA v. Excell Mortgage Corp., 960 F. Supp. 835, 838 (D.N.J.
1977) (suggesting that the perceived "need for federal courts to be cautious in recognizing a
new privilege" may be inconsistent with Rule 501, "which allows federal courts to be flexi-
ble in the development of rules governing privileges"); Agosto, 553 F. Supp. at 1324 ("Rule
501 ... declined to restrict testimonial privileges as they had developed up to that point. But
what is perhaps even more significant is the fact that Rule 501 recognized and arguable even
advocated the evolution of new testimonial privileges as they were deemed necessary by
courts in the future.")
578 See EEOC v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 995 F.2d 106, 107-08 (7th Cir. 1993)
(citing "recent decisions that have declined opportunities to create new evidentiary privi-
leges"); Spencer Say. Bank, 960 F. Supp. at 838 ("[F]ederal courts have rarely exercised
their authority under Rule 501 to expand common law testimonial privileges.").
579 Rule 501 was enacted on January 2, 1975, and became effective on July 1, 1975. See In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374, 377 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Kinoy v. Mitchell, 67
F.R.D. 1, 7 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
580 See, e.g., Dinnan, 661 F.2d at 429 (observing that "a number of new privileges have
been established recently"); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys. - W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597, 605
(S.D. Ohio 2002) ("[L]ower courts have not felt inhibited from recognizing new privileges
on an ad hoc basis in the absence of Supreme Court precedent."); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Sealed), 607 F. Supp. 1002, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (referring to "the trend of ... courts
in expanding testimonial privileges").
581 See In re Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1161 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997) (Mansmann, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (referring to "the more widely recognized professional testi-
monial privileges"); Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 721 F. Supp. 1397, 1408 n.5 (D. Mass. 1989)
("[A]n evidentiary privilege... is - or should be - a highly functional and strictly limited
device for advancing some particular professional role ...."); Marianne E. Scott, Parent-
Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family
Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. Rev. 901, 902 (1983) ("[I]n the past thirty years ... courts have
accepted new privileges protecting communications between laypersons and
professionals.").
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arguably falls within this category,58 2 and its similarity to the most rigorously
protected professional relationship 583 - that of attorney and client58 4 - makes it
a logical candidate for the protection of an evidentiary privilege.585 More
importantly, the recognition of such a privilege would further significant fed-
eral policies underlying the NLRA and the FSLMRS.5 s6
Nevertheless, only the NLRB, the FLRA and the New York state courts 8 7
have recognized any form of union representation privilege to date.58 8 The
582 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hayden Elec., Inc., 693 F.2d 1358, 1367 n.9 (11th Cir. 1982)
(describing a union representative as "a professional in the field of labor relations"); Kath-
leen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 10 F. Supp. 2d 460, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (referring to
"union representatives, and other professionals"); Graham v. Crow Wing County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 515 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing "[pirofessional union rep-
resentatives [who] represent ... employees in contract negotiations."). But cf. Cottrell v.
Candy Workers Union, Local 342, 630 F. Supp. 1081, 1085 n.1 (C.D. Ill. 1986) ("Union
officials are not professional advocates .... ").
583 See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 74 (1991) ("Others have likened the
relationship between union and employee to that between attorney and client.") (citing
Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 582 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)); Spyrnal v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co., 156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2474, 2476 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (asserting that an employee's
"consent to have union representatives act on his behalf' is "analogous to his hiring an
attorney"); Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 302 N.L.R.B. 1008, 1009 (1991) (noting that "the
legal relationship between a union and the employees it represents" has been "analogized to
... the relationship between attorney and client").
584 See United States v. Hurley, 728 F. Supp. 66, 67 (D. Mass. 1990) ("The attorney-client
privilege is the most fundamental of all legal relationships and any interference with or
disruption of that relationship should be exercised only under extraordinary circum-
stances."); cf. In re Impounded, 241 F.3d 308, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) (Nygaard, J., dissenting)
("American jurisprudence has long recognized the central importance of the attorney-client
relationship. The privilege is the most common means of protecting the relationship, but it is
not the only one.").
585 See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1198 (D.S.C. 1974)
("[T]he attomey-client and analogous relationships are 'recognized in law by privileges
against forced disclosure ....') (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 709 (1974)). See generally Jackson, 721 F. Supp. at 1408 n.5 (noting the "peri-
odic claims of various professional groups for recognition of an evidentiary privilege con-
cerning their professional communications and papers"); Coulter v. Rosenblum, 682 A.2d
838, 840 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (discussing "the crucial role that uninhibited speech, fostered
by privilege, plays in professional relationships.").
586 One federal court has noted that "the creation of entirely new privileges ... and the
expansion of older privileges" are essentially "policy issues," United States ex rel. Edney v.
Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), and "[c]onfidentiality is important to the
policies of the National Labor Relations Act." Int'l Union v. Garner, 102 F.R.D. 108, 114
(M.D. Tenn. 1984); see also Nat'l Tel. Directory Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 420, 421 (1995) ("The
confidentiality interests of employees have long been an overriding concern to the Board.").
587 A California trial court also recently concluded that there "should be a privilege as to
communications between a union officer and members." Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 150 (Ct. App. 2003). However, the California Court of Appeals
declined to recognize the privilege, noting that unlike the New York courts, courts in Cali-
fornia have the authority to recognize a new privilege "only if ... statutory language and
legislative history plainly demonstrate the Legislature's intent to create such a privilege."
Id. at 152.
588 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 39 F.3d 361, 368-69 & n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Jan. 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 336 & n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
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only federal courts to consider the issue have either rejected the privilege 589 or
declined to decide whether it should be recognized. 590 In many cases, employ-
ees aware of that fact5 91 will be hesitant to confide in their union representa-
tives.5 92 Thus, until the federal courts are also willing to recognize and enforce
the privilege,59 3 federal agency and state court decisions recognizing the privi-
lege may be of little practical significance,5 94 and the policies intended to be
served by the privilege will not be adequately fostered.595
589 See McCoy v. Southwest Airlines Co., 211 F.R.D. 381, 386 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 336-37; Walker v. Huie, 142 F.R.D. 497, 501 (D. Utah
1992). See generally Chemise Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 253 F. Supp. 999, 1001
(D.N.J. 1966) ("[T]he rule is simply that communication[s] between a client and an adminis-
trative practitioner who is not an attorney are not privileged.").
590 See, e.g., Dep't of Justice Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. FLRA, 939 F.2d 1170,
1175 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Amicus curiae .. . suggests that we address whether... [a] privilege
arises out of the employee-union representative relationship. Our decision makes it unneces-
sary to reach the issue, and we decline to do so."); see also Am. Airlines, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
153-54 (noting that "there are no cases where a court has ever found a union privilege" under
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (2000), a federal labor relations statute that
grants employees of common carriers "the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives").
591 Like other professionals, a union representative presumably "can be expected to inform
the other [party to the relationship] of the existence [or nonexistence] of the privilege." In re
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140, 1153 n.21 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting PROPOSED FED. R. EVID. 505
advisory committee's note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 246). In University of Michigan,
103 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 401, 401 (1994) (Daniel, Arb.), for example, a union representa-
tive "decided that [the employees he was representing] needed to be represented by legal
counsel at [an investigatory] meeting because any statements [they] made to an attorney
would be protected from disclosure in a criminal proceeding but not those that might have
been made to him as their union representative."
592 See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. FLRA, 266 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[A] union
representative might be called to testify at a [federal] trial .... And if the employee is
concerned about the possible testimony of the union representative, he [may] simply decide
not to ask for one."); cf Grand Jury Subpoenas, 995 F. Supp. at 338 ("[A]n [employee] who
wishes to ensure that anything he says relating to a criminal matter is shielded by [a] privi-
lege should ... not [assume] that any communications he has with a union representative are
somehow shielded from ... inquiry.").
593 The present prospects for such enforcement may be dim: "That the courts of a particular
state ... recognize a given privilege will not often of itself justify a federal court in applying
that privilege." Am. Civil Liberties Union of Miss. v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.
1981); cf. Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Only by forging
independent rules of privilege after taking into account the policy determinations of all of the
states can the federal courts develop a uniform federal law of privilege.") (emphasis added).
594 The Supreme Court itself has noted that "any... promise of confidentiality would have
little value if the [communicant] were aware that the privilege would not be honored in
federal court." Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 13 (1996); see also In re Int'l Horizons, Inc.,
689 F.2d 996, 1005 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that a state law privilege is unlikely "to foster
candor and confidential communications... if other courts refuse to follow the State's rules
of evidentiary privilege").
595 Indeed, one state court has asserted that "an uncertain privilege has the potential of
achieving the worst possible result: it could harm the truth seeking process without a corre-
sponding increase in candor." Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 879 (Ariz.
1993) (citing Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients: The Control Group
Test, 84 HARV. L. REV. 424, 434 (1970)).
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